Feature licensing and the interpretation of bare nominals in Wolof

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1 Overview. Béjar & Rezac:2009 propose the *Person Licensing Condition*, which requires that the feature [PERSON] be licensed by Agree. I argue that the same holds of [NUMBER]:

(1) ***Number Licensing Condition****: A number feature must be licensed by Agree.*

The empirical motivation behind (1) is the interpretation of bare nominals (BNs) in Wolof.

2 BNs in Wolof are singular. A number of languages allow for their nominals to occur without any functional morphology. These nominals are dubbed 'BNs'. Languages of this type include Mandarin (Rullmann&You:2006), Br. Portuguese (Müller:2006, a.o.), Hindi (Dayal:2011), Amharic (Kramer:2017), a.m.o. A crosslinguistically stable property of BNs is *number neutrality* (Corbett:2000), i.e. the lack of commitment to a singular (SG) or plural (PL) interpretation. Wolof is another BN language. I assume that a BN in Wolof is a nominal that does not have a definite or indefinite determiner, nor the C(lass) M(arker) (Babou et al.:2016) affixed to it.

(2) Awa defar-na oto b-i / oto y-i / a-y oto / **oto**.
Awa fix-NA.3SG car CM.SG-DEF / car CM.PL-DEF / INDEF-CM.PL car / car
'Awa fixed the car/the cars/some cars/a car.'

That BNs in Wolof are SG can be shown by the fact that they cannot be the antecedent of PL discourse anaphora (3), saturate a collective predicate (4), or bind a reciprocal (5).

(3) Gis-na-a **jangalekat**. Maymuna bëgg-na ko / *leen.
see-NA-1SG teacher Maymuna like-NA.3SG OBJ.3SG / *OBJ.3PL
'I saw a teacher. Maymuna admires her/*them.'

(4) *Jangalekat b-i dajeele-na **xale** ci bayaal b-i.
teacher CM.SG-DEF gather-NA.3SG child PREP park CM.SG-DEF

(5) *Jangalekat b-i wanale-na **nonggo darra** ñu xam-ante.
teacher CM.SG-DEF introduce-NA.3SG student 3PL know-RECIP

This contrasts with BNs in e.g. Mandarin and Brazilian Portuguese, which can be referred back to with a SG or PL pronoun and saturate a collective predicate [not shown]. The generalization is that BNs in Wolof are SG. However, they can also be PL depending on PL Agreement.

3 PL behavior. The addition of a PL R(elative) C(lause) allows a BN to saturate a collective predicate (6), be the antecedent of a PL pronoun and of a reciprocal [the latter not shown].

(6) Jangalekat b-i dajeele-na **xale** [$_{RC}$ y-u Samba xam] (…).
teacher CM.SG-DEF gather-NA.3SG child [CM.PL-COMP Samba know]
'The teacher gathered some students who Samba knows (…).' (cf. (4))

Conversely, a nominal modifier without number morphology or the syntax of a RC does not have the same effect: a BN modified by it still behaves as if it were SG:

(7) *Roxaya dajeele-na **fécckat** brezilien.
Roxaya gather-NA.3SG dancer Brazilian

The comparison between (6) and (7) suggests that what is relevant is the presence of a PL morpheme (the CM *y*). The same is suggested by the sensitivity of possessive determiners to the number of the poss'um. In (8a)/(8b), the poss'um's form remains unchanged. Its PL interpretation is correlated with the occurrence of the PL suffix *-y*. (*y* is not a CM, which is *ñ* for *nit*.) The possessed nominals in (8a)/(8b) are BNs, since this structure allows for a determiner and a CM: *sama jigéen y-i* 'POSS.1SG woman CM.PL-DEF' (*the fem. friends of mine*).

(8) a. sama **nit** b. sama-y **nit**
POSS.1SG person 'my friend' POSS.1SG-PL person 'my friends'

In contrast, the genitive *-u* is not sensitive to the number of the poss'um and a SG arises (9). (In (9), the number of the poss'um is revealed by a *pronoun*. *Muus* is a BN because this construction can have a determiner: *a-y muus-u Mareem* 'some cats of Mareem's'.)

(9) Toogakat b-i gis-na **muus**-u Mareem, waay xa-w-ma *b-an* / *y-an la.
cook CM.SG-DEF see-NA.3SG cat-GEN Mareem but know-NEG-1SG CM.SG-Q / *CM.PL-Q COP.3SG
'The cook saw a cat of Mareem's, but I don't know which.'

The generalization is that, if a morpheme does not encode plurality, a SG interpretation persists. I argue that these morphemes are the exponent of PL Agreement and that this operation is necessary in order to license the [PL] feature in the BN.

4 Analysis. Torrence:2013 proposes that the CM prefixed to the RC complementizer results from Agree. I extend this proposal to the CMs that appear in determiners like those in (2). That CMs are the exponent of Agree is further suggested by the fact that more than one CM can occur in the same nominal (cf. Kramer's:2009 analysis of multiple determiners in Amharic).

(10) Roxaya xam-na a-b jangalekat b-u Maymuna bëgg.
Roxaya know-NA.3SG INDEF-CM.SG teacher CM.SG-COMP Maymuna like
'Roxaya knows a teacher that Maymuna admires.'

The CM morpheme also encodes number information, as seen by the *b*/*y* (SG/PL) alternation in (2). I assume the nominal spine in (11) (cf. Ritter:1991; Harbour:2011; a.m.o.), with the addition of AgrP, which probes for Number and CM, formalized here as a feature. Lastly, I assume that root-specific information like class or gender is encoded at categorizers (Embick:2015; Sigurðsson:2019, a.o.). The derivation of a full nominal in Wolof is as in (11), where Agr has its number feature valued by Num and its CM feature, by *n*. This combination of feature values may be exponed as e.g. /y/ (cf. (2)). In (11), if Num is PL, it is Agreed with by Agr.

(11) $[_{DP}\ D\ [_{AgrP}\ Agr_{[CM:\_,\ Num:\_]}\ [_{NumP}\ Num_{[Num:PL]}\ [_{nP}\ n_{[CM]}\ \sqrt{}\ ]]]]$

Following Massam:2001; a.o., I assume that BNs are truncated: BNs in Wolof lack a DP and an AgrP layer. NumP is retained under the assumption that this is the only locus of number interpretation (Ritter:1991,1992; Harbour). Hence, the BN structure is $[_{\mathbf{NumP}}\ \mathbf{Num}\ [_{\mathbf{nP}}\ \boldsymbol{n}\ \sqrt{}]]_{BN}$. Num could be SG or PL, since these are options exhibitted by full nominals in Wolof. If Num is PL, nothing Agrees with it. I submit that this is what causes the absence of a PL interpretation (§2). More precisely, I propose that the [PL] feature must be licensed by Agree (1). Following this reasoning, SG would not have this requirement. I follow Nevins:2011 in assuming that SG Num is the absence of a number specification, which could be why a condition like (1) cannot be formulated *wrt* [SG]. In that case, nothing prevents the derivation from converging. This would be why BNs in Wolof are SG. I also follow Torrence in assuming a raising analysis of RCs. The CM prefixed to the RC COMP is a consequence of Agree. This is captured by an AgrP below CP. If a BN is the RC's head, its [PL] can be Agreed with by Agr (12), satisfying (1). This captures why BNs modified by a PL RC can be PL. Plain modifiers (7) lack number exponents, hence why [PL] cannot be licensed; the only convergent derivation is one where Num is SG.

(12) $[_{CP}\ C\ [_{AgrP}\ Agr_{[CM:\_,\ Num:\_]}\ [_{TP}\ \textit{subj}\ T\ [_{VP}\ t_{\textit{subj}}\ V\ [_{\mathbf{NumP}}\ \mathbf{Num}_{[Num:PL]}\ [_{\mathbf{nP}}\ \boldsymbol{n}_{[CM]}\ \sqrt{}\ ]]_{BN}]]]]$

(1)'s role in the availability of a PL can also be witnessed in the contrast between the possessive constructions in (8b) and (9), of which only the former has a [PL] exponent. I assume that (8b) has the structure (13), where the possessive determiner is a head. It has [NUMBER], which can Agree with the BN's [PL], thereby licensing it. As for the genitive (9), I assume Den Dikken's:2006 R(elator) P(hrase), where the poss'um is at Spec-RP and the poss'or, at Compl-RP (13); R is exposed by *-u*. Because this morpheme is not sensitive to number, it lacks the corresponding feature. As such, (1) is violated and a PL reading cannot arise.

(13) $[_{PossP}\ sama_{[Num:\_]}\ [_{\mathbf{NumP}}\ \mathbf{Num}_{[Num:PL]}\ [_{\mathbf{nP}}\ \boldsymbol{n}_{[CM]}\ \sqrt{\mathbf{NIT}}\ ]]_{BN}]$

(14) $*[_{RP}\ [_{\mathbf{NumP}}\ \mathbf{Num}_{[Num:PL]}\ [_{\mathbf{nP}}\ \boldsymbol{n}_{[CM]}\ \sqrt{\mathbf{MUUS}}\ ]]_{BN}\ [_{R'}\ R_{-u}\ [Mareem]]]$

5 Conclusion. Unlike other BNs, BNs in Wolof are exclusively SG. I proposed an analysis that extended Béjar & Rezac's *Person Licensing Condition* to [NUMBER]. If correct, this analysis may provide further support for Kalin's2019 feature licensing/featural derivational time bombs.

How to Derive Non-Logophoric Backward Binding for Stative Location Verbs

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Summary: New English data (from the native speaker author and other native speakers) shows that non-passive backward binding (BB) is not limited to experiencer predicates, as previously claimed (e.g., [1]), and may occur with stative location verbs. This challenges treating such BB as uniformly involving logophors (=logophoric uses of anaphors), as the binder in the new data does not meet criteria licensing logophors. I show two ways to derive Principle A-obeying BB: idiosyncratic Case assignment (cf. [2]), or smuggling (cf. [3]). I argue for the first analysis for the new data based on more novel data from particle verbs. This enriches our understanding of the typology of verbal predicates, since it shows at least two distinct ways to derive transitive surface structures: the standard way disallows BB, while the way shown here allows it.

Previous Accounts: BB occurs when an anaphor is bound by a DP below it. Non-passive BB has (primarily) been shown before with object experiencer verbs and psych causatives [4, 5] (also [1] and references therein; discussion of other psych-related BB is omitted here due to space):

(1) a. Each other$_i$'s constituents annoy the politicians$_i$. (Stative object experiencer)
b. Each other$_i$'s parents make every couple$_i$ nervous. (Periphrastic psych causative)

A **structural** approach to BB assumes that at some point in the derivation of these sentences, the binder c-commands the anaphor. The anaphor-containing DP then moves to Spec,TP in the course of the derivation ([2, 5, 6, 7], a.o.), but extending this to periphrastic causatives and more complex cases proves difficult [1]. A **logophoric** approach treats the "anaphors" as logophors, identical in form to an anaphor (in English), but licensed differently ([1], and references therein); logophors are licensed by and refer to animate perspective-takers [8, 9]. BB with experiencer predicates is always amenable to a logophoric analysis, since their meanings require animate perspective-takers.

New Data: BB with Stative Location Verbs: In light of these facts, consider the following novel data in (2), which shows grammatical instances of BB with stative location verbs:

(2) a. Each other$_i$'s monitors blocked the computers$_i$.
b. Each other$_i$'s lids covered the pans$_i$.

(Nothing hinges on the use of reciprocals.) These show non-passive BB with non-experiencer verbs. Crucially, this BB is not logophoric, as inanimate DPs cannot license logophoric anaphors [8, 9].

Two Approaches: Passives also allow non-logophoric BB:

(5) Each other$_i$'s noses were hit *(by the girls$_i$).

BB is only licit with the *by*-phrase. There are two ways to derive this, given standard assumptions about intervention and Principle A binding. Assume Principle A anaphors must be bound by a local c-commanding DP, as in (3), where DP_1 binds into DP_2. BB arises when DP_2 moves over DP_1. This violates Relativized Minimality (RM) [10] if no feature distinguishes DP_1 and DP_2. The two approaches differ in how they avoid violating RM. One approach marks DP_1 as a non-mover. In passives, *by* does this, ensuring the object will move over the agent DP to Spec,TP (e.g., [11]). Traditionally for non-passive BB, the equivalent to this approach explains BB by assigning DP_1 lexical accusative Case [2]. The other approach smuggles DP_2 past DP_1, as in (4). Here, in passives, the VP moves above the agent DP. The object can then smuggle to Spec, TP [3] past it. More generally, moving a phrase containing DP_2 high enough relative to DP_2 means DP_2 can then smuggle out of the moved phrase without violating RM or preventing movement of DP_1. More abstractly, these are the **only** ways to derive syntactic BB—be it in passives, with stative

(3)



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

location verbs, or unknown contexts—without revising common ideas about RM and Principle A.

Deriving BB: Consider BB with *cover* (*up*):

(10) Each other$_i$'s lids **covered up** the pans$_i$. /
Each other$_i$'s lids **covered** the pans$_i$ **up**.

Crucially, *up* may appear either before or after the object. In explaining this, I will use [12]'s analysis of particles, but the claims I make extend to any analysis where particles occur below the verb. Consider the structure licensing binding, (6). (Although (6) implies odd semantics, this is an intentional simplification.)

(6)



Taking the first option from above means moving DP_2 over DP_1 to Spec,TP. The verb moves to *v*, (optionally) leaving the particle behind as in (7), which derives (10). This means DP_1 cannot move to Spec,TP, to avoid violating RM. I attribute this to lexical accusative Case, following [2]'s approach.

(7)



Now consider smuggling. Suppose the lower VP moves to Spec,*v*P as in (8). DP_2 smuggles past DP_1 to Spec,TP, deriving pre-object *up*. But post-object *up* poses a problem. Suppose V head-moves higher, and DP_1 moves between V and *up*. Consider when VP has moved, and no DP has yet moved independently in (9). The surface order shows DP_1 adjoins to ?′P, but DP_2 is closer, and must be prevented from moving just as before. Smuggling has brought no payoff.

(8)



(9)



Implications: What is surprising here is not that the object of stative location verbs gets accusative Case, which is apparent, but this Case's lexical source. But there are 3 reasons to favor this. First, while all speakers consulted so far have accepted the novel data, variation might be possible; this could be attributed to lexical Case assignment by some speakers but not others. Second, lexical Case for just these verbs explains why most transitives disallow BB. Finally, stative location verbs describe spatial relations between their arguments, akin to prepositions. This idiosyncratic Case assignment could be related to these meanings; cf. [1] (a.o.). Note that **agentive** uses of location verbs do not describe spatial relations between the subject and object, and disallow BB, like agentive uses of experiencer verbs [2, 4], as in (11); despite agentive and stative variants' surface similarity, BB reveals a more complex derivation for the latter, likely related to their distinct meanings.

(11) a. * Each other$_i$'s friends deliberately annoyed the men$_i$.
b. * Each other$_i$'s owners intentionally covered the monitors$_i$.

References: **[1]** Landau 2010. **[2]** Belletti & Rizzi 1988. **[3]** Collins 2005. **[4]** Pesetsky 1987. **[5]** Pesetsky 1995. **[6]** Cheung & Larson 2015. **[7]** Cheung & Larson 2018. **[8]** Charnavel & Zlogar 2016. **[9]** Charnavel & Sportiche 2016. **[10]** Rizzi 1990. **[11]** Bruening 2013. **[12]** Johnson 1991.

On the interaction of reflexives and periphrastic causatives in Icelandic

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Cross-linguistically, reflexive verbs frequently show puzzling behavior when embedded under causatives (Taraldsen 1984; Loewenthal 2013; Holvoet 2016). In this talk, we focus on two ways that this pattern manifests itself in Icelandic Indirect Causatives: (i) verbs that normally cannot be embedded are allowed with reflexives, and (ii) a pleonastic use of the causative verb becomes available in imperatives with oblique subjects. We propose that these facts follow from the syntax of long-distance reflexives (which involves a "point-of-view" operator OP_{POV}), and a Voice-stacking analysis of indirect causatives (Nash 2017; Nie to appear; Sigurðsson & Wood to appear). The claim is that there is a limited set of ways to interpret the Voice-stacking structure, and reflexives provide one particular way to do this that is not otherwise available. The analysis supports the view that the syntax of causatives is derived from the interaction of more basic primitives and mechanisms, and is not encoded with a dedicated functional head in the grammar.

❶ **Causatives as Voice-stacking** Analyses of causatives across languages vary in terms of whether they involve a dedicated causative head in the cartography of the vP, or are derived from the interaction of independent elements. Recently, a family of proposals has emerged claiming that **causatives may involve Voice-stacking**—a Voice head that takes a VoiceP complement directly (see references above).

(1) [$_{\text{VoiceP}}$ causer Voice [$_{\text{VoiceP}}$ causee Voice [$_{\text{vP}}$ …event…]]]

One immediate problem with this view is **how to interpret this structure**: the two Voice heads cannot both introduce agent roles for the same event (the "Stratal Uniqueness Law" in Perlmutter & Postal 1983; see also Myler 2016:286). However, Myler (2016) and Wood & Marantz (2017) (among others) have argued that **Voice heads in general are underspecified for meaning**, are compatible with a variety of thematic roles, and may even be semantically expletive (see also Alexiadou et al. 2015, Schäfer 2017). Sigurðsson & Wood (to appear) argue for a Voice-stacking analysis of Icelandic Indirect Causatives (ICs), where the specifier of the lower VoiceP is a silent φP; the light verb *láta* 'let/make' is a realization of the higher Voice head.

(2) [$_{\text{VoiceP}}$ þau Voice(=*láta*) [$_{\text{VoiceP}}$ φP Voice [$_{\text{vP}}$ kyssa þorsk]]]
they let kiss codfish
'They let/made/had someone kiss a codfish.'

Importantly, the lower φP cannot antecede reflexives, but does define a domain: thus, complex reflexives like *sjálfan sig*, which must be locally bound, are ungrammatical, and long-distance simplex reflexives like *sig* can only be bound by the higher (overt) subject.

As for interpretation, they develop Lundin's (2003) proposal for Swedish, which is that these constructions involve "**Agent splitting**". The idea is that a canonical agent is both an INITIATOR (responsible for agentive, sentient aspects of bringing the event about), and a DOER who is responsible for performing the physical actions that bring the event about. **In ICs, these two aspects of agency are split**, divided across the Voice heads, with the higher head introducing the INITIATOR and the lower head introducing the DOER. The apparent causative meaning, in this case, does not come from having two separate events related by a cause relation, but rather from having one event with a distinct INITIATOR and DOER (leading to the inference that there must be some kind of relationship between them so that the initiator could control what the doer does). However, agent splitting is **not the only conceivable way** of resolving the issue of how to interpret a Voice-stacking configuration. In what follows, we will show how the presence of a reflexive leads to another possibility.

❷ **vPs that normally resist embedding** under ICs often allow it if they contain a reflexive. One prominent example of this involves perception verbs like 'watch' or 'hear'.

(3) Hættu að horfa á Guðmund$_i$, hann$_i$ vill ekki **láta** **horfa á sig$_i$.**
stop watching Guðmundur he wants not let watch REFL
'Stop watching Guðmundur, he doesn't want to be watched.'

(4) * Hættu að horfa á Guðmund$_i$, ég vil ekki **láta** **horfa á hann$_i$.**
stop watching Guðmundur I want not let watch him
INTENDED: 'Stop watching Guðmundur, I don't want {him watched / to let anyone watch him.'}

We propose that these verbs do not allow 'agent splitting' because the external argument is not an agent (an INITIATOR and a DOER), but a PERCEIVER. This rules out (4), as there is no well-formed interpretation of the Voice-over-Voice structure. In (3), however, the reflexive allows an alternative path to a well-formed interpretation. We assume that long-distance reflexives are logophors, bound by a "point-of-view" operator OP$_{POV}$ (Sells 1987; Koopman & Sportiche 1989; Sigurðsson 1990). (3) is possible because the lower Voice head introduces the full, ordinary external argument interpretation (PERCEIVER), leaving no interpretation for the higher Voice head, which is thus expletive. However, the higher VoiceP may host OP$_{POV}$ to bind the long-distance reflexive. (We remain agnostic about whether this is by movement or unselective binding.) This operator lambda-abstracts over the reflexive (cf. Landau 2011:795ff), so that the syntactic external argument is interpreted as (i) binding the reflexive, and (ii) the logophoric center of the embedded proposition.

(5) [$_{VoiceP}$ *DP$_i$* OP$_{POV\text{-}i}$ Voice [$_{VoiceP}$ φP (=PERCEIVER) Voice [$_{vP}$ …REFL$_i$…]]] —>
λx x
≈ (λxλe∃y. perceiver(y)(e) & watch(x)(e) & POV(x)(e)) (DP)

Thus, there is no actual causative meaning in such cases; the meaning is rather much closer to a passive: the external argument is existentially bound and the surface subject is thematically related to the object position (where the reflexive is). It is distinct from the passive in involving OP$_{POV}$, which makes it essentially a passive with the derived subject as the logophoric center.

❸ **Verbs that take oblique subjects** cannot form imperatives in the normal way in Icelandic (Sigurðsson 1989). Instead, to express the intended meaning, a causative is used with a reflexive for the subject.

(6) Lát-**tu** **þér** batna.
let-you.NOM REFL.DAT get.better
'Get better!' (Lit. 'Let/make yourself get better.')

(7) Lát-**tu** **þig** ekki vanta
let-you.NOM REFL.ACC not be.missing
'Don't be a stranger!' (Lit. 'Don't let yourself be missing.')

Assuming that there is a syntactic constraint on the canonical imperative construction that bars oblique subjects, our analysis explains why the causative construction can be used to express this same meaning. The lower Voice head will be unaccusative (as with all oblique subject constructions in Icelandic) and there is no theta-role available for the higher Voice head. The derivation proceeds exactly as above, except that there is no implicit external argument: the surface subject binds the (OP$_{POV}$ which binds the) reflexive, allowing a nominative formal subject (to meet the syntactic constraint of imperatives) to connect to the oblique thematic subject.

❹ **Summary** Voice splitting, along with the assumption that Voice is underspecified for interpretation, offers a novel way of understanding why reflexives interact with causatives in the way that they do: causatives are derived by Voice-stacking, and reflexives offer a special way of interpreting that structure, using the normal mechanisms of long-distance reflexive binding.

Top-down derivations: Flipping syntax on its head

Robert Frank (Yale) and Hadas Kotek

Summary: Several decades of Minimalist syntax have focused on theories that build structure in a *bottom-up* fashion (Chomsky 1992 et seq), using the *Merge* operation. As sometimes noted, derivations could instead proceed *top-down*, where structure building embeds one syntactic object within another already existing one. It has however proven difficult to argue decisively for one approach over the other (but cf. Phillips 2003; den Dikken 2018). This talk revisits a number of well-known empirical domains that we believe, on further reflection, provide arguments in favor of a top-down approach. In the phenomena we discuss, properties of *higher* structure condition the availability of syntactic operations or interpretive possibilities of *lower* structure. Under a top-down approach, such patterns follow naturally from the order in which elements are integrated into the structure (i.e., higher before lower). If derivations are incrementally interpreted (semantically and morphologically) in phases, the interpretation of lower structure can be conditioned on the earlier interpretation of a higher phase but not conversely. Bottom-up derivations lead to opposite predictions, but we claim that such patterns are much rarer and more restricted.

Syntactic arguments: *(a) Superiority*: English exhibits a restriction on movement in multiple *wh*-questions: the *wh*-phrase that is base-generated higher must raise both in matrix and embedded questions (1a-b)) (Kuno and Robinson 1972; Chomsky 1973). However, embedded Superiority violations are possible if there is a higher *wh*-phrase with which the embedded in-situ *wh*-phrase can be co-construed, (1c) (Huang 1982, p.572, Lasnik and Saito 1992). On a top-down perspective, this pattern of facts can be captured: the matrix *wh*-phrase is already present in the structure when movement in the lower clause takes place, and can serve as a conditioning factor. In contrast, the bottom-up approach encounters difficulty: determining whether the embedded C can induce Superiority-violating movement will require some measure of lookahead into the matrix clause.

(1) a. * What did who buy? b. * I wonder what who bought.
c. Who wonders what who bought?

(b) Resumptive pronouns: In English, certain syntactic gaps are realized as resumptive pronouns *only* when they are within islands (2) (Ackerman et al. 2018). In a top-down derivation, the island context is integrated into the derivation before realization as a resumptive pronoun must be determined, allowing for the contrast in (2a–b). In contrast, the bottom-up approach has difficulty specifying, in an incremental fashion, whether an element can be realized as a gap or pronoun: islandhood information is unavailable at the point that the gap is spelled out (Georgi and Salzmann 2017).

(2) a. Which woman did the detective throw a fit $[_{\text{island}}$ after the newspaper claimed [that the police had questioned {✓her/*∅}]]?
b. Which woman was the detective surprised $[_{\text{non-island}}$ that the newspaper claimed [that the police had questioned {*her/ ✓∅}]]?

Semantic arguments: *(a) Sequence-of-Tense* shows an ambiguity (3), where *lower* past tense predicates can be interpreted as *past* or *zero* tense, *only* when the *matrix* is past (Ogihara 1996; Kratzer 1998).

(3) Mary said that she was eating.
a. *Simultaneous Reading*: Mary said "I am eating." past on *was* = zero tense
b. *Back-Shifted Reading*: Mary said "I was eating." past on *was* = past tense

This is naturally accommodated in a top-down model: the higher tense is integrated first, providing the necessary context to determine whether a SOT reading is available for the lower tense. In contrast, a bottom-up approach requires either the abandonment of derivationally incremental interpretation or a more complex means of computing temporal interpretation.

(b) neg-words in non-strict negative concord (NC) languages provide a similar argument. In Spanish, post-verbal *neg*-words must exhibit NC, (4a). Pre-verbal *neg*-words, on the other hand, are typically interpreted with their own negative force. However, in examples like (4b), the higher predicate *imposible* can license a NC interpretation of the pre-verbal *neg*-word in the lower clause, leading to an ambiguity. From a top-down perspective, this data is natural and unproblematic: the negative predicate *imposible* is structurally integrated first; at the point of reaching the *neg*-word, we already have the information needed to determine whether a NC reading can be licensed. On a bottom-up derivation, on the other hand, this seems to require some amount of lookahead.

(4) a. Es imposible [que lo sepa *nadie*]. (only single negation reading)
'It is impossible that anyone knows it.'

b. Es imposible [que *nadie* lo sepa]. (ambiguous between single and double negation)
'It is impossible that anyone/nobody knows it.' (Herburger 1999, p.102)

(c) English any and wh-words: Arguments parallel to (3)–(4) can be made from English *any* as NPI vs. FCI (e.g. "I didn't [take any apple]" vs. "you can [take any apple],") and from English *wh*-elements as relatives vs. questions (e.g. "I know [who wrote the book]" vs. "I know the woman [who wrote the book]"), with possible interpretations in each case determined by higher context.

Morphological arguments: Morphological/inflectional dependencies are typically captured in Minimalist syntax through a downward Agree operation (Chomsky, 2000). Yet there are numerous cases where morphological marking on a syntactic element must be driven by properties of a higher element, something which top-down derivations make available. Well-known examples include Arabic subject agreement (Aoun et al. 1994) and Romance past participle agreement (Kayne 1989; see also Longenbaugh 2019). Such patterns have motivated Zeijlstra (2012); Wurmbrand (2012, 2014); and Bjorkman and Zejlstra (2019) to argue for *Upward* Agree. Arguments in favor of UA thus lend support to the top-down view, but are challenging to a bottom-up approach.

Discussion: We aim to show that a top-down view admits straightforward analyses of the patterns discussed above within the confines of phase-local derivation, while bottom-up accounts do not. We hope that this conclusion will encourage others to view syntactic problems from this top-down perspective, as it opens up a novel set of questions. Can a top-down view shed light on the lack of SOT phenomena in head-final languages like Japanese, and on the lack of relative/question ambiguities in their use of *wh*-elements? Further, since the majority of our arguments also argue in favor a left-to-right (linear) derivational mode, is there evidence that can tease these two apart?

Selected References: Ackerman, Frazier & Yoshida 2018. Resumptive pronouns can ameliorate illicit island extractions. *LI*. **Bjorkman & Zeijlstra 2019.** Checking up on (ϕ-)Agree. *LI*. **den Dikken 2018.** *Dependency and directionality*. **Georgi & Salzmann 2017.** The matching effect in resumption. *NLLT*. **Herburger 1999.** On the interpretation of Spanish n-words. In *Semantic issues in Romance syntax*. **Longenbaugh 2019.** On expletives and the agreement-movement correlation. Dissertation, MIT. **Wurmbrand 2014.** The Merge Condition: A syntactic approach to selection. In *Minimalism and Beyond: Radicalizing the Interfaces*. **Zeijlstra 2012.** There is only one way to agree. *The Linguistic Review*.