

YOU AND MONSTERS

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1. The problem.

The existence of indexicals that can shift their reference under influence of linguistic context has been the subject of much debate (Kaplan 1989, Schlenker 2003, *inter alia*).

Kaplan 1989 claims that operators capable of shifting contexts do not exist in natural language, and terms them *monsters*. Schlenker 2003 pleads for the existence of monsters, offering data from Russian present tense (among others). Present tense, which is usually taken to be an indexical pointing to the time of the utterance, shifts in attitude reports to point to the reported utterance time (1).

(1) Russian: Last month, John said "I am building a house."

V proshlom mesjace Vanja skazal, chto on stroit dom.

In last month John said that he builds.PRES house

'Last month John said that he was building a house.'

(lit.: 'Last month John said that he is building a house.')

Some recent proposals limit the types of shifting indexicals that exist in natural languages, and of *monsters*, or operators that can quantify over or shift the contexts (Adesola 2004, Anand and Nevins 2004, Sharvit 2004).

I will discuss the impersonal use of the second-person pronoun *you* (2) in English and Russian, demonstrating that it shifts in contexts with adverbial quantification.

(2)a. *Teper' takih vidov ne najdesh' uzhe.*

Now such views not will.find.2nd-sing already

'You don't find such views nowadays'

b. You don't get this kind of undeveloped countryside anymore.

The chief challenge presented by the impersonal *you* is how to reconcile its indefinite-like susceptibility to quantification with its indexical nature.

I will argue that this shifting behaviour should be analysed without recourse to monsters, and present a unified semantics for the deictic and impersonal uses of *you*.

2. Indefinite behaviour.

In sentences with adverbial quantification, *you* acquires the quantificational force of the adverb: quantificational variability effect (QVE), both in regular sentences with quantificational adverbs (3a), and in donkey-sentences (3b).

(3)a. In those days, you usually/rarely lived to be 60.

b. If you deal with the Mafia, you usually/rarely/sometimes get killed.

This is trademark behaviour of indefinites (4), which provide a variable that is then bound by the adverb.

(4) In those days, a man usually/rarely lived to be 60.

3. *You* is not indefinite.

In sentences lacking adverbial (or silent generic) quantification, *you* can only be interpreted deictically (5). In contrast, indefinites in such sentences are interpreted as existentially quantified variables (6).

This lack of existential reading provides apparent contradiction with the indefinite behaviour of *you* in QVE contexts.

(5) Yesterday you burned a house (*impersonal *you*, only deictic reading ok)

(6) Yesterday, a criminal burned a house

Another peculiarity of *you* is that even on its impersonal use it always requires that the addressee empathise with the agent denoted by *you* (compare with *one* in 7).

- (7) a. In those days in England, one had to show you some respect
b. In those days in England, you had to show one some respect

4. The proposal.

Like Alonso-Ovalle (2002) and Malamud (2005) I propose a unified analysis for the impersonal and deictic use of *you*.

I do so by, first, separating the addressee's *self* and the addressee's *persona* in the reference of *you*.

The *self* is the decision-maker/soul/mind; the *persona* is the role the decision-maker is playing/ the body the decision-maker is wearing. This separation is independently needed for an account of indexicals in counterfactuals like (8).

In (8), *you/I* refer to addressee/speaker themselves (their souls/minds/selves), describing a (counterfactual) situation in which they are in Mary's shoes/persona/role.

- (8) a. If you/I were Mary, you/I wouldn't be dating this horrid guy she's with! =
b. If your/my *self* had Mary's *persona*/role, this self (in Mary's role) wouldn't be dating this guy

Persona is a two-place predicate, relating two individuals in a world: the actor (your self or my self in (8)) and the role (Mary in (8)). In the case of

counterfactuals, the *persona* predicate is a part of the denotation of the copula.

I propose that in addition to the reference to addressee's self, *you* contains a variable over personas/roles (existentially quantified, depending on framework)(9).

- (9) a. [[you]] = $\lambda w. \lambda P. \exists x. \text{persona}(x, \text{addressee}(c), w) \& P(\text{addressee}(c), w)$
b. [[I]] = $\text{speaker}(c)$

In a context without any adverbial quantification, illustrated in (5), the reading would be 'There is a persona, such that the addressee, inhabiting this persona, burned a house' as shown in (10).

(10) You burned a house →

$$\lambda w \exists x. \exists z. \text{House}(z, w) \& \text{Persona}(x, \text{addressee}(c), w) \& \text{Burned}(\text{addr}(c), z, w)$$

The persona/guise/body in which the addressee's *self* burned the house would normally be taken to be the addressee's body (unless prior context provides a belief that the addressee is a witch and can possess other people's bodies, and so could burn a house while possessing someone else's body).

In QVE contexts, the variable over personas is bound by the Q-adverb (again, depending on the framework, either by existential disclosure, or via situational-semantic means, among other possibilities).

Thus, (2) would read 'For most/few people living then, if you're in the shoes of that person, you live to be 60' as shown in (11).

(11) You usually lived to be 60 →

$$\lambda w. \text{Most } x. \text{Persona}(x, \text{addressee}(c), w) \rightarrow \text{Live.to.60}(\text{addressee}(c), w)$$

In contrast to *you*, *I* is underspecified for persona, allowing (8), but not the impersonal use (9b).

7. Further issues.

The data here shows that *you* patterns like other variables in double-pronoun contexts.

Percus and Sauerland (2003) present data on *de se* pronouns, where different readings arise in the scenario where John dreams he is Bill.

Two pronouns in the dream report have two potential antecedents: John and Bill (John's dream-self). This gives rise to incestuous readings, but also to mixed readings (12), except <real-self, dream-self> reading for (12a).

(12) Binding pattern of *de se* pronouns

a. John dreamed he married his granddaughter.

i. ok J dreamed J married J's granddaughter.

ii. ok J dreamed that he, as B, married B's granddaughter.

iii. * J dreamed that J married his=B's granddaughter.

iv. ok J dreamed that he, as B, married J's granddaughter.

b. John dreamed his granddaughter married him.

i. ok J dreamed that J's granddaughter married J.

ii. ok J dreamed that he, as B, married B's granddaughter.

iii. ok J dreamed that J's granddaughter married him=B.

iv. ok J dreamed that his=B's granddaughter married J.

In fact, as pointed out by Hardt (2003), the *de se* pattern in (12) replicates the one observed by Dahl (1973) for the sloppy variables in VP-ellipsis (13).

(13) Binding pattern for sloppy variable in VP-ellipsis

- a. John said he saw his mother, and Bill did, too.
 - i. ok Bill said John saw John's mother.
 - ii. ok Bill said Bill saw Bill's mother.
 - iii. * Bill said John saw Bill's mother.
 - iv. ok Bill said Bill saw John's mother.

- b. John said his mother saw him, and Bill did, too.
 - i. ok Bill said John's mother saw John.
 - ii. ok Bill said Bill's mother saw Bill.
 - iii. ok Bill said John's mother saw Bill.
 - iv. ??ok Bill said Bill's mother saw John.

Here is the data with the double-pronoun sentences involving *you* (14). The data entirely replicates the pattern in (12) and (13)

(14) Binding pattern of *you*

- a. In those days, you could marry your sibling.
 - i. ok Addressee could marry addressee's sibling.
 - ii. ok One could marry one's sibling.
 - iii. * Addressee could marry one's sibling.
 - iv. ok One could marry addressee's sibling.

- b. In those days, your sibling could marry you.
 - i. ok Addressee's sibling could marry addressee.
 - ii. ok One's sibling could marry one.
 - iii. ok Addressee's sibling could marry one.
 - iv. ?ok One's sibling could marry addressee.

Note that however much context you pile up on (14)a, the interpretation in (iii) remains unavailable.

In response to an earlier presentation, Anand (2005) points out that readings like (14)a-iii are available in cases like (15).

(15) If you are a star about to become a supernova, you don't want to be anywhere near you.

Note however, that in (15) both instances of *you* are impersonal, in the sense that they have shifted personas. In (16) I show that readings like (14)a-iii are possible when personas are shifted explicitly in an if-clause. These readings remain unavailable when personas are shifted using Q-adverbs.

(16) If you are a star about to become a supernova, you, my friend, wouldn't want to be anywhere near your gravitational field.

8. Conclusion.

The analysis presented above derives the QVE data, something that Alonso-Ovalle's (2002) proposal for the Spanish counterpart of *you* fails to do.

My treatment of quantificational variability and indexicality in *you* also avoids the use of *monsters* (Kaplan 1989) or analysing Q-adverbs as context-shifting operators, unlike the analysis of *you* presented in Malamud (2005), since in my analysis only non-indexical elements shift in QVE contexts, while indexical elements stay free.

This allows a unified treatment of monsters in Russian: if attitude verbs in Russian shift contexts, allowing the present tense to shift in attitude reports, we would expect Q-adverbs to shift present tense as well, if Q-adverbs were monsters.

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