Map of present-day Anatolia. Known ancient names are given in brackets.
Who were the Hittites?

In 1902 the Norwegian scholar J. A. Knudtzon announced to a sceptical world that he had discovered a new Indo-European language. It was to be found, he claimed, written in a cuneiform script on two clay tablets which had been discovered fifteen years earlier at El Amarna in Egypt among the diplomatic correspondence of the pharaohs Akhenaten (c. 1367–1351) and his father Amenophis III (c. 1405–1367). Since one of the tablets was addressed to the king of a hitherto unknown country called Arzawan, the language was named Arzawan. Knudtzon's suggestion of an Indo-European connection, though plausible, found little favour with his contemporaries, but it was known that a few fragments of tablets written in the same language had been found at Bogazköy in central Anatolia, and excavations begun there in 1906 soon brought to light an archive of thousands of tablets, many of which were written in 'Arzawan'. There was now ample material for a full linguistic study, the result of which, as announced by P. Hrozný in 1915, was a full confirmation of Knudtzon's claim. The language of the texts was indeed basically Indo-European, and so gave scholars their earliest surviving evidence for a member of that linguistic family.

Important as this discovery was for the philologists, for the historians it brought many problems. Central Anatolia was scarcely the place where they had expected to find early speakers of Indo-European, and they had to ask themselves firstly who these people were, and in the second place how and when they had got there. Fortunately, the first question was easily answered. The tablets themselves showed quite clearly that Bogazköy was ancient Hattusas, the capital of the land of Hatti and the seat of rulers who had, during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BC, been among the most important of the Middle Eastern world. Obviously the language of the tablets was that of the kings of Hatti. It was consequently re-christened 'Hittite', and the name 'Arzawan' was quietly forgotten.

Identifying the Hittites

But the solution to this problem raised other problems which demanded answers. It had in fact been suspected for some time that Bogazköy was the capital of the Hittites, but the grounds for this identification seemed to be contradicted by the new evidence. In 1879 A. H. Sayce had suggested that certain basalt blocks inscribed with a hieroglyphic script and found at Aleppo and Hanath in northern Syria were in fact the work of the Hittites, a people hitherto known only from references in the Bible and in the records of Egypt and Assyria. In 1880 Sayce further suggested that a number of rock carvings in south-east, central and western Asia Minor, some of which were associated with the same script as appeared on the Syrian blocks, were also of Hittite workmanship. By 1900 almost a hundred 'Hittite' inscribed monuments of this sort had been recorded. Among these was one which stood in a prominent position among the ruins of Bogazköy, and the natural conclusion was that the site was that of a large and important Hittite city. Consequently it was rather a shock to discover that Hittite records were written in a cuneiform script, for if 'Arzawan' was really Hittite, who wrote in the hieroglyphic script? The issue was complicated by the fact that although the basic decipherment of the cuneiform texts proved to be fairly simple, the hieroglyphic texts were a much more difficult matter. Still, patient work by several scholars succeeded in resolving a large number of their problems, and the
discovery of a long bilingual inscription in 1947 provided confirmation for much of their work and a great increase in the understanding of the script and language. 'Hieroglyphic Hittite' is also an Indo-European language. Most of the known texts can now be seen to date from a period after the fall of the Hittite kingdom, and are the work of south-east Anatolian and north Syrian monarchs who preserved the name and tradition of the old Hittite realm; but some texts go back to the hey-day of the Hittite Empire and are the work of known Hittite monarchs. Yet the language of these inscriptions, while fairly closely related to that of the cuneiform texts, is by no means identical with it. Clearly both languages existed side by side in the Hittite realm, with 'Hieroglyphic Hittite' gradually playing a larger part. It has been suggested that later Hittite monarchs were 'Hieroglyphic Hittites' who took over the kingdom of the 'cuneiform' Hittites, and it has even been maintained that latterly cuneiform Hittite was a dead language used only through the conservatism of royal scribes. However this may be (and there may well be some truth in it) it seems clear that the hieroglyphic script and language were introduced to the Hittite realm from some outside source at a period preceding the greatest days of the Hittite Empire, perhaps during the second half of the fifteenth century BC.

What was that outside source? 'Hieroglyphic Hittites' were already in use in Cilicia by about 1500 BC, as can be seen from the seal of a king of that area excavated at Tarsus. Another seal found at Beycesultan in south-western Anatolia and securely dated to the twentieth century BC bears signs which have been identified by some scholars as 'Hieroglyphic Hittite'. It has therefore been suggested that the home of this script, and of the people who spoke the language written in it, was the southern and south-western part of Asia Minor. The further identification of these peoples is unexpectedly aided by material from the archives of Bogazköy. As well as cuneiform Hittite, several other languages are used in these texts, and one of them is named as Luwian. The curious thing is that 'Hieroglyphic Hittite' is much more closely related to Luwian than it is to cuneiform Hittite, and the two seem in fact to be dialect variants of the same language. But we can go further than this. Luwian is presumably the language of the area known in the cuneiform texts as Luwiya, and Luwiya can be seen to be the earlier name of an area referred to in the Hittite imperial period as Arzawa. And so we reach the final position that the language originally known as Arzawan is in fact the language of the Hittites, while the language written in 'Hieroglyphic Hittite' is a dialect of the language of Arzawa.

What and where is Arzawa? A study of the Hittite archives serves to show that the group of states known to the Hittites by this name formed the principal power of western Anatolia, with their centre either in the Turkish 'Lake District', or, more probably, in what was later known as Lydia. The part that they had to play in Hittite history will be detailed in a later chapter. Here it is sufficient to say that it is increasingly clear that Arzawa was a powerful state with considerable influence in both Anatolian and international politics, and that if her records were to be
recovered they would tell us a great deal that we would like to know about both the Near Eastern and the Aegean worlds.

To return now to our original argument, it can be seen that between 1400 and 1200 BC large parts of Anatolia were controlled by speakers of Indo-European languages. The north-central area, centred on Hattusas, was the heartland of the Hittites, while the areas south and west of this were occupied by speakers of Luwian and the closely related dialect originally known as ‘Hieroglyphic Hittite’, but now usually called ‘Anatolian Hieroglyphic’ or ‘Hieroglyphic Luwian’. The history of these peoples has been reconstructed with a fair degree of detail from their surviving records, and so the first question raised above – the identity of those who wrote the texts – can be given a reasonably full answer.

Hittite origins

But the second question remains to be answered. The evidence for the original ‘homeland’ of the Indo-European languages seems to be overwhelmingly against a situation in Anatolia, and this means that speakers of an Indo-European language must have entered Anatolia at some time and from some other area. But from what area? And at what time? On the first point there is now fairly general agreement that the linguistic evidence points to an Indo-European ‘homeland’ somewhere in the area that stretches from the lower Danube along the north shore of the Black Sea to the northern foothills of the Caucasus. In that area it has plausibly been connected with the archaeological culture known as Kurgan, the bearers of which language must have been spoken in the north-west Anatolia during the Troy II period, and have reached there from south-eastern Europe at some time early in or before that period. But although both Troy II and Troy I were destroyed (c. 2500 and c. 2600 BC), there is no sign at either time of any intrusive cultural element from Europe. There is a similar lack of new elements at the beginning of Troy IV (c. 2900 BC) and even during the preceding Kumepe I/II period, which takes us back, and the only question is: How and when?] It has to be admitted, in fact, that the trail cannot at present be followed into south-eastern Europe, and that there are few obvious signs of any Kurgan penetration into north-western Anatolia. But the fortified settlement of Troy itself is comparable in site and defences to Kurgan hill-forts in the Balkans and possibly as far afield as Siberia, and one can perhaps see in a carved stone block found in secondary use in a middle Troy I context and bearing a strong resemblance to funerary stelae of a type which often marked Kurgan burials, an indication that such a movement was already by that time a thing of the past.

Once arrived in Anatolia, the newcomers’ progress can be roughly traced. At first they were content to build up the prosperity of the north-west along local lines, but by about 2500 BC they had reached as far inland as Tarsus, taking level XVIIa and introducing a culture of Troy I type. The destruction of Troy I, followed by that of Troy IIa, proved only a temporary set-back, and shortly after 2500 the Trojans were sufficiently secure and prosperous to take up trading with distant lands. Contact with Cilicia, presumably by sea, can be seen in

Archaeological evidence

In examining the archaeological evidence from Anatolia it is perhaps best to start in the south-west, where we have seen reason to suppose that there were Indo-European-speakers between 1400 and 1200 BC, with a possibility that they were already there by 2000 BC. Certainly between these two dates there is no sign of an archaeological break at Beycesultan, the principal excavated site for this area, and this helps to confirm the scanty linguistic evidence from the site. But a little earlier than this, at the end of the period known as Beycesultan XIII, there are considerable signs of destruction, and the following level, Beycesultan XII, shows clear signs of change. The new culture, which continued without interruption until the end of the Bronze Age, can be seen to be related in its origins to the culture of the second city of Troy, in north-west Anatolia. This Trojan culture has also many links with the Cilician culture known as EB III. These links have been variously interpreted. Troy II has been regarded as the ancestor of Cilician EB III, and the two have also been seen as being contemporaneous. On the whole, it seems more probable that is in fact an overlap between them. Cilician EB III has sufficient connection with cultures further east and south to establish a fairly accurate date for it, and it seems to have lasted from about 2400 to 2000 BC. This gives us a date of perhaps 2200 BC for the end of Troy II and, since there are elements of Troy I, II and III in Beycesultan XII, c. 2300 BC is a reasonable date for the introduction of the north-western culture to the south-west. If then we may claim that this culture was brought by speakers of an Indo-European language, then it is not possible to say that Troy III must have been spoken in north-west Anatolia during the Troy II period, and have reached there from south-eastern Europe at some time early in or before that period.

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the introduction of the potter's wheel to the north-west during phase 11B. About 2400 BC the attraction of Cilicia proved so strong that it was largely 'taken over' by north-west Anatolians (not just 'Trojans': the cultures are by no means identical), and Cilicia proved so much more convenient as a trading-centre that the north-west, as represented by Troy II d–g, began to lose its importance. Meanwhile Cilicia continued to prosper, and Cilician influence spread up through the Taurus passes and on to the southern and south-western parts of the plateau, where it can be seen in pottery shapes at Beycesultan (level XIII). But the people of Troy II, their overseas expansion thwarted, began to expand inland once more, and by 2300 BC they had reached and destroyed Beycesultan, and pushed on across the Konya Plain to the foot-hills of the Taurus. The over-all result of these conquests, however, was disastrous. Troy itself could not take advantage of them, for c. 2200 it was itself destroyed by fire, without apparently the involvement of any outside enemy. In the rest of western and southern Anatolia the over-all impression is that of a grave decline in material culture. While some areas recovered within two or three hundred years, others, like Lycia and Pisidia, seem to have had little settled occupation until the first millennium.

The invasion seems to have spent its strength before it reached Cilicia. In this area there is no change of culture until about 2000 BC, when an intrusive style of painted pottery, often linked with the arrival of the Hurrians, makes its appearance from northern Syria. But an unexpected echo of the Indo-European incursions is perhaps to be found in the legends of the Mesopotamian Dynasty of Akkad. Sargon, the principal monarch of this dynasty, is said in an admittedly late text to have made an expedition about 2300 BC in support of a colony of Mesopotamian merchants settled at Purushanda, and another text, also of later date, refers to the invasion of the Akkadian empire and the destruction of Purushanda by barbarous hordes about 2250 BC. Purushanda is almost certainly to be equated with the Purushatua, which is mentioned in later texts from Anatolia, and is most probably situated at Acemkoy (Acem Hüyük), south of the central Salt Lake. If then the legends have any historical value, they imply Akkadian influence through Cilicia and well up on to the central Anatolian plateau. If this is so, we can perhaps see the spread of Cilician influence in the same direction between 2400 and 2300, as mentioned above, taking place in conjunction with the spread of Akkadian merchant-colonies. The barbarous hordes of the later attacks could then be identified with the spread of Indo-European-speakers from the northwest reaching the Konya Plain by about 2250.

The north-central area

The foregoing scheme may perhaps account for the 'Luwianizing' of Anatolia south and west of a line drawn from the Bosphorus to the Gulf of Iskenderun. In north-central Anatolia the situation is even more complicated. In this area records in an Indo-European language go back to the earliest days of what we know as the Hittite Old Kingdom, about 1650 BC. Only the 'Anitta-text', which deals with the deeds of the kings of Kussara, refers to events earlier than this, and it may in fact be an Old Kingdom translation into Hittite. Even if it was originally written in Hittite at a time contemporary with the events it describes, this takes us back only to about 1700 BC. The period immediately preceding this, from about 1450 to 1750, is amply documented from the records of the Assyrian merchant-colonists. These records frequently contain names of native Anatolians, and for many years an intensive study has been made of these names with a view to tracing the languages spoken at the time. At first scholarly opinion was inclined to the view that only a few names with an Indo-European etymology were to be found, and that not one of these was unmistakably Hittite. This led to the suggestion that at the period known as Karum II (c. 1840–1800), to which most of the documents belong, the Hittites had not yet reached central Anatolia, and that the destruction of Karum II about 1850 was in fact an indication of their arrival. A line of destruction was traced from the Caucasus to central Anatolia at about the same time, and this was squared with the route taken by the Hittites from the south-Russian steppes. Against this reconstruction there are several objections. First, and most important, further study of the proper names in the Assyrian documents has shown that Indo-European names are much more numerous than was at first supposed, and that many, including a majority of the local rulers' names, can be regarded as 'proto-Hittite'. Second, many archaeologists deny any fundamental break in the archaeological record in Georgia and other areas through which the alleged Hittite invasions must have passed; and third, the linguistic relationship between Hittite and Luwian seems to be too close for one to suppose that they entered Anatolia by such
diverse routes. The destruction of Karum II cannot then be accepted as a sign of the arrival of the Hittites. On the contrary, they seem by that time to be already established in a powerful position, and the linguistic evidence can now be seen to agree with what the archaeologists have long been stressing, that central Anatolia in the colony-period is basically Hittite.

What is required then is evidence for a spread of influence to central Anatolia from the areas to the south and west at a period subsequent to the 'Luwianizing' of these areas, but before the colony-period. Archaeologically this spread is easy to observe. Hand-made 'depas' (p. 132) cups at Aliağa and Kültepe correspond to those of the so-called 'Trojan' phase in Cilicia; at Kültepe there are also wheel-made plates with the same connection, and grey bottles and other Syrian imports which are likewise common in Cilicia at this time. Other signs may also be observed. The beaked-spouted jug, a typically Hittite shape of vessel, is rare in central Anatolia before this period, and it may be suspected that it now appears through the influence of the contemporary culture of south-west Anatolia and Cilicia. Most significant of all is the plan of a large public building at Kültepe. This is in the form of a 'megaron' or hall-and-porch, a type of building which is foreign to central Anatolia but which has a long ancestry in the west. Whether it is to be identified as a temple or a palace, it serves to show that people with western connections had achieved positions of considerable power in the area. The dating of these influences can be roughly linked to the Cilician sequence, and the over-all impression is that this period in central Anatolian prehistory begins about 2350-2250 BC.

One important change in the central Anatolian ceramic repertory has not so far been mentioned. This is the sudden appearance of painted 'Cappadocian' pottery which gives a rather exotic touch to the predominantly plain tradition of the area. This painted pottery has often been regarded as a Hittite introduction, but it now seems clear that it was a local development from the simpler painted wares of the immediately preceding period. But the spread of Indo-European influence into central Anatolia can perhaps be seen in the fact that early 'Cappadocian' vessels have painted patterns which repeat the incised ornamentation of pottery found at Beycesultan in levels immediately succeeding the 'Luwian' invasion. Thus although the pottery itself is not a Hittite innovation, some features of its development may be linked with the arrival of speakers of an Indo-European language.

One item of linguistic information may also be added. It has been pointed out that the clearly Hittite words 'ishu' and 'ispant' occur in the records of the Assyrian merchants in connection with the place-names 'Luwazantiya, Nenassa and Ullamas.' This suggests that Hittite was spoken in and around these places contemporaneously with the merchant-colonies, and since all three are probably to be located south or south-west of Kültepe we have yet another indication of the direction from which the Indo-Europeanizing movement must have come.

What seems to emerge from all this is a largely peaceful spread of influence—and language—into central Anatolia from the south, and to a lesser extent from the west, shortly after these areas had themselves been 'Indo-Europeans' from the north-west. The Kültepe megaron shows that the new arrivals had already gained considerable influence there by about 2250, and by the period of the Assyrian merchant-colonies they formed a large proportion of the population, and were clearly even then largely absorbed into the native element. This is only to be expected from the linguistic evidence of the later Hittite texts, where an Indo-European structure is combined with a very large indigenous vocabulary, and from the organization of the Hitite state, which shows no sign of a class-system based on language differences. All this presupposes a long period of previous development with speakers of both Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages present in the population.

At the time of their arrival, the newcomers probably spoke a form of Indo-European that had yet to be differentiated into Hititie, Luwian and other dialects which we know from the later second millennium. For several hundred years Kanesh played the leading part in central Anatolian affairs, but shortly after 1800 the kings of Kussara, a town in the eastern periphery of the area, began to extend their influence westwards. Kanesh and other central towns were conquered, and eventually Kussara was able to take over the dominant position. A hundred years later, as we have seen in chapter 1, rulers in some way connected with Kussara set up their capital at Hattusas, and by this time their language is recognizably a slightly archaic form of Hittite. The script in which they wrote it is not the same as that of the earlier Assyrian colonists, and was presumably adopted by them from some area, as yet unidentified, to the south-east of Anatolia.

The picture that has emerged from the foregoing discussion is a fairly simple one, but it must be said at once that there are complications. The first of these is the fact that there are other signs of western influence on central Anatolia at a slightly later period than the
one described above. About 2000 BC, a wheel-made monochrome ware makes its appearance at Kanesh and other central Anatolian sites, and the ancestry of this pottery seems on the evidence of surface surveys to lie in north-west Anatolia, and particularly in the Tavşanlı-Kütahya region. The interesting point about it is that it is to be found in the earliest levels of occupation at Bogazköy, a fact which suggests that the original settlement at this site was made by north-westerners who were presumably Indo-European, but not Hittite, in speech. 12 This drive from the north-west may have been the occasion of the establishment of Palai, another Indo-European dialect known from the Bogazköy records, in the vicinity of Kastamonu, towards the Black Sea coast north-east of Ani, an area in which it was probably spoken in the second half of the second millennium. No linguistic features in the Hittite texts from the Bogazköy archives can yet be ascribed to this wave of western influence. It has in fact been claimed that the movement shows the arrival of the Hittites themselves in central Anatolia, but on the whole it seems to be too late and from the wrong direction to satisfy all the evidence.

The Hattians

Another problem which should be mentioned here is that of the predecessors of the Hittites in central Anatolia. The Bogazköy archives contain texts which are described as being in 'Hattic', a language of a completely different structure from Indo-European, and it is usually supposed that the speakers of Hattic were the inhabitants of the land of Hatti before the arrival of the Indo-European-speaking immigrants. If so, then they presumably to be equated with the people of the EII or 'copper-age' period which immediately preceded the influences described above. This period is well known from Kültepe, Alacahöyük, Alaca and elsewhere, and its most spectacular surviving remains are the 'royal' tombs at Alaca, with their famous 'standards' and other metalwork. But although the ordinary people of the royal tomb period may have spoken Hattic, it is by no means certain that the monarchs who occupied the tombs did so as well. Slightly later tombs with similar metalwork have been discovered at sites which are closer to the Black Sea coast than Alaca, and it has been suggested that the Alaca tombs show the temporary extension of a northern culture into central Anatolia. Excavations in the northern area are now revealing a good deal more about this northern culture, and it can be seen that its metalwork is in many ways related to that found at Minoan and Tsaritsa in the basin of the Kuban, north of the Caucasus. This Russian culture has reasonably been ascribed to Kurgan peoples who had recently come under the influence of higher cultures south of the Caucasus. If so, the occupants of the Alaca tombs, which show many Kurgan features, may well also have been Kurgan people, speaking an Indo-European language. But there is no sign of any spread of this Kurgan culture further south into Anatolia, and so it cannot be linked with the spread of Hittite, to say nothing of Palai and Luwian. The language of the rulers who were buried in the Alaca tombs, although probably Indo-European, was almost certainly not proto-Hittite.

All of this, of course, brings us no nearer to identifying the Hattians. They may have been the peoples of central Anatolia who were temporarily subject to the kings buried at Alaca, and whose remains can also be seen at Alacahöyük and Kültepe, but it has even been suggested that they followed the Hittites from south-east Europe into Anatolia rather than preceding them in the central area. 13 It is also worth mentioning that in the records of the Assyrian merchant-colonies the 'Land of Hatti', whose native language one must assume was originally Hittic, may not have been centred on Hattusas/Bogazköy, but have been a good deal further to the east, in the area around modern Divriği. The question 'who were the Hattians?' must at present be left open.

Early Greeks in Anatolia

No discussion of the linguistic background to Hittite Anatolia can be complete without some mention of the suggestion that another important group of Indo-European-speakers was to be found there in the late third and throughout the second millennium BC. At the beginning of that period, it has been maintained, speakers of an early form of what was to be known as Greek entered the north-western area, and while the majority of their descendants later moved on to Greece, some at least remained in Anatolia and were still in occupation of the north-west during the period of Hittite domination of central Anatolia. If this theory is accepted, it has wide implications, for it not only raises the possibility of Hittite-Greek contacts in the area of the Troad; it also makes it possible to suggest that the Trojan War of Greek legend (traditionally dated to 1200 BC) was not a conflict between the alien worlds of Greece and Asia, but that, since the inhabitants of Troy at the time were in fact linguistically Greek, it was rather an inter-state conflict within the orbit of the Greek world of the time. This would certainly make it easier to understand why Troy plays such a large part in Greek tradition, and would suggest that the large number of personal contacts between Greeks and Trojans mentioned in the Homeric poems, and the ease with which opponents communicated with each other as they fought or parleyed, was something more than an elaborate poetic fiction.

In order to assess this theory it is necessary to turn for a moment to the possible origins of Greek. It has long been commonly accepted that the Greek language was introduced to Greece by newcomers who brought with them the type of pottery known as 'Minyan' ware. For many years the evidence available suggested that this pottery appeared in Greece about 1000 BC, at the beginning of the Middle Helladic period. Since very similar pottery was found at Troy, where it was introduced at approximately the same date (early Troy VI), it seemed an obvious conclusion that there had been a two-pronged invasion from somewhere further north, with one group moving down into Greece and the other occupying north-western Anatolia. The inhabitants of Troy VI then, it could be assumed, spoke an early form of Greek. One difficulty in accepting this theory was that there were no sign at all of pottery ancestral to Minyan ware in the areas north of Greece and in the Balkans where it might have been expected to appear. A further
complication was added when it was suggested that Trojan Minyan (and therefore presumably Greek Minyan as well) could be seen to have its ancestry in the latter part of the Early Bronze Age in the region south and east of the Sea of Marmora. The conclusion to be drawn from this was that proto-Greek speakers had entered Anatolia earlier in the Early Bronze Age, had stayed there for some time, and had then crossed by sea to central Greece at the beginning of the following period, leaving some of their number to develop the culture of Troy VI.20

More recent research, however, seems to indicate that both these theories are based on false premises. Minyan pottery has now been found in Greece, most notably at Lerna in the Argolid, in EH III contexts. This can be explained away by claiming that some proto-Greek speakers had crossed from Anatolia earlier than others. But this is contradicted by studies which suggest that the EH III culture as a whole is the result, not of immigration from Anatolia, but of a period of indigenous development in central Greece preceded by influences which came ultimately from the Baden culture of Austria-Hungary, a culture which in turn can be linked with the spread of Kurgan features into central Europe.21 Further analysis of Anatolian ‘Minyan’ also suggests that the resemblances between it and Greek Minyan are largely illusory, and that the two have different origins and different developments.22 So theories that there were Greeks in north-west Anatolia during the Middle and Late Bronze Ages seem to be without foundation. Yet a certain amount of doubt remains. Although detailed examination of the two types of pottery shows that shared shapes were almost non-existent, the overall similarity in appearance and in fabric can be taken too be too close to be accidental. And when in the first millennium the north-west emerges into written history, it is part of the Greek world, occupied by Greek-speaking peoples. But the arrival of these ‘Aeolic’ Greeks from Greece, unlike that of the Ionians further south, cannot be recognized without doubt in the archaeological record, for first-millennium pottery in the area seems to be directly descended from that of the second millennium, rather than introduced from any outside source. Nor can the scanty foundation legends of the Aeolic settlements inspire great confidence in their historical accuracy. Only further excavation and research can show whether the Aeolic Greeks were in fact immigrants from across the Aegean or the descendants of Greek-speaking natives of the second millennium, the ‘Trojans’ of the Homeric poems.

**Luwians in Greece**

Another theory which suggests close linguistic connections between Anatolia and Greece centres on the many place-names ending in -anthos, -asso, and similar forms, which are to be found on either side of the Aegean. These endings can plausibly be explained as Luwian, and their distribution suggests that Luwian, or rather its linguistic ancestor, was at some time spoken over large areas of both western Anatolia and Greece. It has been suggested that it was ‘Luwians’ (rather than Greeks) who arrived in Greece at the beginning of the Middle Helladic period (c. 1900 BC), or even that they arrived as late as the Shaft Grave period (c. 1600 BC). But, as was pointed out long ago, there is a remarkable coincidence between the distribution of place-names of this type and that of sites with Early Helladic II connections.23 The origins of numerous features of the Aegean Early Bronze Age have been seen in western Anatolia. These may well be explicable in terms of trading contacts. But since, accepting the arguments presented above, western Anatolia was already at that time proto-Luwian in speech, there is something to be said for a contemporary linguistic spread to the Greek mainland. On this hypothesis Greek was not the first Indo-European language in Greece, but was preceded in the area by a ‘proto-Luwian’ linguistic element which was widespread during the earlier part of the Early Bronze Age.

**Conclusions**

Is there then an answer to the question posed in the title of this chapter? To some extent at least there is, but it must first be emphasized that we cannot define the Hittites, or any of their contemporaries, in terms of their physical appearance. There is nothing that can be labelled uniquely ‘Hittite’ in the shape of their skulls, or the colour of their skin, eyes or hair. In political and chronological terms definition is much easier. The Hittites, the Arzawans and other peoples who have been mentioned above occupied neighbouring areas of second-millennium Anatolia, and their history, and many aspects of their life, will be the subjects of subsequent chapters. But to limit our definition in this way is to ignore a very important part of what we know about the Hittites and their contemporaries - their languages. Using this as a tool we can define a Hittite as someone who used the Hittite language, an Arzawan as a speaker (or writer) of Luwian, the language of Arzawa, and so on. This opens up a much wider area of enquiry, for it can then be seen that much of second-millennium Anatolia was occupied by speakers of languages which were closely related to each other and which, more importantly, have their origins in the Indo-European family of which large numbers of modern languages, including our own, are also members. Linguistic evidence can to some extent be linked to the evidence of archaeology, and in this way we can hope to trace the history of the Hittites and Arzawans (i.e. speakers of Hittite and Luwian, or rather their immediate ancestor, perhaps better referred to as proto-Anatolian) back into earlier millennia, long before the existence of any written documentation of their existence. We can also recognize the possibility that speakers of a closely related language were to be found in third-millennium Greece and the Aegean, and that at least something to be said for the theory that north-west Anatolia was occupied by speakers of an early form of Greek (also Indo-European, but belonging to a different branch of the family). In Hittian we have evidence for at least one of the languages spoken in central Anatolia before the arrival of the Indo-European-speakers. Thus in our search for the origins of the Hittites and their neighbours the evidence of language enables us to go back far beyond the boundaries imposed by any historical material contained in surviving texts.
3

The Hittites and their neighbours

In chapter 1 we saw how trade between Anatolia and Assyria was ended about 1780 BC when the routes along which merchandise travelled were cut by the increasingly active Hurrian states of northern Mesopotamia. We saw, too, how the kings of Kussara took advantage of this situation to gain control of much of central Anatolia. In fact the speedy removal of their capital westward to Kanesh/Nesa was probably a direct result of Hurrian pressure, for Kussara itself, if it lay near modern Divriği, was uncomfortably close to the newly emergent powers. Central Anatolia, however, provided its own problems, for there too there were unruly neighbours, and it was perhaps the presence of such neighbours, most notably the state of Zalpa, on the northern frontier, that led a prince of the royal house about 1650 BC to decide that strategic considerations were of greater importance than the curse of Anittas, and to build a new fortress at the long deserted but naturally defensible site of Hattusa. The Hurrian advance continued, and it may be supposed that when the eastern parts of the Kussaran realm fell to them Hattusili--'man of Hattusa', as the prince now styled himself--was left as an independent monarch, the founder of what we now call the Hittite Old Kingdom.

Hattusili I

Hattusili quickly set about consolidating and expanding his kingdom. The direction of his expansion may well have been based on economic considerations, for the loss of the Assyrian connection must also have meant the loss of essential tin-supplies, and an alternative source had to be found. The obvious alternative was, as we have seen, the route which ran up the Euphrates valley from Babylonia to the Mediterranean coastlands, and it was towards the control of this route that his policy, and that of his successors, was directed. The rough outlines of what happened can be reconstructed from surviving contemporary documents and later references. From them it can be seen that Hattusili's first action was the conquest of the cities that lay between his capital and the Cilician Gates. Once these cities were secured, he could move down into Cilicia and reach the Mediterranean. Here, on the threshold of the Syro-Mesopotamian world, he could build fortresses like that at Mersin (originally ascribed by the excavators to a later period) and make preparations for his attack on the trade-route. The enemy against whom his efforts were directed was Aleppo, the power in command of the northern terminus of the route. But Aleppo was much too strong to be dealt with at one blow. First the Hittite king turned on Alalah, the principal port of the area, thus robbing Aleppo of its outlet to the sea. Fortunately for us, the site of Alalah has been excavated, and the Hittite attack may be convincingly equated with the destruction of Level VII of the site, an event which can be dated to between 1650 and 1600 BC.

The geography of western Anatolia

After capturing Alalah, Hattusili moved against Urshu, a little to the north, and other allies of Aleppo. But before he could complete the isolation of his enemy, he turned in a completely different direction. His opponent on this occasion was Arzawa, which we have already met as the principal power of western Anatolia. Unfortunately, written documents have yet to be recovered from this area, and what little is known of it comes from fairly meagre archaeological results and from references in the texts of other peoples, notably the Hittites and the Egyptians. As a result of this lack of evidence, the geography of western Anatolia in the second millennium BC has for long been a subject of considerable dispute. But since the reconstruction and interpretation of the history of the Hittites is dependent to a great extent on an assessment of the geographical positions of their neighbours, it is essential first to consider these in a little detail.

The state of Arzawa is the focal point of the area, and round it are grouped the 'Arzawa-countries' of Mira, Hapalla and the Seha River Land, closely attached to Arzawa itself by linguistic and dynastic ties. The main evidence for establishing the positions of these countries lies in Hittite texts describing royal campaigns against them. From these texts a pattern of inter-relationships of towns and areas can be established. In relating this pattern to the Anatolian landscape, one has to take note of the few routes along which armies might march in a generally westerly direction from the Hittite homeland. Two such routes are of particular importance. One, the more northerly, proceeds more or less due west and ends up in the central part of the Aegean coastlands. A branch-route from it turns off after crossing the River Sakarya and proceeds in a rather more northerly direction until it reaches the Sea of Marmara. The other, southerly, route passes south of the central Salt Lake, runs through the Turkish 'Lake District', and finishes in the south-west, either in Pamphylia or in Lycia. The more southerly route has much in its favour in establishing the location of Arzawa. Arzawan attacks on Hittite territory often seem to impinge on the lands south of the Salt Lake, and it would therefore seem reasonable to suppose that Hittite attacks on Arzawa should start from the same area. On this basis the Arzawa-countries are to be located in the south-west, and since Arzawa itself has a coastline, the coast in question must be that of either Pamphylia or Lycia.

This conclusion seems eminently reasonable, but there is one big problem. Survey-work in Lycia and Pamphylia has so far shown no sign at all of settled occupation during the Hittite period. It is easy enough to accept that some sites in an area may have been overlooked, or
that all settlements were built of stone which was re-used and so has left little or no trace, or that they were mere collections of wooden shacks on the hillsides or among the trees. But it is difficult to believe that all surface traces of a country as powerful as Arzawa, a country which, as we shall see, could challenge the power of the Hittites and at least try to correspond on an equal footing with Egypt, have so far defied all efforts to locate them. It must be said of course that in recent years it has become increasingly clear that many pre-Classical sites in the west are so deeply buried under layers of sediment, the result of large-scale erosion of more upland areas, that they have left little or no surface indication of their existence. It may therefore be that all traces of even the largest settlements of Arzawa, if it lay in the south-west, have been obliterated in this way. But until such time as there is physical evidence for the existence of considerable sites of the appropriate period, the identification of Arzawa with south-western Anatolia remains a matter of grave doubt.

The alternative is to follow the other, more northerly, route, and see Arzawa as lying in the area of Classical Lydia, with its coast along the Aegean around Classical Ephesus and Smyrna. In either case the 'Arzawa-countries' have to be placed in some way between Arzawa and Hittite territory, since in texts dealing with military campaigns hostile action from Hittite lands seems to affect them before it reaches Arzawa itself.

Other western lands must also be mentioned here. Wilusa was sometimes recognized as an Arzawa-country, but was for long periods closely allied to the Hittites. There has for many years been a strong temptation to link its name with W-ilion and make it include the site of Ilion/Troy. But it is difficult to imagine that an extremely strong link with central Anatolia could have been preserved over many years if Wilusa lay in the remote and rather inaccessible Troad. A position closer to Hittite territory, perhaps in or near the Plain of Eskişehir, seems much more likely. Then there are the Lukka Lands. These too are clearly western, but they are elusive, and have been located in areas as far apart as Lycia, Lycaonia and the southern shores of the Sea of Marmara. The answer here, it has recently been pointed out, may well be that 'Lukka' is the Hittite for what in western terms is called Luwya, and is a linguistic rather than a geographical term - that is, it means 'Luwian-speaking' rather than 'living in a Lukka Land.' This may in the end help to explain how Lukka-people keep popping up in unexpected places, and may save us from having to postulate two or more Lukka Lands, or large-scale migrations of Lukka-people for unknown reasons from one area to another completely different one.

Ahhiyawa

This leaves Milawanda and Ahhiyawa, and brings us to the most controversial question of all. Ever since Forrer's proposal in 1924 that the Ahhiyawans of the Hittite texts were to be equated with the Homeric Achaeans, and consequently with the Mycenaean Greeks, academic opinion has been sharply divided between support and rejection of his view. Philhellenic scholars claim that Hittites and Mycenaeans cannot fail to have made contact in the Aegean and eastern
Mediterranean, that the contact, when it is made, is at just the times, and at just the places, where one might expect it, and that the resemblance of names between the Achaean and the Ahhiyawat is more than fortuitous. Anti-Mycenaeanists, that archaeologically there is little evidence for contact, that there is nothing in the texts to suggest that Ahhiyawa is outside Anatolia, and that the equation of the names is a philological impossibility.

In a conflict of this nature one has to take sides, and the author must admit at once that although he would like to accept the equation with Mycenaean, he still feels that the balance of evidence is against it. This view is based mainly on the wider question of Anatolian geography, for Achaean and Ahhiyawa, a coastal city under Ahhiyawan influence, are closely linked with areas such as the Sefah River Land, which are, if one accepts that Alasia occupied the central Aegean coast, and that the south-west was virtually unoccupied, to be located in the north-western corner of Anatolia. The Mycenaean theory is largely based on the equation of Millawa and Miletus, where there is a known Mycenaean settlement. Attractive though this theory is, it creates several problems which will have to be resolved before it can gain universal acceptance.

It is for instance hard to see how Millawa, if it is Miletus, can be fitted into the pattern of western Anatolian states without placing some of them, including Alasia, in the problematical south-western area; and even if one can interpret the geographical evidence in a way which keeps Alasia in Lydia, it is equally difficult to see how relations between the Hittites and Millawa/Alasia, whether friendly or otherwise, could have been maintained at times when a hostile Alasia lay between the two. It is also necessary to assume from the textual evidence that Mycenaean raiders were already penetrating well up onto the Anatolian plateau as early as 1450, and for this there is no visible evidence — although it can of course be reasonably claimed that such raiding parties would be unlikely to leave any recognizable physical trace of their presence. Then there is the evidence of a treaty drawn up about 1350 between the Hittites and the land of Amurruru on the Levantine coast. In this treaty the ruler of Amurruru is forbidden to allow ships of Alasian to trade through the ports of Amurruru with Assyria, at that time a Hittite enemy. Now it is true that there is abundant evidence of Mycenaean trade in the Levant, and evidence too of that trade greatly declining c. 1450-30. But it is important to remember that Mycenaean trade was purely coastal in character. There is no evidence at all of Mycenaean goods penetrating far inland and passing through Levantine territory to be received in Assyria. If the trade was of sufficient importance for a Hittite king to try to put a stop to it, one might expect some signs of Mycenaean pottery east of the Euphrates.

Nevertheless the Alasian/Mycenaean Greek equation has over the years been strongly and persuasively argued, and it is with some hesitation that the alternative view is maintained here. It has in the end to be admitted that the evidence is at present insufficient to offer conclusive proof for either case. What we really need before we can accept one side or the other is something rather more secure than deductions made from the Homeric poems on what, if anything, the Mycenaeans called themselves. Evidence from Linear B texts would be invaluable, as would information from some outside source — say Ugarit — on what Mycenaean were called by their contemporaries. One day such evidence may be found, but that day is not yet. Until it comes, one has to take up the position which seems to one to be the most probable in terms of the evidence there is. Accordingly, the historical reconstruction which follows in this book is based on the assumption that Millawa lay on the shores of the Sea of Marmara, and that Alasia too was situated, at least in part, in north-west Anatolia, and very probably included territory on the European shores of the Sea of Marmara as well. However, an alternative map is provided, with Millawa at Milletus and Arzawa in the south-west, and those who disagree with the reconstruction can follow their own geographical pattern and reinterpret the narrative accordingly.

The problem of tin supplies

In attempting to justify this view we may now return to Hatussas and his campaign against Alasia. Its purpose is unknown. He may have been attacked from behind when his attention was directed to the south-east, but equally his expedition may be linked with one ascribed to "Labarna" in a later treaty, in the course of which both Alasia and Wilusa were conquered. If we now ask what the importance of Wilusa was, a glance at the map will show us, for Wilusa lay astride the branch of the northern route, previously mentioned, which led from the Land of Hatti to north-western Anatolia and from there across the straits into Europe. Was it then trade which provoked Hittite interest in this route, as had economic factors in the south-east also? And if so, what articles or materials came to Hattusas along the route? We can only guess, for no Hittite monarch ever gives any hint of economic motives in attacking, making a treaty with, or otherwise seeking to influence another country.

It has been suggested that this route too was a tin-route, leading through the Balkans and eventually to the rich resources of Bohemia. And that leads us directly to the vexed question of the source, or sources, of the tin which was widely used in the manufacture of bronze in ancient Anatolia. In considering this question, already touched on in chapter 1, one must take into account evidence from the Early and Middle Bronze Ages as well as the Hittite period. It is clear for instance that in the third millennium BC the percentage of copper-based artifacts containing more than five per cent tin is much higher in north-western and central Anatolia (and also north-western Iran) than it is in neighbouring areas such as Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt and Crete. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that there was a tin-source
somewhere in (central) Anatolia which was available to local metal-workers. But herein lies the core of the problem, for despite the most intense investigation no such tin-source has yet been found. The problem becomes more acute when we move into the second millennium, for not only Anatolia, but neighbouring areas as well, can be seen to have access to supplies of tin for bronze-making, and still there is no clear indication of any source within the area from which it could have come. We have, it seems, to accept the fact that the tin which was used in the Mediterranean basin, Anatolia, western Iran and Mesopotamia, came from somewhere outside those areas, and that trade in tin played a considerable part in economic life.

But where did the tin come from? One possible source is the eastern desert of Egypt, the only area within easy reach of the Mediterranean and Mesopotamian waters where there are known sources of cassiterite (stannic oxide, SnO₂), the form in which tin was most easily available to ancient prospectors. But there is no evidence either for the third-millennium exploitation of this tin or for the second-millennium use of Egyptian tin as a trade-item, and we regretfully have to look elsewhere.

If we turn first of all to the east we find, as we have seen, tin being imported to central Anatolia from Assyria. But the source of that tin has for long been obscure. Such evidence as there is points to somewhere beyond the Zagros Mountains. Until recently, however, no possible source had been identified between the Iranian border and India. So it was suggested that tin came to Mesopotamia from as far afield as Thailand and Valaysia, being imported by sea up the Arabian Gulf. But there is certainly no evidence for trading-connections between Thailand and the Gulf, and it is very difficult to see the tin used in Anatolia (which is our main concern here) as having its ultimate origin so far away as south-east Asia. However, in recent years a new possibility has emerged with the discovery of major tin deposits in Afghanistan. It may then be that Afghan tin was brought overland to Assyria, and it is also possible that it was carried south from Afghanistan to the coast and then brought by ship up the Arabian Gulf to Mesopotamian ports, where it was loaded onto donkeys for transport up-river to the north, and distribution via the Assyrian trade-network in Anatolia.

A solution such as this may help to explain the early second-millennium import of tin into central Anatolia from the south-east. But it offers no help in explaining why the percentage of tin-bronze in third-millennium Anatolia—and especially in the north-west—is much higher than that in Mesopotamia. This evidence suggests that there must have been another tin-source, and the likelihood is that it was somewhere west, rather than east, of Anatolia. So if we turn now to the west, we have to ask ourselves whether importation of tin from the prolific mines of Cornwall is a possibility. There seems to be a complete lack of tin-bronze in Britain itself before about 2200 BC, and this makes it totally unlikely that Cornwall was the source of the tin used in Anatolian bronzes in the third millennium. After 2200, however, objects of tin-bronze in Britain increase greatly in numbers, and the export of objects made of British tin-bronze into northern and central Europe has been noted. This export-trade may have been associated with the export of tin for use by continental smiths, and thus British tin may by the second millennium have been reaching the Mediterranean coast, whence it could have been carried by sea to ports on the shores of Anatolia. This is at least a possibility which has to be kept in mind, but it must be admitted that there is at present little or no evidence for it.

What of other possible sources? One such that cannot be left out of consideration is central Europe. Here, in the region of Bohemia, there are ample supplies of tin-ore, but as usual there are problems connected with it. The main one is that Bohemian tin occurs in the form of vein-deposits in granite rock, and because of the hardness of this rock it has been claimed that such deposits were completely inaccessible to ancient miners. This is largely true. But even the hardest rock yields in time to natural erosion, and because of this tin-ores may well have been available in quantities sufficient to make exploitation worth while. In fact the importation of tin from Britain, mentioned in the previous paragraph, may well have inspired central European prospectors to look more closely for local supplies. If these were available, an easy export-route led down the Danube valley to the Balkans, and so across the straits into north-western Turkey. Certainly central Europe had trade-connections as far afield as Syria long after the beginning of the second millennium, and onwards to that millennium a trail of objects with spiral decoration has been taken to show that the Mycenaean also used the route. But these decorations could equally well have originated in north-west Anatolia, and there is no trace of pottery or anything else that can be unequivocally ascribed to the Mycenaeans. It is therefore possible to argue that supplies of central European tin (or even Cornish tin passing through central Europe) reached Anatolia by way of this north-western route. Admittedly the arguments in its favour are weak, but too are the arguments for any alternative source. It is little wonder that increasingly those who study the problem are turning once more to a native Anatolian tin-source, undetected and, because totally exhausted, probably undetectable. But faced with a choice between an invisible local source and a variety of equally improbable outside sources, the author feels once again that he has to make a decision. And since the geographical reconstruction proposed above, however substantial its basis, points clearly to a continuing Hittite involvement with the north-west, he feels it worth while to accept as a working hypothesis the theory of a central European tin-source, and to interpret Hittite history and Hittite policy accordingly.

Western Anatolia is of course no richer in tin-deposits than central Anatolia, and we may also be justified in seeing in Bohemia the ultimate source of the tin that was needed by the kings of Arzawa. It is then a reasonable guess that in conquering Arzawa and forging a link with Wilusa that was to last almost unbroken for hundreds of years, Hattusilis (we return to last at our starting-point) had the same motive as we have ascribed to him when he attacked Alalakh and the southeast route. In each case the object of his campaign may well have been tin.
Old Kingdom campaigns

A Hurrian counter-attack soon forced Hattusili to turn eastwards again. The whole of the Land of Hatti, except its capital, fell into their hands, but within a year or two the Hittite king had driven them back through the Taurus passes, and was able to advance to the Euphrates. About this time too the ancient capital of Kussara must have been recaptured, and we also hear of successes on the north-eastern frontier. In this area too metal-supplies may have been the ultimate motive for the king's interest: Despite these successes, however, Hattusili was unable to defeat his first opponent, Aleppo, and he may have received a mortal wound while trying to do so.

His death left the final conquest of north Syria to Mursilis, his grandson and successor. It occurred to this monarch that diplomacy might bring success where force had failed, so he applied himself to the problem of disrupting the trade-route to his own advantage. Aleppo at its northern end was still much too strong to succumb to Hittite pressure. Babylon at its southern end was weak, but allied to Aleppo. On the middle Euphrates, however, Mari had now disappeared and the new power in the area was the kingdom of Ana. This state was not under Amorite rule like Babylon and Aleppo, but had recently come under the influence of the Kassites, a foreign people from the Iranian hills. The obvious course was an alliance with Ana to encircle Aleppo, disrupt her trade and reduce her prosperity, and it is probable that this move was made. We have few details of what happened, but about 1596 Mursilis descended from Anatolia and succeeded in destroying Aleppo.

Thus the south-eastern trade-route came under Hittite control at least as far as the middle Euphrates. Mursilis had gained his end, but his allies in Ana were not satisfied, and persuaded him that greater glory was at hand. Thus spurred on, Mursilis swept down the Euphrates and descended on Babylon. The dynasty of Hammurabi was brought to a humiliating end, and the Hittites arrived in force on the international field.

The conquest of Babylon cannot have been more than a rash venture by the Hittite king. Physiological control of the entire trade-route was not necessary for his purpose and he soon returned to his homeland, leaving the images of the deities of Babylon, and doubtless a part of its treasure, with his allies in Ana. Continuing Hurrian pressure would have made it difficult to hold on to such distant conquests, and palace rivalries in Hattusa also helped in persuading him to withdraw. Shortly afterwards Mursilis was murdered by his brother-in-law, and with his death the Hittite conquests began to crumble away. Under his successors the Hurrians, now led by a dynasty with Indo-Aryan connections, advanced again through north Syria and into Cilicia, the peoples of the northern hills captured the holy city of Nerik and forced the reformation of Hattusa itself, and Arzawa broke away and regained its independence. By the time of the accession of Telepinus (c. 1350) the kingdom was confined once again to central Anatolia. Telepinus however was able to consolidate his position sufficiently to advance once more in the direction of north Syria, win several victories in the Anti-Taurus area, and conclude an alliance with the ruler of Kizzuwadina, a new power which had been established in Cilicia by a Hurrian or Indo-Aryan dynasty.

From Middle Kingdom to Empire

With Telepinus what is usually known as the Old Kingdom comes to an end. Its achievements had been ephemeral, but the policies of its kings set a pattern which was to be followed in all its essentials by the monarchs of the later and greater Hittite Empire. This is the name normally given to the period between about 1450 and 1380 BCE. Its history has recently been complicated by the fact that a number of documents, previously assigned to the reign of Tudhaliyas IV towards the end of the period, can now plausibly be taken to describe events in the reign of a much earlier Tudhaliyas, probably the first king of that name, who reigned at the beginning of the Empire. The obscure period between the Old Kingdom and the Empire, sometimes known as the Middle Kingdom, is one of almost unrelieved Hittite decline. Only a treaty with a king of Kizzuwadina shows a temporary success against the Hurrians, now organized and united as the north Mesopotamian kingdom of Mitanni and eager to gain control of the Euphrates route. At this time too the attraction of northern Syria, with its rich trade and wealth of natural products, brought another major power on to the scene in the shape of Egypt. Shortly after 1450 Tuthmosis III advanced up the Levantine coast and conquered Aleppo.

These new developments were highly unwelcome to the Hittites, but they prudently paid tribute to Egypt and waited for their opportunity. It came when Aleppo rebelled against Egypt on the death of Tuthmosis. Although this rebellion may have been instigated by the Hittites, Aleppo was sufficiently grateful to transfer her allegiance to Mitanni. This was the situation when Tudhaliyas I came to the throne shortly after, and his action was swift and decisive. First the alliance with Kizzuwadina was renewed, and within a year or two of his accession he was able to meet and defeat both Aleppo and Mitanni. The south-eastern trade-route was once again in Hittite hands.

Tudhaliyas then turned to the west, and campaigns followed against Arzawa and the Seha River Land. To the north-west, a number of smaller states on or near the route to Europe had banded together to form a confederation under the general name of Assuwa. As this name does not appear in any later document, it must be assumed that after its defeat Assuwa broke up again into its constituent parts. At this time too Abhiyana first appears in the Hittite records as a hostile power whose king Attarasis at least twice attacked the Hittite vassal Maddinawettas. But despite temporary successes in this direction it is clear that Tudhaliyas failed to achieve lasting control of the north-western route.

To the north of the Hittite realms there was trouble in the Gaspas, which were from then on to be constantly hostile to the Hittites. This may indeed have been the very time at which the Gaaga-people were moving into the northern coastslands. Further east the Hurrians were making up for their lack of success in north Syria by wooring the kings of the Armenian mountains. It is probable that Tudhaliyas...
directed a campaign against the north-eastern country known both as Azzi and as Hayasa, and he certainly had to deal with Isuwat, a land which lay across the Euphrates around modern Elazig. Little is known of this campaign, but it may be pointed out that on the borders of Isuwat are to be found the most important copper-mines in the Middle East (the modern Ergani Maden). These had been known to the Assyrian merchants centuries earlier, and their presence in the border area between Hatti and Mitanni must surely be regarded as an important factor in the eminence of these powers.

The empire of Tudhalyas was followed by another period of disaster. North Syria and Kizzuwadna were rapidly lost, and enemies from all sides—the Gasea-lands to the north, Azzi-Hayasa to the north-east, Isuwat to the east, and several other countries besides—closed in on Hattusa and burnt it to the ground. The Land of Hatti was so weakened by these attacks that the king of Arzawa was able to ignore it while he struck across the southern Anatolian plateau towards the approaches to the Cilician Gates. Clearly he too was interested in the south-eastern trade-route, and had ambitions to succeed the Hittite king as an international figure. This can be seen also in the Arzawa letter from El Amarna (mentioned in chapter 2) in which there was talk of a marriage-contract with the Egyptian royal house. Nothing tells us that any marriage took place, but the fact that it was suggested shows that the Arzawan monarch sought to be regarded as equal of the other Great Kings of the Middle Eastern world.

**Suppiluliumas I**

The triumph of Arzawa did not last. About 1356 the Hittite throne was seized by an energetic young prince called Suppiluliumas, a man who had already before his accession shown by victories in the north-east, north and north-west that he could deal with his country's enemies. An early attack on Mitanni was a failure, although it may have resulted in the temporary recovery of Isuwat. Later, Isuwat was recaptured on a more permanent basis, and Kizzuwadna and the 'Huiti-land', a powerful north Syrian rival of Mitanni, were linked by treaty to the Land of Hatti. Thus Suppiluliumas was in a much stronger position when he moved again against Mitanni, and he very soon gained possession of the lands west of the Euphrates. Aleppo and other north Syrian states were conquered, and the Hittites were once more firmly established at the head of the Euphrates-route.

Suppiluliumas did not repeat his predecessor's mistake by venturing down river to Babylon. Instead he tactfully gained his objective by contracting a marriage with the Babylonian king's daughter. Then a Mitannian counter-attack towards Isuwat was made the pretext for a strong Hittite campaign which succeeded in capturing the Mitannian capital and destroying its remaining power. Finally an attack was mounted on Carchemish, a powerful state situated at the point where the Euphrates comes nearest to the Mediterranean coast, and with its fall Suppiluliumas was able to organize north Syria on a basis which would ensure continuing Hittite supremacy. Carchemish and Aleppo were made into vassal-states under the rule of two of the king's sons, and further east potential danger from Assyria, which had gained its independence at the fall of Mitanni, was counter-balanced by the creation of a new Mitanni subject to the Hittites and acting as a buffer-state against danger from its former subject. Even Egypt almost became a sphere of Hittite influence when the widow of Tutankhamun wrote to Suppiluliumas asking for one of his sons to be her husband. Unfortunately for the Hittite king his son was murdered on the way to Egypt and the proposed alliance did not take place.

In the west Suppiluliumas did not meet with such great success. He had already defeated the army of Arzawa before he came to the throne, and shortly after his accession he drove it back across the Konya Plain from the approaches to the Cilician Gates as far as Mira and Hapalla. But it is unlikely that the land of Arzawa itself was conquered, and it remained a constant danger to the south-western parts of the Hittite realms.

To the north-west the situation was rather different. Dependent as he must have been on supplies of tin to equip his forces in Syria, Suppiluliumas made every effort to keep this trade-route open. The Seha River Land was on the whole an effective buffer against aggression from Arzawa, and Ahhiyawa was now a friendly power, probably bound by treaty to the Hittites. The only danger came towards the end of the Hittite king's reign when Millawanda was persuaded by Arzawa to rebel and seek Ahhiyawan assistance. Mira and the Seha River Land were also involved, and the situation must have been rather ugly. Suppiluliumas however was too deeply involved in north Syria to attend to things himself, and the solution of this problem was left to his son Mursilis.

In the north-east Suppiluliumas succeeded in making an alliance with the king of Azzi-Hayasa, but the northern Gasea-people were a constant source of trouble, and yearly campaigns were necessary to cope with their unending raids.

**Mursilis II**

Suppiluliumas died about 1334 of a plague which his soldiers had brought back from a Syrian campaign. His eldest son quickly followed him to the grave, and the throne passed to his younger son Mursilis, who proved to be an effective successor to his father. Fortunately for him, there was no need for immediate action to defend the south-eastern route. The buffer-state of Mitanni, backed by the armed forces of Carchemish, was able for a time to absorb the aggressive energies of Assyria, and Egypt was still recovering from a period of weakness and was as yet unwilling to extend her influence into north Syria. Thus Mursilis was able to attend to the north-western route. Millawanda, which had caused trouble at the end of his father's reign, was quickly defeated. Then Mursilis mounted a full-scale and highly successful attack on the Arzawa lands. On its conclusion Arzawa itself was awarded to a presumably pro-Hittite member of its royal family, while Mira, Hapalla and the Seha River Land were created separate vassal-states, bound by elaborate treaties to the Land of Hatti. Thus Arzawa was encircled by a line of states which separated her both from 22
the Land of Hatti and from the tin-route. Clearly Mursili hoped that he would have no more trouble in the west, and for the remainder of his lifetime and throughout that of his successor his policy proved remarkably effective.

In other directions Mursili met with similar success. The Gasa-people continued their attacks from the north, and finally Mursili established a firm line of border-fortresses under military control which did succeed in containing his enemies, if not in conquering them. Further east Azzi-Hayassa rebelled but was defeated again, and in Syria Mitanni, which had eventually fallen to the Assyrians, was probably recaptured. All over the empire the emphasis was on good organization and firm control through vassal-states, a policy which became increasingly necessary with the revival of Egypt and the renewal of her interest in northern Syria. The latter part of Mursili’s reign was certainly directed towards preparation for the inevitable clash of powers, and there is no record of any further expansionist policy at this time. In the far north-west there was a certain amount of trouble from Pyiamaras of Millawanda, an unruly vassal who had transferred his allegiance to Ahhiyawa. Mursili, preoccupied by the growing danger from Egypt, was content to lead an expedition to Millawanda and ask for the extradition of Pyiamaras, who had fled to an area under Ahhiyawan control. His request was probably granted, and it is likely that Pyiamaras gave a promise of good conduct and was restored to his throne.

Muwatallis

The reign of Muwatallis (c. 1308–1385) is rather poorly documented, as the destruction of Hattusas by the Gasa-people and the growing danger from Egypt caused him to move his capital from Hattusas to a more southerly site, perhaps near modern Karaman, and the full records of his reign have yet to be discovered. The growing menace from the south also made it even more vitally important that there should be no trouble in the west. Yet Arzawa was restive, and in the north-west Pyiamaras was misbehaving again. So a quick western campaign was necessary, and although no details are known, it was clearly a success. The loyalty of the vassal-states was assured, and the Seha River Land, the vital buffer between Arzawa and the tin-route, was bound even more closely to the Hittite realms. The result was that when the Egyptian attack finally came, large contingents from the western states served in the Hittite army. But Hittite control must have been rather precarious, for it can be seen that Muwatallis regarded the west as a source of potential rebellion. Clearly disaffection was liable to break out at any moment.

Along the northern border skirmishing with the Gasa-people continued, but with one disastrous exception the fortified line established by Mursili held, and this meant that the northerners could be kept in check by a comparatively small number of troops. Thus almost all the forces of the Hittite Empire could be concentrated where they were most needed, in north Syria, to meet the advance of the Egyptian pharaoh Rameses II. When the two armies met, at Qadesh on the River Orontes in c. 1285, the result was a victory for the Hittites, and their control of northern Syria remained unimpaired. Yet the war had very serious consequences for Muwatallis, for while his efforts were concentrated on stopping Egypt, Assyria took advantage of the situation to defeat Mitanni and make it an Assyrian vassal.

Hattusilis III

Thus despite the glorious victory of Qadesh, the Hittite Empire was in considerable danger from both east and west. When Muwatallis died about 1285 the situation rapidly worsened, for throughout his short reign his son Urhi-Teshub, who succeeded as Mursili III, was preoccupied by a quarrel with his uncle Hattusilis, whom he rightly suspected of having designs on the throne. On this issue the lands of western Anatolia were sharply divided. The Seha River Land was strongly in favour of Hattusilis, while Mira and possibly Ahhiyawa supported Mursili. The course of events is obscure, but it is clear that after the deposition and exile of Mursili II by Hattusilis (c. 1278) most of the western lands disappear from the Hittite records. Hattusilis boasts that all those who were well-disposed to his predecessors were equally well-disposed to him, but there is little or no evidence to substantiate this claim for western Anatolia. One has to assume that the Arzawa-lands took advantage of the situation to shake off Hittite control. Only in the north-west, along the vital tin-route, did the Hittites make any
effort to retain its interest. Fighting in the Lukka Lands is mentioned in the fragmentary annals of Hattusilis, and the Seha River Land remained a Hittite dependency. Millawanda may have been a Hittite vassal again, and gifts were still exchanged between Hatti and Ahhiyawa.

The situation in Syria was almost as serious. Egypt had been defeated, but Ashurnasirpal I of Assyria had taken advantage of a revolt in Mitanni to incorporate all the territory as far as the Euphrates into his realm. The south-eastern route was thus in great danger. A hasty and transitory alliance was arranged with Babylon, and finally the mutual danger brought Hattusilis and Rameses together. Their treaty stressed the reality of Hittite control over northern Syria, and the Egyptian renunciation of claims to that area, but clearly the agreement was largely meaningless. While the Hittite king was engaged in making arrangements for his daughter to marry Rameses, or for a summit meeting somewhere in Palestine, the Assyrians were consolidating their position further east and moving up into the hills which bordered on Anatolia. The climax to this movement came when the Assyrian king Shalmaneser I reached the Euphrates near Malatya. In the course of this campaign he must have succeeded in finally wresting from Hittite hands the control of the copper-mines of Isuwa.

Tudhaliays IV

The loss of his richest metal-source was a serious blow to the Hittite king, although it was partially offset by the fact that further south, around Carchemish, Hittite forces had succeeded in containing the Assyrian advance. This means that the powers of the Syrian coast were still in Hittite hands, and it was probably with the help of a Syrian fleet that Tudhaliays IV (c. 1250–1220), the son and successor of Hattusilis, invaded Cyprus, where he could find ample supplies of copper safe from Assyrian attack. To make this doubly certain, a Hittite treaty with Amurru, on the Syrian coast, included a clause prohibiting commercial relations of any kind between Amurru and Assyria.

Thus along the south-eastern trade-route the position remained temporarily favourable to the Hittites. In the north-west similar pressures were building up. Trouble in the Seha River Land was probably caused by Millawanda and backed by Ahhiyawa, and although Tudhaliays was successful in gaining a victory, it is clear that his control of the area was slipping. Ahhiyawa was growing stronger, and could now be regarded—though temporarily or mistakenly—as one of the great powers of the Middle Eastern world. Arzawa too must have had an important part to play, but its relations with the other states of Anatolia, and with the Mycenaean Greeks along the Aegean coast, must await future discoveries for their clarification. It is clear, however, that the end of the Hittite Empire was at hand.

The fall of the Hittite Empire

The successors of Tudhaliays could do little to restore the situation. Harbors were falling, and grain had to be imported from as far afield as Egypt to ward off famine. To the east, Assyrian pressure continued. In Syria the vassal-states were becoming lax in fulfilling their obligations to the north the Gaaza-people were an ever-present menace, and to the north-west there was an ominous silence. A temporary revival took place under a second Suppiluliumas (c. 1200–1186) who won the support of the Syrian vassals once more, defeated an enemy fleet, manned perhaps by rebellious vassals, perhaps by outside invaders, in a sea-battle off Cyprus, and even led a campaign into upper Mesopotamia in which he may have inflicted a defeat on the Assyrians and regained control of the Isiawan copper-mines. But all this was in vain. When the final blow came, it was not Assyria which delivered it, for to the north-west a great migration was beginning which was to be stopped only on the borders of Egypt. The reasons for this movement and the identity of the people who took part in it have been much discussed without any certain conclusions being reached, but it is evident that by the time the invasions reached Egypt (c. 1186) both Aegeans and Anatolian peoples were involved in it. Yet whatever elements may have made up the invading force, its effect on Anatolia is clear. The north-western trade-route was the first to be cut. Arzawa, the great rival of the Hittites for its use, could not take advantage of the situation, for the sea was swept away as the invaders moved down the Aegean coast and on along the Mediterranean shore. Cilicia fell to them, then Cyprus, and the great copper-source had gone. Finally the invaders reached and ravaged north Syria, causing the Hittites' second life-line to be severed. What happened afterwards at Hattusas is by no means clear. Certainly no Aegean seafarers came sailing up the Halys, but the centre of the
empire was so weakened by the loss of the trade-routes that it could no longer resist the attacks of the ever-present Gasga-people and their neighbours to the north and east. The Land of Hatti was destroyed, and its capital was burnt to the ground.

So the Hittite Empire disappeared and was quickly forgotten. For two hundred and fifty years it had maintained its place as a leading power in the Middle Eastern world by a policy of keeping control of the routes by which vital raw materials reached it. This policy had been devised by the monarchs of the Old Kingdom, and its full implementation during the Imperial period gave the Hittites a position of strength and authority from which no other Middle Eastern state could dislodge them. Only when a completely new element was introduced and the trade-routes were cut by barbarian invasions from the north-west did this policy finally fail, and its failure, as Professor Goetze has said, marked the end of an epoch.

Some misconceptions

Perhaps this is a suitable point at which to mention several mistaken ideas of the nature of Hittite power. The first of these is that the Hittites owed their dominant position to their monopoly of the production of a secret weapon called iron. For this there is, as far as I know, no evidence at all. Secondly, it has been suggested that the superiority of the Hittites was due to the fact that they were ruled by an Indo-European aristocracy. The myth of Indo-European super-intelligence has been exploded long ago, but it is perhaps worth while to point out again that by the time of the foundation of the Hittite Old Kingdom (c. 1650) the invasion by speakers of an Indo-European language was already an event of the distant past, and that there is little or no evidence to suggest that the class-structure of the Hittite realm was based on considerations either of language or of race. The Hittites, like other peoples before and after them, were thoroughly hybrid in their racial make-up. Finally, the Hittites have been pictured as a horde of barbarous mountaineers who in 1595 flooded out from behind their barriers and descended, open-mouthed with greed and wonder, upon the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia. I hope I have shown that Anatolia before the Hittite descent on Babylon was by no means barbarous as this theory would have us think. On the contrary its traditions were as ancient, and its standards as high, as those of most parts of the contemporary Middle East. I have also tried to show that Hittite interest in Mesopotamia was based on economic principles which were rather more rational than simple barbarous greed.

North and north-east

The military and diplomatic problems which the Hittites faced in maintaining themselves were caused primarily by their geographical position and their economic needs. In order to understand these problems more fully it is necessary to look in some detail at the land of Hatti and its relations with neighbouring countries. Our starting-point may well be the city of Hattusas itself, and its situation on a rocky ridge looking north across a fertile plain turns our attention immediately in that direction. This rich agricultural land supplied much of the capital's corn, and its defence against the Gasga from the northern hills was a perpetual problem for the Hittite authorities. No permanent Gasgan conquest of the area was necessary; a yearly destruction of the crops was sufficient to disrupt the life of the capital. To prevent these annual raids some sort of frontier-line had to be established and maintained, and this was a constant preoccupation of Hittite kings throughout the period of the Empire. The strategic centre of this area was Hapkis (probably present-day Amasya), and from this town a line of fortified posts extended through such places as Hanhana and Hattena (perhaps near Merzifon and Gumushakkoç) in the direction of the holy city of Nerik, situated possibly at Havza, or perhaps rather further north at Oymaçaş Tepe, north-west of Yeziporup. Nerik itself was dangerously close to Gasgan territory, and was for a long period in Gasgan hands. The strength of the northern frontier depended on constant patrolling between the fortified positions, and on the use of local inhabitants to spy and report on Gasgan movements. If the line broke, a last-ditch defence along a line running from Amasya through Çorum was possible. If this too fell, there was nothing to prevent a Gasgan descent on the capital itself.

Immediately east of Hapkis the frontier ran, probably through the narrow gorge of the Yeşil Irmak, to Gaziura at present-day Turhal. From there it continued until it reached the upper Halys somewhere between Sivas and Zara. Along this line too there was constant raiding by Gasgan tribesmen, and although Hittite forces penetrated as far as the river Kummesmaha (possibly the Kelkit Çay) they were unable to gain any permanent advantage. Gasgan armies were able not only to devastate the area north of the Halys, but on occasion to cross the river and sweep down its southern bank towards Kanesh, near modern Kayseri, thus endangering the Hittites' most important communication-route with the east.