Easy Words: Reference Resolution in a Malevolent Referent World

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Abstract

This article describes early stages in the acquisition of a first vocabulary by infants and young children. It distinguishes two major stages, the first of which operates by a stand-alone word-to-world pairing procedure and the second of which, using the evidence so acquired, builds a domain-specific syntax-sensitive structure-to-world pairing procedure. As we show, the first stage of learning is slow, restricted in character, and to some extent errorful, whereas the second procedure is determinative, rapid, and essentially errorless. Our central claim here is that the early, referentially based learning procedure succeeds at all because it is reined in by attention-focusing properties of word-to-world timing and related indicants of referential intent.

Keywords: Psycholinguistics; Language development; Word learning; Reference

1. Introduction

In 2005, our research group outlined an updated theory of how language learners acquire what we called “hard words” (Gleitman, Cassidy, Nappa, Papafragou, & Trueswell, 2005). “Hard” and “easy” here pertain to the facts about acquisition. “Acquisition” in the regards we will discuss means gaining the knowledge that the concept ‘dog’ is expressed by the sound segment /dɒg/ in English. As this learning process begins, it seems reasonable to suppose that the child’s only recourse for solving this problem is to
examine the relation between some recurrent sound segment /dɔg/ and what is happening out in the world (in the best case, dog sightings). Hard words, roughly, are the ones whose meanings do not come readily to mind as a consequence of this word-to-world pairing procedure. On this definition, the word *think* would be classified as “hard” because observers do not usually guess “They’re thinking” upon observing thinkers thinking. In contrast, the word *jump* would be classified as “easy” because observers, quite consensually, guess “They’re jumping” upon observing jumpers jumping. And indeed language learners acquire words like *dog* and *jump* before words like *idea* and *think*. We proposed that the acquisition of the latter requires the use of linguistic context, which must be organized as a structured syntactic representation; it is the easy words that allow the learner to construct those representations. Putting this theory in shorthand terms, the postulate was that learners could align their sampled structured representations (syntactically analyzed sentences of, say, English) with the counterparts of these in a structured representation of the observed situation—a procedure called “syntactic bootstrapping” (Gleitman, 1990; Landau & Gleitman, 1985). This approach found support and was materially fleshed out in a series of empirical demonstrations that followed over the last few decades (e.g., Nappa, Wessell, McEldoon, Gleitman, & Trueswell, 2009; Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2006; Snedeker & Gleitman, 2003; Yuan, Fisher, & Snedeker, 2012) and, indeed, had been documented in many of its elements by several demonstrations and theoretical commentaries that led up to it (e.g., Fisher, 1996; Fisher, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1991; Gleitman, 1990; Gleitman & Landau, 1994; Lidz, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 2003; Naigles, 1990, 1996; Naigles, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1986; for reviews, Fisher & Gleitman, 2002; Gleitman & Fisher, 2005).

In retrospect, progress on the hard-word front might have been expected because the explanation drew upon, and was couched in, the kind of theoretical apparatus and terminology that Cognitive Science was designed for and proved good at (cf. Chomsky, 1959; Fodor, 1975; Pinker, 1984; Turing, 1950; Wexler & Culicover, 1980). So, for instance, Fisher et al. (1991) could predict with relative confidence why *laugh* (which describes a self-caused action) occurred in one-argument (intransitive) sentences, and by so doing recover the argument-taking properties of this predicate in a formally satisfying way, with obvious pointers to a learning schema. But these same authors acknowledged that this approach casts little light on the “other part” of the meaning of *laugh*, namely, the “ha-ha” part. Contemporary critics, and the authors of such theories themselves, looked hopefully to “the world of observation” (how words line up with their extralinguistic contingencies) to solve this “other part” of the lexical acquisition problem, sometimes being unkind enough to remark that the “ha-ha” part was what, after all, everybody else had taken to be the meaning of *laugh* in the first place (cf. Pinker, 1994; J. A. Fodor, personal communication) and that we are light years from a theory of this part. Perhaps paradoxically, the easy words and the easy parts of the hard words are the more resistant to current theorizing and explanation.

In this essay, we review some of the contemporary thinking and findings on this problem: how the “easy words” (and the “easy” parts of hard words) could be identified by a suitably endowed organism—by hypothesis, the human infant who is attempting to map words to her referents. But first, the problem and why it is so hard.
1.1. The hard problem of learning easy words from observation

We have just asserted (as if it were a truism) that in order for language learners to acquire the meanings of their first words, they must rely exclusively on what they can observe from the immediate situational context. At this initial stage, by definition, they do not have internal linguistic information to help with the task. For instance, from an utterance like “The chef baked the cake” it would be easier to learn the meaning of the word *bake* if you had previously learned the meaning of *chef* and *cake*. And it would be easier still if you knew that “chef” was the Subject of the sentence, in which case you might conjecture the meaning ‘bake’, whereas if you knew “cake” was the Subject, you might conjecture ‘poisoned’. Instead, learners without such knowledge must see (hear, feel, smell) things that exist out in the world, hear a speech segment, and hopefully make the correct connection. Speaking practically, how hard is this? Fig. 1, which shows the vocabulary growth of the child, provides some hints to the answer to this question. Infant word learning appears to be slow and laborious until the dawn of syntax. For the first 100 words or so, which are likely acquired from observation alone (Gleitman et al., 2005; Lenneberg, 1967), the rate of vocabulary accrual is unimpressive at best. Even after 18 months, the child’s vocabulary size is still only about 100 words. But a dramatic inflection point is observed immediately thereafter, when the first rudiments of connected speech (and by implication syntax) are observed. Very similar patterns are observed in estimates of child receptive vocabulary (see Caselli et al., 1995). And indeed, as many have noted before (e.g., Chomsky, 1959; Quine, 1960), learning one’s first words is not an easy problem to solve even if we make reasonable, evidently supported assumptions.

![Graph showing vocabulary growth](https://example.com/vocabulary_growth.png)

Fig. 1. Number of word types produced as a function of age of child. Figure adapted from Hart and Risley (1995).
The primary critical assumption is that even early word learning is a mapping problem between two kinds of categories (linguistic categories on one hand, and conceptual categories on the other), and not, for example, an unprepared multi-modal sensory associative process. The child who is prepared to learn words must, for example, already have candidate word forms to work from—that is, linguistic categories comprised of syllables and phonemes that permit correct generalization across speakers and permit easy detection within the continuously varying speech stream. This preparation presumably takes about 6–8 months of exposure to the language to start a candidate lexicon of word forms (e.g., Johnson & Jusczyk, 2001; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Thiessen & Saffran, 2003) and morphosyntax (Marcus, Vijayan, Rao, & Vishton, 1999). On the world side of the word-to-world equation, we also cannot assume that a learner’s mental representation is an unprepared sensory stimulation: Just like speech sounds differ from different speakers on different occasions, a dog sighting stimulates the mind in different ways every time it is experienced—different angle, different lighting, even a different dog. At the time of word learning, we have assumed that these different circumstances all evoke the category ‘dog’.

Here though is where the problem of early word learning gets hard. Very hard. Consider the situation illustrated in Fig. 2, in which a boy is hearing the word "shoe" uttered in a typical context. If this confrontation with English is to be of use to this word learner, he must confront the problem of reference resolution, the main burden of the present article. As Fig. 2 illustrates, shoes do not usually appear on white backgrounds in the form of a still photograph; there are many other objects, events, and qualia present with any particular shoe sighting. If the learner duly records every entity, relation, or implied motion in this scene, the task of learning looks hopeless. But a first clue is that the child is looking toward the shoes. Perhaps we can understand the problem of reference resolution by concentrating on such social-attentive cues. Several researchers have provided positive evidence in this regard. Bruner (1974/1975) usefully pointed out that speaker and child are in cahoots, concentrating their attention jointly on only certain elements in the scene. This suggestion has been backed up by a wide range of experimental findings demonstrating that the presence of these social-attentional cues to reference facilitate infant and child word learning (e.g., Baldwin, 1991, 1993, 1995; Bloom, 2000; Jaswal, 2010; Nappa et al., 2009; Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986; Woodward, 2003; for a recent review, see Papafragou, Friedberg, & Cohen, in press). In her classic study, Baldwin (1991) found that 16- to 19-month-old infants are sensitive to a parent’s attentional stance (cued via eye gaze, head- and body-posture) when identifying the referent and learning the meaning of a novel word. Infants connected the parent’s utterance of the word to an attended object if and only if the parent was also attending to that object.

An optimistic picture that could emerge from this body of evidence is that early word learning, so filtered, is not so hard after all. If social-attentional alignment between the parent and child is commonplace—the rule rather than the exception—it is possible that a large proportion of word occurrences are informative learning moments. Learners who are aggregating across these instances would be able to identify reference and meaning
rapidly as they get convergence (Yu & Smith, 2007). And yet, until quite recently (e.g., Clerkin, Hart, Rehg, Yu, & Smith, 2017; Roy, Frank, & Roy, 2009), surprisingly little research has asked what the situational context is like in the home for children learning their first words. This is where our inquiries began (see Section 2). It is likely that knowing what the informativity patterns are in the home will allow us to offer better theories of the cognitive machinery that supports word learning (a topic we will take up in Section 3).

2. What is the situational context like in the home?

For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that, to make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances stand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the idea; and then repeat to them the name that stands for it; as white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog. (John Locke, 1690, Book 3, IX.9)

The laboratory work on reference resolution mentioned in the previous section establishes that young language learners can use several social-attentional cues to determine the referential intent of a speaker and thus acquire an unfamiliar word’s meaning. Moreover, observational research examining parent–child interactions has established that parents who spontaneously exhibit these behaviors during object play, for example, of labeling what a child is attending, have children with larger vocabularies (e.g., Harris, Jones, Brookes, & Grant, 1986; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986; Tomasello, Mannle, & Kruger, 1986; Tomasello & Todd, 1983). However, neither the laboratory nor the
observational studies indicate what the rate of informative learning instances is in the home under more common circumstances. The observational work has been almost exclusively limited to object play, typically with a small set of predetermined objects. Moreover, with few exceptions, both the laboratory work and the observational work have been limited to situations when parents utter nouns with concrete meanings. This certainly overestimates the informativity of word learning situations. A child learning her first words does not know which ones have concrete meanings and which do not, nor are they likely to know which label objects and which do not. If we expand our assessment of referential informativity to content words in general (i.e., recurring word forms that receive some kind of prosodic stress above and beyond function words), and we expand our assessment to more than just object play, it is entirely possible that these informative situations are exceedingly rare and atypical.

2.1. Rarity of referential gems and their contribution to vocabulary growth

Our own work suggests that moments of referential clarity are very rare in the home. Much of the evidence comes from a procedure we have called the human simulation paradigm (HSP) first introduced in Gillette et al. (1999). The authors suggested that different sources of evidence as to an unfamiliar word’s meaning might be available from various aspects of the input stream. In principle, as we have discussed so far, the situational context (“observation”) would supply some evidence; later, the co-occurrence of the unfamiliar word with familiar ones (“distribution”) could supply further evidence; and later still, the structural position of the unfamiliar word in the sentence (“syntax”) could provide yet even more evidence. An experimental procedure was developed to estimate the relative contribution of these several sources of evidence taken alone or jointly. Specifically, a video corpus was built of examples of parents uttering common nouns and verbs within natural sentences to their offspring, partitioned into 40-s “vignettes” in which the word of interest (henceforth, the “mystery word”) had been uttered by the adult 30 s into each vignette. For each mystery word, six vignettes were chosen randomly from the corpus. One group of participants observed the vignettes with the sound off with the mystery word indicated by an audible beep at its exact occurrence, a proxy for the extralinguistic situation taken alone (“observation”). A second group saw just “distributional” evidence for the mystery word, that is, an alphabetical list of the nouns as they occurred in each of these six sentences (e.g., “BLEPPED: cake, chef” for the sentence “The chef BAKED the cake”). A third group was provided with “jabberwocky” versions of the parent’s utterances, that is, with content words replaced with nonsense words (“syntax”: “The florp BLEPPED the dax”). Additional participant groups received two or all three of these kinds of information together (see especially Snedeker & Gleitman, 2003). In all of these conditions, participants were given six examples of any one word in a row and, in Gillette et al., participants were told in advance whether the mystery word was a noun or a verb. The central finding of this work was that the different participant groups learned different aspects of vocabulary based on these different input representations. Those who received only the observational evidence learned mainly concrete
nouns and not verbs, thus reproducing in adults the first stages of vocabulary acquisition by infants (e.g., as documented in Bates, Dale, & Thal, 1995). Adults who were provided with the “distribution” and especially “syntax” information successfully identified more abstract words including the verbs and particularly those with abstract meaning, thus reproducing the aspects of later child vocabulary. The bottom line conclusion was that the course of early vocabulary learning is legislated by the order in which the child has access to the different sources of information and not perhaps by some hypothesized conceptual change in the nature of the learner—information change rather than conceptual change. The child hears sentences in situational contexts from the beginning but appreciates the distributional and syntactic cues only at later stages.

Perhaps the most relevant aspect of the Gillette et al. (1999) findings to the present discussion is that the initial learning procedure (“observation”) was somewhat unimpressive even in its own terms. Adults in the “observation” condition, who were given a video recording of the local, seemingly quite relevant, situational context, were only able to guess the correct meaning of 40% of the most common nouns and 15% of the most common verbs. Even this is an overestimate of the informativity of the observational database because: (a) all six vignettes of, for example, ‘dog’-mentionings, were presented in sequence, after which learners offered a final guess (this massed-trial procedure is surely not a feature of everyday conversation); and (b) participants were actually told whether the mystery word was a noun or a verb (again surely not information explicitly provided to real learners). This raises the question of how informative observational evidence actually is for first words.

To this end, our group set out to understand better the true patterning of parental word use in the home that might be underpinning the acquisition of first words. Medina, Snedeker, Trueswell, and Gleitman (2011, exp 1) used the “observational” condition of the HSP to answer this question. Medina et al. improved the procedure of Gillette et al. (1999). They used a new vignette corpus that sampled more widely across common daily activities, such as bath, meal, and play time. As in Gillette et al., the resulting video corpus consisted of 288 vignettes in which parents uttered common content nouns or common content verbs (144 vignettes each, 24 word types each, 6 vignettes for each word). Videos were again muted and a beep occurred just as the parent had uttered the mystery word. Unlike as in Gillette et al., participants were not told which words were nouns and which were verbs, nor were the six examples of a word strung together in a row; vignettes were intermixed and appeared in a random order, eliminating the benefit of comparing information from successive instances of a single word. Under these more natural sampling conditions, nouns were guessed correctly only 17% of the time and verbs a paltry 6% of the time. Medina et al. also noted that not all word exposures (i.e., vignettes) are created equal. Only a small percentage (7%) were informative above the 50% accuracy rate. We can think of these as referential “gems,” in which the situational context, including the social interaction between parent and child offered enough information to allow for the majority of naïve observers to guess what the parent was saying. Strikingly, all gems were nouns, and none verbs. Moreover, most other vignettes might be characterized as referential “junk,” yielding a less than 33% accuracy rate. Worse, observers
typically offer a scatter of different false conjectures rather than one or two (as also observed in Gillette et al.).

The picture that emerges, then, is a learning environment in which most instances of a given word’s use are uninformative but punctuated by rare occasions of referential clarity. But before taking these findings and conclusions at face value, a pressing question that must be answered is whether adult responses in the HSP are in fact an adequate proxy for the referential experiences of the children in these videos. After all, the videos are taken from a third-person angle and judgments were from adults rather than children. At least three findings in the literature alleviate these concerns.

### 2.1.1. Children perform similarly to adults on the HSP task

It is possible that responses from adults in the HSP overestimate the complexity of referential contexts, since adults may possess more concepts and more ways of interpreting scenes. Children may consider far less information and thus may be better at identifying referents if they preferentially select common word meanings—a form of the “less is more” argument (Elman, 1993; Newport, 1990). However, results do not support this possibility. Adult HSP viewers tend to guess meanings corresponding to children’s first words (Gillette et al., 1999). Moreover, child-friendly HSP studies have been conducted, in which children (4 years of age and older) produce results similar to adults (Medina et al., 2011; Piccin & Waxman, 2007). Rather than doing better than adults, children perform worse overall (Medina et al.) but nevertheless present similar patterns in their data. In particular, similar to adults, they are more accurate on nouns than verbs (Piccin & Waxman) and find the same contexts highly informative (Medina et al.).

### 2.1.2. Third-person angle is informative

The child’s own view in these HSP vignettes is quite different from the one offered to HSP observers who viewed the situation from a third-person camera angle. If HSP observers were not focusing on where the child was looking in these videos, it is possible that HSP observers consider very different information than the children in these videos. After all, the third-person videos step back and show a rather broad view of the whole scene, while the child’s focused vision is much more restrictive (Smith, Colunga, & Yoshida, 2010; Smith, Yu, & Pereira, 2011). The question of course is whether that distinction, dramatic as it seems, makes a difference. Yet, when compared, HSP responses from videos of a first-person head-mounted child camera yield very similar accuracy results to responses from videos of the same parent–child interactions viewed from a third-person fixed camera angle (Yurovsky, Smith, & Yu, 2013). In particular, HSP accuracy was exactly 58% correct from both angles and yielded very similar distributions of accuracy across items. (Higher accuracy was observed here than all other HSP studies presumably because only object play was considered and only utterances that referred to co-present objects were selected as stimuli.) First-person advantages were very small and were found only in a second study using the least informative learning instances. The lack of substantial differences between first and third-person camera angles is less surprising when one considers that adult observers are able to judge what another person is
looking at under live-action conditions in which head-turn and gaze information are present (Doherty, Anderson, & Howeieson, 2009).

2.1.3. Effects of input conditions on vocabulary size and growth

Now we turn to the truly newsworthy outcomes of such studies—that is, evidence of real-world applicability of these laboratory HSP findings (Cartmill et al., 2013). Cartmill et al. compiled video vignettes of parents uttering common concrete nouns to their 14- to 18-month-olds sampled from 56 different families ranging in socioeconomic status (SES) (as part of a larger longitudinal study, see Goldin-Meadow et al., 2014). Cartmill et al. were able to show that differential informativity (that is, the ratio of gems to junk) varies greatly across families and predicts measures of vocabulary size when assessed 3 years later at school entry. Specifically, for the most referentially transparent families, HSP participants guessed the parent’s intended meaning 45% of the time, and for the most referentially opaque families only 5% of the time! This difference predicted Peabody Vocabulary test scores measured at kindergarten entry, with this relationship holding even after controlling for the amount of talk in the home (see Fig. 3). Cartmill et al. found that both quantity of talk and its quality (i.e., its referential transparency) predict vocabulary growth. Notably, although the amount of talk was found to be positively related to family income (as observed in many studies previously, e.g., Hart & Risley, 1995), the difference in the proportion of gems to junk is a familial and not an SES variable. Although more advantaged families talk more to their children, they do not provide as a group a

Fig. 3. The quality of referential environment in the home predicts child vocabulary size 3 years later. Each data point represents a parent–child dyad. The x-axis is the average accuracy with which naïve adult observers could guess what the parent in this dyad was saying to their 14- to 18-month-old child, based on a set of muted video vignettes of everyday parent–child interactions in the home at age 14–18 months (human simulation paradigm [HSP], Accuracy). The y-axis is that same child’s vocabulary size 3 years later at school entry (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test [PPVT], at age 54 months). Panel A is the direct relationship, and Panel B is the relationship after controlling for the quantity of early input (the average number of words per minute uttered by the parent to their child at 14–18 months). Figure reproduced from Cartmill et al. (2013).
larger proportion of informative learning instances. What this means commonsensically is that it matters whether you are talking with your children rather than at them. That is, the difference comes down to commenting on the visibly passing scene more than on beliefs, desires, and commands pertaining to the world at large.

2.2. Characterizing referential gems

Another pressing question that all of this work raises is what exactly makes a referential act a gem? If laboratory evidence is a good guide, one might expect that social-attentive behaviors present in these videos determine moments of referential clarity. Trueswell et al. (2016) reported a large-scale video coding project of the Cartmill et al. (2013) HSP vignettes and confirmed that social-attentive behaviors are indeed associated with referential clarity, but they also identified a crucial amendment to this conclusion: it is the precise timing of these cues to reference, not their mere presence, that determines referential clarity. For each 40 s HSP vignette from the Cartmill et al. (2013) study, trained coders annotated the videos on a moment-by-moment basis for the presence of social-attentive cues to reference, including referent presence, parent attention to the referent, child attention to the referent, and parent gesture/manipulation of the referent. The timing of this information was found to predict the HSP accuracy score for each vignette. For instance, although low-informative vignettes (junk) were overall less likely to have the referent object present during the interaction as compared to high-informative gems, Fig. 4 shows that it is really the sudden appearance of the referent just prior to its mention that is an informative cue.

The importance of the timing was also observed for social-attentive cues to reference, such that (a) gems, not junk, are more likely to contain a sudden shift in attention by parent or child just prior to the word onset (Fig. 5A and B), which can also be characterized as (b) the onset of joint attention between adult and child (Fig. 5C); (c) parent gestures to and manipulation of the referent at or near the time of word onset are also associated with referential gems (Fig. 5D). A second-by-second multiple regression that entered all these cues simultaneously to predict HSP accuracy scores confirmed that all of these cues together contribute to HSP accuracy except for gesture/manipulation, which no longer was significant. What this means is that no single cue is a driving factor for referential clarity. For instance, Trueswell et al. found that even if one analyzes only those videos in which the referent was present throughout the entire video, the exact same timing patterns emerge for the social-attentive cues or, in other words, Fig. 5 would look very similar if it included only vignettes in which the referent was present throughout. Such patterns suggest that exact timing of information, not just the continued presence of it, drives referent identification.

Trueswell et al. (2016) asked much more specifically about how these timing relations influence learning. If “good timing” supports learning, it follows that “bad timing” should defeat it. If the relation between the word and world must be exquisitely tight, as in the imputation of cause-and-effect in the physical world (e.g., Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Michotte, 1946/1963), this would affect a massive further filter on the learning procedure.
Accordingly, Trueswell et al. (2016), in a smaller HSP study of their own, experimentally manipulated the temporal relation between the observed world and the word form, while keeping the broader situational content constant. The method was simple: Gems from previous HSP studies were modified in time such that the “mystery word” was uttered not when the linguistic event actually happened but either 1, 2, 4, or 6 s before or after. Does this matter? If the general gist of the situation in its entirety were driving the subject’s conjecture, then one or a few seconds mismatch should not matter much. But if the timing relationship is required to be very tight, we should see decrements in confidence and correct guessing in the face of even 1 or 2 s of mismatch. Indeed, this is what was observed (see Fig. 6). A corresponding study with children replicates this pattern in the essential target population (Trueswell, Dawson, Pozzan, & Gleitman, unpublished data).

2.3. Interim summary

We believe these results offer a better picture of the informational composition and distribution of referential acts in the home for young children learning their first words, more so than studies that are pre-selective both in terms of stimulus items and...
presentation conditions. Our findings suggest that rare moments of referential clarity exist in the everyday uses of common content words. Most other moments are referentially opaque in the sense that even adult observers of these parent–child interactions are unable to guess what is meant by a speech act when deprived of the linguistic signal. Moments

Fig. 5. Proportion of human simulation paradigm (HSP) vignettes that were coded as containing: (A) parent attending to the referent; (B) child attending to the referent; (C) the intersection of these two, that is, joint attention; and (D) parent gesturing at or manipulating the referent. High informative vignettes were ones where HSP observers guessed the parent’s utterance over 50% of the time. These vignettes were rare and contained a sudden increase in the relevant social-attentive behaviors just prior to word onset. Low informative vignettes were those where HSP observers guessed correctly <10% of the time. These vignettes were common and lacked relevant social-attentive behaviors. Medium informative vignettes were the rest of all vignettes and fell in between. Shaded areas reflect the time periods for which the social-attentive behavior was reliably predicted by HSP accuracy scores (*p < .05). Adapted from Trueswell et al. (2016).
of referential clarity are characterized by precisely timed social-attentive cues to reference. Moreover, homes with a greater proportion of moments of referential clarity have children whose vocabularies outpace children in homes with fewer highly informative interactions. These results point to a possible solution for how learners could solve the indeterminacy problem (so many referents in the world, yet the word refers to only one on a single occasion). If a learner has means for distinguishing the gems from the junk (a topic we take up in the next section), then one or two gems may be enough for referent identification. In other words, massive indeterminacy is a fact about the world but may not matter to the suitably endowed learner.

3. What kind of learner operates on this input?

Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse, nor the color of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold ... unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. (John Locke, 1690, Book 3, VI.28)

We have so far given evidence that the input database for the novice learner taken at face value seems malevolent: Even though there are gems, there is an enormous amount of junk. How is the learner to navigate through input of this kind? At one extreme, the learner could accept all of the information gleaned from gems and junk alike, winnowing down the meaning conjectures by locating recurrent sub-patterns in a sea of chaos. At
bottom, this is an associative procedure in the sense first outlined by Hume (1748/1902) and accepted by many present-day theorists who propose cross-situation models of word learning in which all available data are aggregated (Siskind, 1996; Yu & Smith, 2007; inter alia). What this means, however, is that a wide range of erroneous information will be entered into the learning system every time “junk” is encountered. For instance, as Locke points out (but does not recommend), you could take the co-occurrence of a passing horse accompanied by a voice of a sheep heard nearby to construct some mythical representation of a sheephorse, or you could say there are two words one approximating the meaning of sheep and the other the meaning of horse. But we are recommending a third way (which was Locke’s way too). Impressed by the apparent facts about real learning, we have proposed that the learner enters into the lexicon only a single conjecture on any learning instance, gem or junk. On the succeeding occurrence of this word form, that conjecture is tested for fit to the current situation, in a process we have called propose-but-verify. It is interesting to consider what these two approaches, cross-situation versus propose-but-verify, are expected to do on a moment of referential junk. The former will enter into learning a wide variety of erroneous conjectures (e.g., sheep, horse, sheephorse), whereas the latter will store just one, thereby limiting the situation’s negative impact. In propose-but-verify, a checking procedure does the rest; the next time the word is encountered the learner retrieves the original conjecture (be it horse, sheep or sheephorse) and attempts to verify it against the new stimulus. This procedure is effective for it is unlikely in the extreme that one will again hear the voice of a sheep upon seeing the shape a horse.

3.1. Targeted learning under cross-situation circumstances

The first evidence for this highly targeted learning procedure came from an HSP study that permitted the subjects to engage, if they wished, in cross-situation comparison (Medina et al., 2011, exp. 2). The stimuli were vignettes of parents uttering common nouns to their young children in the home under everyday circumstances. Five vignettes were selected for each word. Instead of hearing a “beep” at the exact moment the target word was uttered, adult observers heard a nonsense word (e.g., for each “ball” vignette participants heard “mipen,” for each “horse” vignette, “dax”). For each vignette, participants wrote down their best guess as to the meaning of the nonsense word, but here the recurring instances of a nonsense word were opportunities for cross-situation comparison, assuming participants could recall aspects of the previous “mipen” vignette(s). We distributed referential clarity across word occurrences (the distribution of gems and junk) to approximate what is found in the natural input: Only one in five instances of each nonsense word was a gem, and sometimes no gem occurred at all. As in natural input, we intermixed the word types such that not all “mipen” vignettes were encountered in a row. Participants’ successive guesses for each word suggested that they were following a learning procedure like propose-but-verify. In propose-but-verify, the learner is expected to pair a word form with a single referent (the current proposal) but not connect the word with any other information about that situation, including other hypothesized referents.
So, while the learner might very well remember that he saw the horse in a corral on an early Sunday morning with a ribbon around its neck, and even as a sheep passed by, these aspects of the situation are not stored alongside the word for the purposes of the acquisition of the emerging lexicon. Upon encountering the word “horse” for a second time, the learner retrieves from memory what they think “horse” means, not the past situation in which the word “horse” was encountered. We see this in our own data (Fig. 7). When people made an incorrect guess as to the referent to the word, their performance on the next word’s occurrence was no better than other participants who had viewed the same vignette in isolation without the benefit of cross-situational comparison. If participants had recalled the past situation, they would have been expected to outperform those subjects who saw only a single instance, but they did not. For instance, when the mystery word was “horse,” horses happened to be present in all five vignettes. Yet, for a participant who thought the mystery word meant something else (e.g., *sheep*), there was no remembrance of horses past. Such a participant looks for a sheep but finds none present and posits a guess based on the current situation alone.

For the most part, we have used adults as proxies for all of the work described so far on the theory that information availability rather than conceptual sophistication is the right approach. But it would be reassuring, to say the least, if we could reproduce these results in young word learners. Woodard, Gleitman, and Trueswell (2016) did just this in a highly simplified laboratory study. Children ages 2 and 3 years “went on an animal safari” in which they viewed photographs of familiar and unfamiliar animals (see Fig. 8). Critical trial sequences began with a presentation (Panel A) of an unfamiliar animal and
a familiar one (e.g., a cow). Here, only the familiar one was labeled (“Oh look a cow. Point to the cow”). On the next trial (Panel B), two additional unfamiliar animals are presented, and the spoken utterance “Oh look a mipen. Point to the mipen!” is heard. Children gaily pointed to one of the two animals without any basis for this choice. After two intervening filler trials in which known animals were labeled with their English names (Panel C), participants encountered the word “mipen” again. Here, children were assigned to one of two conditions. Children in the “No Switch” condition viewed the animal they had selected previously alongside the unfamiliar animal that they had encountered earlier but never saw labeled (i.e., the animal from Panel A). Thus, for those children who had selected the animal on the right in Panel B, they were given the trial depicted in Panel D1. For those children who selected the left animal in Panel B, they were given the trial in Panel D2. Children in the “No Switch” condition showed very good retention of mipen, selecting the referent that they had selected before with 80% accuracy (Fig. 9). Children in the “Switch” condition encountered a more malevolent referent world, one that mismatched their earlier conjecture: They viewed the animal they had not selected previously. Thus, those who had selected the animal on the right in Panel B were given Panel D2, whereas those who had selected the animal on the left in Panel B were given Panel D1. Our fundamental question is what happens under these conditions. A child who remembers the past situation of mipen (and its unselected alternative) should be well above chance. However, if all children can recall is their previous guess for mipen, they should now be at chance when faced with one animal never before paired with mipen and another that had been but was unselected. Indeed, this was the case—they behave exactly as if this was the first time the word was encountered, a case of propose-but-failure-to-verify (Fig. 9).

Research from other laboratories provides supporting evidence from children of similar ages (Aravind et al., 2018; Yurofsky & Frank, 2013).

The learning patterns observed in Figs. 7 and 9 were obtained from very different stimulus conditions (HSP vignettes and laboratory photographic images) and from subjects of different ages (adults and 2- and 3-year-olds). Yet in both cases, subjects seem to store a single conjecture with a word form, discarding it only if it does not fit the succeeding referential context (i.e., it is not verified); in this latter case the subject seems to start again from scratch in finding the referent for the presently observed stimulus. From these data, we suggest that learners do not aggregate situation-word-form pairs over many instances, seeking the best fit gradually and overall. Rather, learners do one trial learning with verification (one-and-a-bit trial learning). What this means is that assuming that the moment of correct identification varies across subjects, aggregation of accuracy across these subjects will look like gradual learning (a point made by several prior investigators of learning, including Gallistel, Balsam, & Fairhurst, 2004; Rock, 1957; Roediger & Arnold, 2012). Indeed, we observe a gradual learning pattern of this sort—on average subjects as a group gradually get better, but each individual may learn at a different moment in the sequence (see Trueswell et al., 2013). Thus, no individual “gradually learns” a word’s meaning, even though the group as a whole gradually improves.
3.2. Not so fast: The problem of homophones

Despite these successes, propose-but-verify contains the seeds of its own potential destruction: in principle, this procedure cannot acquire homophones. If the procedure had already proposed the interpretation *the proboscis-of-an-elephant* it would expunge this conjecture upon next seeing a heavy piece of luggage, toggling back-and-forth between two meanings of “trunk.” The great virtue of propose-but-verify is that it immediately and irrevocably discards a large number of unlikely hypotheses (undetached rabbit parts,
or luggage in the shape of an elephant’s nose, or a sheephorse for that matter). Its other great virtue is rapidly accepting the likely hypothesis upon passage of the simple checking procedure (i.e., verification). However, for homophones with two meanings of similar frequency, the checking procedure may not be effective, for the next occurrence of this word may be its evil homophonous twin, leading to rejection of the (correct) alternative meaning. In response to this, Stevens, Gleitman, Trueswell, and Yang (2017) offered a friendly amendment to propose—but-verify that made it more robust to homophony and other conditions of noise—namely a disconfirmed hypothesis can be retained and later evaluated. Stevens et al. (2017) offered a computational implementation of this variant of propose—but-verify, which they called Pursuit. Pursuit, like propose—but-verify and unlike cross-situational models, stores only one referent per learning instance, but unlike propose—but-verify, a rejected hypothesis can return for consideration later in a learning sequence, leading to two entirely separate entries for the homophone (this, by the way is consistent with the well-known observation that young children who know both meanings of a homophone nevertheless fail to notice the ambiguity nor understand puns that play with these words, Hirsh-Pasek, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1978). In a series of model comparisons, Stevens et al. found that Pursuit captured key findings in the literature better than either a state-of-the-art full cross-situational model or the previous, more fragile, propose—but-verify learning procedure (see also Yang, this volume). Pursuit also performed as well or better than the full cross-situational model in overall measures of

Fig. 9. Two- and three-year-olds propose-but-verify. Young children, even under highly simplified laboratory contexts (Fig. 8), recall only what the word referred to previously, not the context in which the word appeared. Children who were previously “correct” (the “No Switch” condition) selected the animal that had co-occurred with the nonsense word. Participants who were previously “incorrect” (the “Switch” condition) were at chance, suggesting that they did not recall that the animal had co-occurred with the nonsense word. These findings are very similar to the behavior of adults who were attempting to learn words from complex natural scenes (i.e., human simulation paradigm vignettes, Fig. 7) or from laboratory conditions that were referentially complex (Trueswell et al., 2013). Reproduced from Woodard et al. (2016).
success when learning word meanings from corpora of child-directed speech. This latter demonstration, of a model using more limited data but performing as well or better than a model with full information, was explained as a case of limiting the detrimental effect of referentially ambiguous word contexts, junk.

3.3. Further filters on learning: A return to timing

Note that if learners also had access to information that permits the filtering (or down-weighting) of incorrect referential guesses, rare highly informative learning instances would on average have an even greater positive impact on the learner. Indeed, experiment 2 of Trueswell et al. (2016) found that HSP observers are more confident about correct guesses as compared to incorrect ones. This occurred despite the absence of explicit feedback, indicating a role for implicit feedback from the observed visuo-social context. They identified one plausible candidate for such feedback: the timing of visuo-social cues to reference relative to word onset. As discussed above, observers were less confident about their correct guesses when the beep was surreptitiously offset from the actual occurrence of the word, even by just 1 s. Under this account, when the observer has a referential hypothesis in mind, expectations exist about how interactions with the referent object will unfold in time relative to the word’s utterance. When these expectations are not met, confidence in that guess drops and a different guess may be posited. They proposed that word learners (children and adults) have implicit sensitivity to this timing information, and they use it to determine if a referential hypothesis for an utterance is a good one. If the learner’s referential hypothesis does not comport well with the behaviors of the speaker or of the target referent (e.g., if the hypothesized referent attracted attention too soon or too late), then this referential hypothesis is decremented. This proposal would suggest that although learners hear new words again and again (in this sense the stimulus situation is “cross-situational”), they likely attempt word learning only or primarily during rare single-situation events when cues to reference and their timing are satisfied. The learner who monitors and selects for precise temporal coupling between event and utterance is likely to experience occasional “epiphany moments” that push learning forward and dovetail with the observation that word learning is rapid, quite errorless (at least to the level of referent identification), and often occurs on a single or very few exposures.

What this means for early word learning is that, especially for situations of high ambiguity (junk), learners may be less likely to posit any referential hypothesis at all. Propose-but-verify and its later variants assumed that learners guessed a single hypothesis in the face of many alternatives (rather than storing them all). In this way, propose-but-verify could reduce the deleterious impact of ambiguity (it entered only a little bit of junk into learning rather than a lot). However, if instead, referential guesses are entered into learning only when there is reason to have confidence in that guess, some additional junk may be ignored entirely. Future research will need to explore the role of confidence within and across potential learning instances.
4. Conclusions

By general consensus, vocabulary acquisition is a matter of pairing sounds with their meanings—to a first approximation, hearing “dog” upon seeing a dog. However, as we remarked in the beginning, this kind of theory is a lot easier to assert than to defend, owing to the richness of the human conceptual and perceptual repertoire, and the buzzing-blooming complexity of the world that engages the system. Our general approach has been to find ways in which the scope of this problem is naturally reduced by the learner, in ways that account for, and hopefully explain, the course and character of child word learning. To these ends, we proposed a theory of vocabulary learning in 2005, that was based primarily on information likely to be available to the novice learner, which would change in both quality and kind during the first few years of life. Specifically, we offered the following picture, restated directly from Gleitman et al. (2005):

1. Several sources of evidence contribute to solving the mapping problem for the lexicon.
2. These evidential sources vary in their informativeness over the lexicon as a whole.
3. Only one such evidential source is in place when word learning begins; namely, observation of the word’s situational contingencies.
4. Other systematic sources of evidence have to be built up by the learner through accumulating linguistic experience.
5. As the learner advances in knowledge of the language, these multiple sources of evidence converge on the meanings of new words. These procedures mitigate and sometimes reverse the distinction between “easy” and “hard” words.

We accepted, to avoid the problem of circularity, that the anchor point of this procedure was to be a small set of words, acquired from observation without collateral linguistic evidence, much as proposed by Grimshaw (1994) and Pinker (1984) and documented in vocabulary growth findings from Hart and Risley (1995) and others (see Fig. 1). The present essay has returned to ask in detail whether this default assumption is tenable and how it might work in detail.

The first half of this essay showed that the complications and richness of the raw input are real and raise the question of an effective procedure for dealing with it. One classical and modern theme of the solution for solving problems in a noisy environment has been the use of “big data.” Indeed the intelligent machine that engages in a vast aggregation process can produce incredibly impressive results on language data (e.g., Dyer, Balles-teros, Ling, Matthews, & Smith, 2015; Hinton et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2016). And that is very much in tune with the kinds of associative learning procedures that have been considered since the British Empiricists and in the tradition of Structural Linguistics (Harris, 1964). Yet there are many reasons to wonder about such theories as analogs for how the human mind works. One of them is that, at least on first inspection, children appear to learn a word “in a flash” based on one or a very few experiences rather than thousands. We have tried to convince you that child word learners are not considering many hypotheses from a single learning instance, but rather find ways to silence the noise in
the data with a series of perceptual and procedural filters. In terms of perceptual filters, we have emphasized timing, the exact temporal confluence of word with world. In terms of procedural filters, we have suggested that the learner extracts one hypothesis at a time, seeking verification.

Supposing our informal model of primitive word learning to be correct in its general properties, the explanatory victory seems at first glance to be hollow because, as we acknowledged, word-to-world pairing is a crude, domain-general procedure which can account for perhaps 1% or 2% of the vocabulary present in adulthood (see Bloom, 2000; Carey, 1978). At best, it describes only the first few hundred words understood and lisped out by children in the first year and a half of life. Not only is this vocabulary stage brief, it is quite restricted in its types, comprised mainly of whole-object nouns (see Gentner, 1982; Gentner & Boroditsky, 2001) and a smattering of other words which are very likely to occur just when the relevant event is happening (“all gone” when the plate is clean, “up” as the child is being lifted, “uh-oh” when an error or accident is happening).

Nonetheless, the primitive vocabulary thus achieved is central to understanding language acquisition for four main reasons. First, the social intercourse between adults and infants is materially advanced when even a little mutually known vocabulary is present (see Golinkoff, 1986). Second, this primitive vocabulary draws solely on the sophisticated knowledge of perceptual and belief–desire psychology that infants bring into the learning situation (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; Leslie, 1987; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Spelke, 1990); that is, infants understand “the world” though not the exposure language.

Third, the primitive vocabulary allows learners to uncover the specifics of their language’s syntax insofar as this varies (cf. Gleitman et al., 2005, among many other sources). In particular, the phrase structure representation enabled by the easy words makes possible the reconstruction of the argument structure of sentences (“whole thoughts”). This cannot be done absent specific language knowledge because of the variability in how argument structure is realized in surface structures within and across languages. For instance, arguments can be dropped (e.g., Mandarin Chinese vs. French), oblique cases vary in their marking in surface sentences (e.g., Finnish vs. English), and sentential Subjects can appear either serially early or late in the basic language structures (e.g., English vs. Fijian). To organize this variable though constrained database, the easy words inserted intonationally into the stream of words, can do much work. This change in the representational power of the input analysis—from word-to-world mapping to structure-to-world mapping—can explain how we distinguish “hugging” from “giving” (argument number, see Fisher, 1996; Gordon, 2003; Lidz et al., 2003; Naigles, 1990), when it is better to ‘receive’ than to ‘give’ (argument position; Fisher, Hall, Rakowitz, & Gleitman, 1994; Nappa et al., 2009), and, perhaps most interesting of all, how the blind learn “to see” (Landau & Gleitman, 1985).

The fourth virtue of our position is its potential for explaining two broad characteristics of the early learning procedure: why it is so slow and fast at the same time. It is slow with regard to vocabulary accrual in which the first words (mainly, the first 200 or so words produced and understood) are acquired at the rate of less than a word per week.
Hart & Risley, 1995). We explain this slowness, as well as the types of words then acquired (largely, concrete terms), because the information comes solely from observing how words line up with their conversational contingencies. A sudden increase in the word learning rate occurs at the moment when children bring new sources of evidence on line, taking into account not only the word as an isolated element, but as rendered within a syntactic structure (Lenneberg, 1967; Landau & Gleitman, 1985, inter alia). In contrast, word learning is fast from the beginning in another sense: Rather than requiring hundreds or thousands of exposures to acquire the easy words, infants seek out and acquire them at auspicious moments when the likelihood of some single hypothesis has been maximized. We have tried to explain the efficiency of this process in terms of a variety of filters, conceptual, perceptual, and procedural, that sort the gems from the junk.

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Notes

1. Notationally, we use italics for mention of a phrase or word, “double quotes” for its utterance or sound, and “single quotes” for a concept.
2. There is great disagreement as to what could be meant by the concept ‘concept’ in the first place. We cannot of course engage this enormous and ill-formulated problem here. Suffice to say, some have thought that concepts are mental images (Hume). Others have thought that a concept is a definition (a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the object to fall under this concept, Katz & Fodor, 1963). And still others have thought it is the typical or prototypical usage conditions (Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). For present purposes, we can remain blissfully neutral in these controversies, but granting on the principle of charity that the child’s success depends on reaching consensus with the adult world on such representations. Some commentators hold that child representations differ somewhat or perhaps even radically from adults and change as a function of concept growth and acquisition (Carey, 1978; Gentner, 1982; Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1995). However, others hold that information availability rather than concept change accounts for the changing character of early vocabulary (Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman, Gleitman, & Lederer, 1999).
References


