Private Language, Public Laws: 
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Introduction

Perhaps the greatest controversy over statutory interpretation during the past two decades concerns the use of legislative history as evidence of the intent of the legislature. Opponents say that relying upon the historical record of the law-making process is undemocratic (committee reports are not enacted),¹ unreliable (history is often conflicting, and may even be planted to influence judges in the future)² and incoherent (it does not represent the views of all members of the legislature, so it cannot be evidence of “legislative intent.”).³

More basically, the concept of legislative intent has itself been subject to attack.⁴ Whose intent? What difference does it make what people intended as long as we know

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¹ For interesting argument along these lines, see John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997). For arguments to the contrary, see Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (2000), Professor Manning’s response, John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (2000); and Professor Siegel’s reply to Professor Manning’s response, Jonathan R. Siegel, Timing and Delegation: A Reply, 53 VAND L. REV. 1543 (2000). I discuss this debate infra Part V.


³ ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1977). Justice Scalia actually makes all of these arguments.

what they said? Holmes’s 1899 statement, “we do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means,”\(^5\) continues to be widely quoted today.\(^6\) Moreover, although criticism of legislative intent is generally associated with politically conservative “textualist”\(^7\) judges and academic writers, critiques appear throughout the political spectrum. For example, William Eskridge, who is generally regarded as a progressive theorist on questions of statutory interpretation, expresses concern that resort to legislative intent can serve to ossify the interpretation of statutes, making them inappropriately unresponsive to changes in the interpretive environment over time.\(^8\)

This Article defends the use of legislative intent in statutory interpretation. Using advances in linguistics, social and development psychology, and philosophy,\(^9\) the Article argues that it makes perfectly good sense to speak of legislative intent. We routinely attribute intent to a group of people based on the intent of a subset of that group, provided that there is agreement in advance about what role the subgroup will play. The legislature is a prototypical example of the kind of group to which this process applies most naturally. Moreover, resort to legislative intent need be no less democratic than the legislative process itself. To the extent that a small group of legislators participates in


\(^{6}\) See, e.g., St. Charles Investment Co. v. Comm’r, 232 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 2000).

\(^{7}\) In this context, much of the focus is on the philosophy of Justice Antonin Scalia. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., *The New Textualism* 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) for the seminal article on this issue. See infra Part II for further discussion.


\(^{9}\) Several recent articles have expressed skepticism about this use of these disciplines, especially the philosophy of language, as tools in legal interpretation. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, *Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the Problem of Legal Determinacy?* 16 RATIO JURIS 281 (2003); Michael Green, *Dworkin’s Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach us About the Law*, 89 VA. L. REV. 1897 (2003). The strong claim with which these articles disagree is the claim that particular approaches to linguistic meaning can determine the outcomes of legal cases. The claim I make, in contrast, is that certain evidence of meaning, sometimes challenged as incoherent is, in fact, perfectly coherent, and is appropriately considered in determining the meaning of a legal text. At that point, however, the weight it is given becomes a legal question. Because I see little disagreement between the specific claims of writers like Bix and Green on the one hand, and my own on the other, I do not discuss this literature further. However, the titles of their articles convey a stronger statement than they actually make.
determining the details of a law, it does no harm to democratic principles for a court to recognize the process for what it was in trying to work out the application of those details in the real world. Only when the proffered evidence of legislative intent comes from participants to whom there was no planning delegation do problems arise, and courts are right to reject such evidence as irrelevant. Thus, evidentiary arguments to the effect that courts sometimes misuse legislative history may have merit, and should be dealt with on a case by case basis. In contrast, arguments against reference to legislative intent in principle do not have merit, and should be rejected.

Part I of this Article briefly introduces the problem. Part II then addresses one of the major criticisms of legislative intent: There can be no single intent because the legislature is comprised of many people who do not share a single set of goals. First, relying largely on the work of philosopher Margaret Gilbert, I argue that it is both coherent and commonplace to speak of the intentions of a group, whether or not everyone in the group shares that intent. What matters most is whether the group would be willing to accept the intent of a subgroup as that of the larger group. I then bring to bear on the issue a body of psychological research that explores how people, in identifiable circumstances, perceive groups as individuals and attribute to them states of mind, especially intent. Psychologists call this phenomenon “group entitivty.” The phenomenon applies quite generally, especially when groups make decisions through a deliberative process.

Part III looks at another body of research: studies showing that we acquire new words and concepts by developing a theory of the mind of the individual that brought the new concept to our attention. We begin doing this as young children, and never stop.
Basically, it is how we learn. This explains why it seems only natural to ask what the legislature had in mind when it enacted a statute whose applicability is in dispute. Our drive to answer question by looking into the minds of others is so strong that it is not clear that we can give it up even if we want to do so. For this reason, it should not be surprising that “intent” language slips through the rhetoric of even the most devoted textualists, and is used by the judiciary thousands of times each year.

Part IV turns to an important linguistic fact that relates to the issue of intent. Many of those who oppose speaking of intent advocate for focusing more heavily instead at statutory language. The underlying assumption is that one can look at language independently of any inquiry into intent. This part argues that this perspective is based on an illusion. When language is clear enough so that there is unlikely to be disagreement, we can dispense with considerations of intent because anyone using that particular expression (absent mistake or insincerity) would do so only with a particular intent. It therefore makes sense to speak of a statute’s “plain meaning.” Even when there is no dispute about meaning, however, intent lurks in the background as a crucial element of our understanding. In fact, it is commonplace for courts to justify their reliance on plain language not because the language is somehow separate from legislative intent as Holmes and some modern textualists would have it, but rather because plain language is the best evidence of intent.\(^\text{10}\)

Once consensus over meaning dissolves, intent becomes more or less a necessary part of the analysis. Knowledge of language must resides separately in each individual. Although we use language to facilitate social interaction, we each have only our personal capacity to speak and understand. When questions of interpretation arise, we really have

\(^{10}\) See \textit{infra} Part IV.
little to ask other than questions about the intentions of those whose words or actions we are trying to understand.\textsuperscript{11} This has significant legal consequences. It means that we cannot avoid asking, when we have doubts about our understanding of language, which of our possible understandings most likely matches the meaning that the conveyer intended. Many of the canons of construction upon which textualists rely are frequently justified by the courts that use them as good proxies for the intent of the legislature.

This part of the Article concludes with a discussion of whether other values espoused by judges and legal scholars, such as coherence, lenity and avoiding constitutional problems can replace intent. I propose a test (called “the Marshall Test” because it reflects the view of Chief Justice John Marshall) to evaluate the viability of approaches to statutory interpretation that would substitute other values for legislative intent. The test requires the individual who claims intent to be irrelevant to be willing to state overtly that she would be willing to thwart the intent of the legislature by promoting the competing values. No value passes this test routinely, and few pass it at all. The principle of legislative primacy is too deeply embedded in our system for judges to be willing, except in unusual circumstances, to dispense with what they know to be the will of the legislature in favor of another interpretation that furthers competing values.

Part V briefly addresses the current debate about the use of legislative history in the context of this psychological and linguistic perspective. Professor Manning has argued that judicial resort to legislative history is unconstitutional because it excessively aggrandizes the role of the legislature by giving too much power to small groups of

\textsuperscript{11} See Daniel C. Dennett, Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness (1996); Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (1990) for an extensive presentation of this position. For discussion of how we conceptualize intent itself, see Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in Sterotyping and Prejudice, in Unintended Thought 253 (James S. Uleman and John A Bargh, eds. 1989).
legislators who were involved in the early stages of the legislative process. This part argues that the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation should not be rejected on constitutional grounds since it is not authoritative, but rather only evidence of intent. However, arguments based on its evidentiary reliability may have merit and are worthy of further exploration.

Finally, Part VI is a conclusion that attempts to place the role of intent in statutory interpretation in perspective. The fact that it is indispensable does not mean that it must be ubiquitous. I agree with those who argue that uncontroversial interpretations of statutory language should be given primacy in statutory interpretation. But the language can take us only so far. When disputes arise, priorities must be established with respect to what arguments will be given more weight. Much of the debate over statutory interpretation is legitimate political conflict over setting these priorities. In contrast, arguments that intent is irrelevant to the interpretive enterprise are not, I believe, legitimate in their own right.

I

Legislation or Legislative Intent?

The question of legislative intent has gained recent prominence in large part because it has been a major item on the agenda of Justice Antonin Scalia, appointed by President Reagan to the Supreme Court in 1986. But the debate is by no means new. About seventy-five years ago, in a biting article published in the *Harvard Law Review*, legal philosopher Max Radin wrote:

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12 Manning *supra* note ___.

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A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.

That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition. The chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small. The chance is still smaller that a given determinate, the litigated issue, will not only be within the minds of all these men but will be certain to be selected by all of them as the present limit to which the determinable should be narrowed.\(^\text{13}\)

Radin argued from the perspective of the legal realist movement, a major theme of which was that judicial rhetoric is often removed from the reality of the actual decision making process, and masks the real reasons behind the decision, which are frequently political.\(^\text{14}\) Today, the same critiques are made by judges and scholars throughout the political spectrum.\(^\text{15}\) Yet despite the large body of law and commentary addressing these questions, the discussion has not progressed much beyond Radin’s observations,\(^\text{16}\) which were perceptive at the time and still not fully answered by proponents of legislative intent as a tool in statutory interpretation.

Defenders of legislative intent often argue that when the language of a statute is not clear enough in a particular situation, a court charged with interpreting the statute should resort to extrinsic evidence to see how best to effectuate the statute’s goals. To do so, the court construes the statute to achieve what the legislature would have intended.\(^\text{17}\)

That intent often can be inferred, at least in part, from the circumstances surrounding the

\(^\text{13}\) Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
\(^\text{14}\) For one classic exposition of this perspective, see Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (1949).
\(^\text{15}\) See Eskridge, supra note ___.
\(^\text{16}\) An important exception to this generalization is the sophisticated debate over separation of powers. See infra Part V.
statute’s enactment. Among those circumstances are the proceedings in the legislature during which the statute was written and its substance and form debated. In fact, not taking this sort of information into account increases the likelihood of a court’s accepting an interpretation that is absurdly at odds with the intentions of the enacting legislature.\(^\text{18}\)

Justice (then Judge) Stephen Breyer makes these and other arguments in his important article defending the use of legislative history by judges.\(^\text{19}\) Breyer catalogues situations in which the language of a law simply does not provide an adequate basis for interpretation. Sometimes, the legislature has made an obvious mistake.\(^\text{20}\) In other cases, the statute is ambiguous.\(^\text{21}\) In still others, the language of the statute seems applicable to a situation on its face, but it would be absurd to apply the statute as written.\(^\text{22}\) In all of these situations, there is more or less consensus that a court must look beyond the words of a statute to determine how to apply the law. Concern for legislative primacy argues that inferring and then enforcing the intent of the enacting legislature is appropriate when statutory language does not suffice for these various reasons.

The counterargument goes something like this: But much of the time the legislature probably had no intent with respect to the law’s application in the particular situation.\(^\text{23}\) That’s what makes it a hard case. In any event the legislature is not a person,

\(^{22}\) Sometimes the fact that a statute would produce such absurd results is evidence that the language used reflects a mistake. United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994). In other instances, the language of the statute typically produces desired results, but in nonprotypical situations that the legislature obviously did not consider, applying the statute would result in an absurd outcome. The classic example of this phenomenon is United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1869), where a sheriff who arrested a letter carrier wanted for murder was prosecuted for interfering with delivery of the United States mail.
\(^{23}\) *See* Scalia, *supra* note ___ at 31-32; Eskridge, *supra* note ___ at 14.
like the governor or the president. The legislature consists of a group of people with
diverse goals and intentions. It cannot itself have “an intention.” In all likelihood most
legislators who voted for the bill did so because the party leadership told them to do so as
a matter of party discipline. “Vote for Bill Number 802, and then we’ll see if we can
move some of your pet projects forward before the legislative session ends.” Or perhaps:
“The President wants this one badly. If you don’t support it, I can’t promise that the
party leadership will help you to win the next primary election. We may prefer a
candidate who will cooperate better than you have.” Therefore, when a judge looks at
legislative history to determine the intentions of the enacting legislature, what she is
really looking at is a set of documents prepared by staff people, or speeches made by
individual members, or other such things that cannot possibly be considered
representative of the thinking of “the legislature” as a whole. At worst, legislative history
will be corruptly unreliable, perhaps “planted” by those who wish to influence courts
without complying with the onerous process of legislative enactment. Often, it will be
self-contradictory, allowing first lawyers and then judges to pick and choose among
statements that support a party’s position. In any event poring through thousands of

24 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “they,” not an “it”: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron,
25 Public choice theorists have long maintained that legislative decisions are driven in part by the
legislator’s making strategic decisions necessary to get reelected. See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P.
Frickey, Law and Public Choice (1991); David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection
(1974). This tactic can go too far. For example, in December 2003, Representative Nick Smith, a
Republican member of the House of Representatives, “told a Michigan radio station … that he was
promised $100,000 for his son’s congressional campaign if he would vote for the Republican-backed
Medicare bill, a contention he later said was ‘technically incorrect.’” Probe Sought in Claim of Medicare
Williams, Restoring Context, Distorting Text: Legislative History and the Problem of Age, 66 GEO. WASH.
27 This is a major theme among those who oppose the use of legislative history. See, e.g., Conroy v.
Aniskoff. 507 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1993)(Scalia, J. concurring); Scalia, supra note ___; Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50
pages of material will run up the costs of litigation with the risk of doing more harm than good.\footnote{28}{The argument concerning the expense of litigation resonated with English judges who opposed the use of legislative history in legal argument. The House of Lords finally permitted the use of legislative history under limited circumstances in Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 1032. See Vermeule, supra note ____ for further argument that resort to legislative history is inefficient.}

Justice Scalia summarizes the danger of using legislative history in a number of his writings. In his book, \textit{A Matter of Interpretation},\footnote{29}{SCALIA, \textit{supra} note ____} he makes the following points:

My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning.\footnote{30}{Id. at 29-30.}

In other words, the concept of legislative intent is irrelevant to legal interpretation, so the use of legislative history to determine legislative intent must be irrelevant too. He continues:

As I have said, I object to the use of legislative history on principle, since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law. What is most exasperating about the use of legislative history, however, is that it does not even make sense for those who accept legislative intent as the criterion. It is much more likely to produce a false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine one. The first and most obvious reason for this is that, with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative history are bound to be false.\footnote{31}{Id. at 31-32.}

He finishes his argument by noting that the historical record of committee reports and the like probably did not influence the votes of many in the legislature even if he concedes everything else.
Scalia’s philosophy comes out strongly in his opinions as well, often concurrences in which he agrees with the court’s result, but objects to its insistence on looking at congressional proceedings in reaching that result. Consider Conroy v. Aniskoff. A federal statute protects members of the military from losing their homes to foreclosure sales if they have not paid their local real estate taxes. State laws that permit cities and towns to sell a house to collect the tax money allow for a period of redemption, during which the owner can rescue the situation by paying the back taxes. The federal law, enacted in the context of World War II, in which there was a huge military conscription, suspends the running of this redemption period while the owner is in the military.

Sensible enough. But what happens when the homeowner is a career military person? Should he get twenty-five years of protection from paying his local taxes? The statute, read literally, suggests that he should. It makes no distinction between the draftee fighting in the trenches in the north of France and the deadbeat who happens to be in the army.

In deciding to interpret the statute broadly to protect all members of the military notwithstanding the context of its enactment, the Supreme Court looked at the legislative history of the relevant statute, and of related statutes. It found no serious contradictions with the plain language and some historical evidence in further support of the literal reading. For example, the relevant provision was reenacted after World War II ended, and

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34 50 U.S.C.A § 501.
during a time of peace.\textsuperscript{35} It thus interpreted the statute according to its plain language, even though this meant enforcing the statute in circumstances broader than the policy behind its enactment would have demanded.

In response, Justice Scalia accused the majority of selecting snippets from the history, and of confusing the role of the judiciary. He remarked:

\begin{quote}
The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: “The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself....” \textit{Aldridge v. Williams}, 3 How. 9, 24 (emphasis added). But not the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, \textit{on the whole}, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate than legislative history.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Scalia pointed to examples from the historical record which, if accumulated, could create the impression that Congress intended to opposite of what the plain language reading suggests.

To this and related arguments, the defenders of legislative history respond, a little more weakly: Of course we should be honest in presenting the historical record, including the possibility that the record is internally inconsistent and does not teach us much in some instances. But laws are written in language and language can only be understood in context. The thinking of those who supported and proposed the law in the first place may not reflect the will of every legislator, but it certainly can make some contribution to statutory interpretation if used wisely. At the very least, it can help us to determine whether the difficulty in applying the statute results from an unfortunate choice

\textsuperscript{35} 507 U.S. at 515 n.8 (recognizing that “Section 14 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 623, provided that the 1940 Act ‘shall be applicable to all persons in the armed forces of the United States’ until the 1940 Act ‘is repealed or otherwise terminated by subsequent Act of the Congress…’”).

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Id.} at 519 (Scalia, J. concurring).
of statutory language to effectuate a legislative goal that is very clear once one
investigates the matter. And it can be used to confirm that decisions made on other
grounds are not likely to fly in the face of what the statute was intended to accomplish.

In response to one of Justice Scalia’s more aggressive concurring opinions, Justice White
replied in a footnote:

As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common
sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information
rather than ignoring it. As Chief Justice Marshall put it, "where the mind
labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from
which aid can be derived." Legislative history materials are not generally
so misleading that jurists should never employ them in a good-faith effort
to discern legislative intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the Court's
practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past. We
suspect that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.37

The quoted passage dates back to an 1805 opinion written by Chief Justice John
Marshall.38 When used sensibly, the argument goes, legislative history can lead to a
more thoughtful analysis of a complex legal problem. Shouldn’t courts embrace every
opportunity to make a more reasoned decision?

I have in the past supported the use of legislative history as evidence of legislative
intent based on this argument,39 and continue to think it to be the best course for reasons
summarized below. But this response begs an important question. Why do the
opponents of legislative history appear to have such an uphill battle against common
sense when their arguments are so intellectually strong?

The answer to this question lies in the psychology of how we perceive groups as
individuals, and in the nature of our knowledge of language. We routinely attribute

39 Lawrence M. Solan, Learning our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L.
Rev. 235.
beliefs and intentions to groups of people as if they were a single individual: “What’s IBM planning for next year?” “Should the philosophy department hire a Descartes scholar?” Doing so when the group is a legislature is just a special case of an ordinary psychological process. This, I believe, leads us to speaking of such things as the intent of the legislature, whether or not such concepts are fully defensible.

The larger stakes in the debate over legislative history and legislative intent, however, are about our conception of language and how it relates to our ability to govern ourselves by enacting laws. Assume, as I will argue later, that understanding language is very much a matter of striving to understand the intent of the speaker, just as speaking is an effort to facilitate our hearer’s efforts to understand our message. If this is true, then statutory language can be no different, and our laws can be no more than efforts at communication based on the intention of the drafters.

Judge Frank Easterbrook expressed the issue in an opinion interpreting the federal Bankruptcy Code: “Statutes are law, not evidence of law.” But once we start talking about intent, language, including statutory language, can be nothing other than evidence of that intent. It might be good evidence, and we might want to privilege it in some way

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40 In developing this position, I rely on Noam Chomsky’s argument that language is essentially private, and internal. See infra Part IV. Although I do not rely on the work of Paul Grice here, intention also plays a prominent role in his work, especially his Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts 41, 45 (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds., 1975). Jonathan Siegel argues that Gricean principles do not necessarily apply to legislation, which is not conversational, and which is the result of a painstaking process of word and language choice. Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra note ___ at 347. No doubt he is correct to that extent. But these differences between laws and conversation do not suggest that we stop caring about what the legislature wanted us to do or refrain from doing when it wrote the statute. In fact, in applying certain statutes, such as anti-fraud statutes that make it illegal to mislead, it is hard to see how Gricean principles can not be said to play a role. See Lawrence M. Solan and Peter M. Tiersma, Speaking of Crime: The Language of Criminal Justice (forthcoming 2005)(chapter 11 – “Perjury”). For discussion about the limits of Gricean implicature in the interpretation of statutes, see M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 373 (1985).

41 In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
as being more reliable than other evidence (such as legislative history), but it is still just evidence. This is a serious problem for a jurisprudence based upon the assumption that government sets out our obligations through a democratically legitimate process, such as the principles of bicameralism and presentment set forth in Article I of the Constitution. \textsuperscript{42} It is a lot messier if we have to start thinking about the intent of the legislature because the enacted words are not good enough. \textsuperscript{43} To the extent that legislative history embodies this vision of statutory language, it represents an important issue about law and government.

Whether the quest for intent is for the good is a separate issue. \textsuperscript{44} In fact, the legal system often has to deal with situations in which our psychological propensities are at odds with the system’s goals. For example, the rules of evidence recognize that jurors are likely to make too much of a defendant’s prior criminal record. Therefore, except for limited purposes, such as to impeach a defendant’s credibility on the witness stand, the rules prohibit prosecutors from introducing evidence of prior convictions. \textsuperscript{45} It may well be that judges are prone to make more of “legislative intent” and legislative history than are relevant in interpreting a statute in a manner consistent with the basic values of a system of justice, and that they should also be barred from doing so. I take up those possibilities later. For now, let us focus on just how natural it is to talk about groups as if they were individuals.

\textsuperscript{42} U.S. CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SEC. 7.
\textsuperscript{44} Dennis Patterson makes this important point about the extent to which one can draw conclusions about how the legal system should be designed from studies of cognitive and linguistic strategies. See Dennis Patterson, \textit{Against a Theory of Meaning}, 73 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 1153 (1995); Dennis Patterson, \textit{Fashionable Nonsense}, 81 TEX. LAW REV. 841 (2003).
\textsuperscript{45} See Fed. R. Evid. 404, 609.
II

Understanding Groups as Individuals

A. Groups as Actors

To see how we regard groups as units in everyday life, consider the following story. Mario and Adela Rossi are both engineers. They met in graduate school in Italy, got married, and emigrated to the United States seven years ago when they were both offered jobs with large companies. You and I are friends of the Rossis, and we both admire them for the exciting vacations that they take. We also both know that Adela is the one who makes all the plans. Mario just tags along, knowing that Adela is certain to have put together something great, whether a trip to an exotic part of the world, or a visit to a country inn within an hour of their home. You say to me:

Where are Mario and Adela planning to go this year?

I respond:

I just talked with Adela yesterday. They’re planning a trip to a wonderful small resort in Virginia. She told me all about it.

In fact, as you and I both know, Mario doesn’t have a clue about this year’s vacation, except for the barest details. It would be very odd to say that he’s planning anything. Adela’s the one doing the planning. Yet, our conversation about the Rossis’ plans seems perfectly natural. We can think of Adela making plans, we can think of Mario making plans and we can think of Mario and Adela making plans as a unit even if it is not the case that they are both, individually, making plans. In this case, it is fair to say that Adela and the plural subject, the Rossis, made plans, but not that Mario made plans.
The philosopher Margaret Gilbert uses examples very similar to this to describe what she calls “plural subject theory.” Gilbert makes an important point about situations like that of Adela and Mario. While Mario may not have personally made any plans, he has committed himself, as a member of the couple, to the plans that Adela made on their behalf. So if Mario later makes separate plans with a friend for the same time, and says to Adela, “I think I’ll skip Virginia this year and go fishing with Fred instead,” it would be more than an insult. It would be a breach of a commitment to follow through with the couple’s plans. Mario would be backing out of a commitment he made when he agreed to accept Adela’s plans as the couple’s plans. Even though only half of the couple has made plans, those plans *count* as plans for the couple as an entity, because they’ve agreed in advance that they should count as such. Put somewhat differently, the couple really *did* make plans when Adela made them.

Gilbert writes of the ramifications of her work for social theory. But the ramifications concerning statutory interpretation are also significant. Mario and Adela tell us that we can and do speak of the intent of a unit consisting of more than one person whether or not all of the people in that unit share that intent. We can similarly speak of the intent of the legislature without committing ourselves to the proposition that every legislator shares the intent that we attribute to the entity.

Consider another example. Your local government is planning to put a large sculpture in a park near your home. You’ve seen pictures of the sculpture, and you like

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46 Margaret Gilbert, *Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory* (2000). My vignettes are modeled after hers, but altered to make them more relevant to the points that I wish to make about the interpretation of statutes.

47 With respect to joint beliefs, Gilbert writes: “It does not, as I understand it, entail that each participant personally believe that p. … The requirement to believe as a body that p might be redescribed as the requirement together to constitute – as far as is possible – a body that believes that p. Presumably this requirement will be fulfilled, to some extent, if those concerned confidently express the view that p in appropriate contexts and do not call it or obvious corollaries into question.” *Ibid.* at 41.
it. But many of your neighbors are against it, including people who are unofficially considered the “leaders” of the neighborhood, such as Joan Platt and Mike Green. You have no idea what percentage of the neighborhood supports the installation, and really haven’t thought very much about it. When I ask you about the sculpture, you say: “I like it, but the neighborhood’s against it.” This would be a perfectly natural thing to say.

But it is also a very complex thing to say. For one thing, it equates “the neighborhood” with the people who live in the neighborhood. This is not always the case. The concept *neighborhood* usually also includes information about the environment, ambiance, and so on. Second, your answer attributes aesthetic responses to the neighborhood as though it were a single person. In fact, it would have been just as natural for you to say that the neighborhood is “mad as hell” about the sculpture. Third, your answer remains reasonable even if you are unable to say exactly who should count as being in the neighborhood and how you draw the line. Some neighborhoods have natural boundaries (like a river), others formally defined boundaries, like SOHO in New York. But many neighborhoods have no such definitions as to their boundaries. Yet we can speak of the attitudes of the neighborhood without regard to these indeterminacies.

Moreover, when you say that the neighborhood is against the sculpture, you do so without any formal criteria for determining the neighborhood’s position on the sculpture. You haven’t taken a poll. Why would you? You thus have no proof that a majority of the people in the neighborhood oppose the sculpture, although you assume that to be the case. All you know for sure is that people who are usually thought to speak for the neighborhood as a whole (whatever that means, given that you don’t know where the

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48 Chomsky writes similarly about the different ways we can understand “London” as referring to the population, the place, a romantic concept, etc. NOAM CHOMSKY, NEW HORIZONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE (2000).
neighborhood begins and ends) are speaking out against the sculpture. And somehow, that seems good enough to make your statement, “the neighborhood’s against” it seem natural and reasonable. If you later find out that only a few people agree with the informally recognized leaders in this case, you may decide that your initial conclusion about the neighborhood’s negative reaction was premature and incorrect. But there is no doubt that taking a position at all is a coherent thing to do.

Similarly, as the philosopher Michael Bratman points out, a group can jointly intend something without having worked out the details of the plan.\(^{49}\) The day before the trip, Mario and Adela can intend to go to Virginia even if they haven’t agreed on a departure time (assuming that they’re driving), where to stop on the way, and many other such details. For that matter, they can intend to go to Virginia even if they have delegated the details of the trip to a travel agent, who will then inform them of where they have various dinner reservations, and where they will be stopping on the way.\(^{50}\) But in order for each to say “we” intend to go, each by then has to intend to go, each has to know that the other intends to go, and whatever subplans each might articulate must mesh reasonably well.\(^{51}\)

Bratman further points out that people can jointly intend without sharing a common purpose for their intent. Let us say (counter to fictional fact) that Mario and Adela participated equally in planning their trip to Virginia, and are in complete


\(^{51}\) Bratman, *Faces of Intention*, supra note ___ at 121.
agreement about where they will go. However, Mario’s excitement about the trip comes from his loving the mountains, and Adela’s comes from her loving the wonderful small town with its antique stores.\(^{52}\) According to Bratman, these differences do not interfere with our saying that they jointly intend to take a vacation in Virginia as long as the details of the trip mesh well enough. My intuitions are in accord with his.

Now let’s return to the real (fictional) Mario and Adela, with Adela planning the trip and Mario tagging along. What would happen if they lost the directions to the inn enroute, and cannot remember the name of the small town? Perhaps while one of them was looking at them, the piece of paper blew out the window of the car. They stop at a gas station and Adela asks the attendant whether he knows of a small town within a certain distance that is known for having a number of interesting antique stores. The attendant knows of the town and directs the couple there, where they find the inn.

The Rossis’ inquiry is motivated by the history of the planning process. The sheet of paper that blew out the window said nothing of antique stores. It had a set of road directions, and the address and phone number of the inn. Significantly, Mario had no complaint that the question that Adela asked was about her planning history. There would be no point to getting upset about that since Mario had no planning history. It would do no good to ask about going to the mountains, or other such vague statements. If Mario and Adela want to carry out their joint intent, the missing details will have to come from looking at the activities of whoever was involved in developing the details. That’s how the details got there in the first place.

To summarize, our conversation about the proposed sculpture in the park illustrates the following about the way we conceptualize:

\(^{52}\) Bratman makes this point by discussing plans to make a trip to New York. \textit{Id.} at ___.
1. Words like “neighborhood,” which consist of a group of people in particular circumstances, can be used to refer to the group.

2. We attribute such human states as emotions, intentions and beliefs to the group as an entity.

3. Our attributions hold even if we don’t know exactly who the members of the group are.

4. Our attributions hold even if we do not have formal procedures in mind for determining their accuracy. What seems most important is that the members of the group would accept the attribution, whether it is based on the statements of the group’s leaders, on a majority of the members, or on other criteria.

5. For a group to intend something jointly, it need not agree on all the details in advance, and even may delegate the details to a subgroup or to an outsider.

6. A group can jointly intend without sharing the same reasons for their intent.

Perhaps our treatment of plural subjects is part of a more general phenomenon. For example, in his important work on the history and conceptualization of boycotts, Gary Minda explores the legal metaphor that a corporation is a “legal person.” My claim is related, but differently focused. Whether or not we call corporations “persons” for purposes of legal analysis, we are likely to attribute volition to them as a single entity because a corporation consists of a group of people acting in concert. Thus, even those who never heard of the legal person fiction can say that Ford intends to come out with a new SUV, Intel plans to develop a new microprocessor, and so on.


54 See infra note ___.
When we say such things, we mean them quite literally. We are not saying that it is as though Intel is planning a new product. It is planning one. Similarly, when I speak of the intent of the legislature, I really mean the intent of a plural subject that I treat as an individual. I mean it literally. The psychologist Sam Glucksberg makes this point generally in his analysis of recurrently used figurative speech.\(^{55}\) Obviously, we know the difference between a person and a group of people. Yet, we treat groups as individuals anyway because we conceptualize groups as individuals.

The linguist Ray Jackendoff points out that we treat events, actual things, abstractions, mental states, and just about anything else we can think about as entities in our speech.\(^{56}\) Below are some examples:

Did you see that? I hope it doesn’t happen again.

I’ll go to the party. It’s an obligation, but I’ll go.

The presumption of innocence is deeply embedded in our system. It is a symbol of freedom from governmental oppression.

Each sentence contains the word it. In the first, it represents an event (noticed, but unspoken), in the second, a predicate (going to the party), and in the third, an abstract concept (the presumption of innocence). In none does it refer to a simple object, like a book, although we use it to refer to a book as well. By treating all of these different kinds of concepts the same linguistically, we are able to use the same limited set of linguistic tools to talk about all of them. We can ask questions,

\(^{55}\) Sam Glucksberg, Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphors to Idioms (2001).

When did it (i.e., the presumption of innocence) take root?

We can quantify,

How many times have you seen it happen that way?

We can embed observations in descriptions of our state of mind,

I thought I heard Bill say that it’s an obligation.

In fact, when we speak about events and abstractions, we can perform all of the linguistic operations available to us when we are speaking about objects.

Thus, there is a great deal to be gained by treating groups as entities as a matter of linguistic flexibility. Let us look a little more closely at the circumstances in which we are likely to treat a group of individuals as a single entity and attribute to that entity the ability to engage in ordinary human psychological processes.

B. How a Group of People Becomes a Single Person

Not every collection of people is seen as a group with a single mind and a unified set of beliefs. If you see a bunch of people standing together at a bus stop you are not likely to become curious about their collective belief about anything of importance. Even if they share beliefs, such as the sorry state of the public transportation system, they do so as individuals with experiences and values in common, not as members of a coherent group. In contrast, we perceive Mario and Adela as a unit by virtue of their being married and by virtue of commitments they have made with respect to what counts as their collective intent. We understand the neighborhood as a group because of physical proximity, a common interest, and a tacit understanding about whose statements count as representing those of the neighborhood. And the legislature is a group by virtue of a host
of legal and social institutions, voting practices and understandings about how their purpose is represented during the legislative process.

During the past decade, a number of psychologists, expanding on earlier research, have been investigating when we are most likely to regard a group of individuals as an entity, and what it is we attribute to that entity. Some fifty years ago, psychologist Donald Campbell, in an important article, referred to the properties of a group that make it more likely to be conceptualized as an individual unit, “group entitativity.” These include similarity, proximity, formation of a symmetrical pattern, and “common fate.” Recently, Robert Abelson and his colleagues mercifully shortened the term to “entitativity,” which is what it is now called in the psychological literature. The authors summarize the implications of entitativity:

The greater the exposure to these factors, the higher the perceived entitativity. It will seem like a kind of person, in the sense that it will have the same sorts of features that a person has: a unitary identity and personality, and in the real world, a web of past, present, and future relationships with other groups. It will have a set of goals and characteristic behaviors in the service of those goals.

We tend to assume unity in the personalities of people. We “size up” the people we know in terms of a small number of core characteristics and interpret what they say and do in a way that is consistent with how we characterize them to ourselves. We expect consistency in people, and attempt to resolve apparent inconsistencies by looking at some external circumstance that led an individual to act other than as expected.

Studies show that the more entitativity a group has, the more people expect it to act in a

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57 Donald T. Campbell, *Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates as Social Entities*, 3 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 14 (1958).
59 Id. at 246.
consistent manner. In other words, groups that are perceived as coherent are seen to behave more like people. Interestingly, one of the major factors that contributes to these judgments about consistent behavior is whether the group is perceived as being “highly organized with a particular purpose or intention that drives the group’s behaviors.”

For our purposes, the most important characteristic of individuals that we can attribute to groups is the property of acting intentionally as if the group were a person with thoughts and goals of its own. Psychologists have just begun to study how this happens. O’Laughlin and Malle observe that “people view each other as agents capable of intentional action, and intentionality is in turn conceptualized by reference to the agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions.” Given this, there are two ways of explaining a person’s behavior. One is simply to attribute an intention to the person. If someone storms out of a meeting in a fit of anger (I saw this happen plenty of times – I was a litigator), we are likely to say that he became angry at what someone said, and left. But sometimes we look not at the person’s own beliefs and intentions, but rather at what O’Laughlin and Malle refer to as the “causal history of reasons.” We also may say, “He often behaves this way when there’s too much pressure on him at his firm. If he loses this case, the company will fire him.” One explanation attributes an intentional state of mind to the actor, the other a set of circumstances in which it may be reasonable for a person to act the way he or she did.

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63 Id. at 34.
64 This is not the only way that psychologists look at facts like these. See, e.g., Michael W. Morris, Richard E. Nisbett, and Kaiping Peng, Causal Attribution Across Domains and Cultures in CAUSAL COGNITION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DEBATE (G. Lewis, D. Premack, and D. Sperber, eds. 1995)(drawing the distinction between attribution to people vs. situations).
O’Lauglin and Malle found that when given a choice of explanations, people more often choose the one that attributes a reason to the person. That is, we explain the behavior of other people in terms of their intent. Historical circumstances act as a backup when we don’t know about a person’s motives, or when a person appears to have acted peculiarly. Thus, when subjects were presented with a fictitious conversation about a young woman named Nina in which it came out that Nina had been using drugs, the subjects were more likely to explain the drug use by attributing reasons to Nina than by describing historical circumstances, although they did both.

As for what causes a group to act as an entity, the more we perceive a group as deliberating and acting jointly, the easier it is for us to attribute the actions of a group to a joint reason that we attribute to the group as a unified agent. When O’Laughlin and Malle substituted “high school seniors” for “Nina” in the story, the number of explanations using causal history instead of intent increased to about half. On the other hand, when a group appears to deliberate and act as a unit, people still prefer reasons over historical background. Thus, “the department faculty” is more likely to produce explanations of intent than is “department chairpersons in the United States,” for the action “added new requirements to the curriculum,” although both are groups. The authors explain:

The perception of jointly acting groups as unified agents, and the explanation of their actions with a preponderance of reasons, may derive from the nature of coordination in group activity. When acting together, such groups must make their intentions and reasons explicitly in order to ensure participation and coordinated action by group members. When explaining such coordinated action, social perceivers will then use reason

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65 This preference may be culture-dependent. See Micael W. Morris and K. Peng, *Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Physical and Social Events*, 67 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCH 949 (1994).
explanations to capture the deliberate and reasoned nature of the group action.\textsuperscript{66}

Legislatures would seem to be a prototypical example of this kind of group. The fit explains why speaking of legislative intent comes so easily.

C. The Legislature as an Entity with Intent

At this point, we can easily enough transpose our stories about groups from examples about small talk to one about the enactment and subsequent interpretation of a law. Assume that a small group of legislators who are members of the party in power believe that it would be a good idea to pass a law, for example, a law increasing (or decreasing) the amount of certain chemicals that can be poured down the drain without having to use expensive procedures for disposing of hazardous waste. Most members of the party are sympathetic with the idea, but only those working on the project really understand the details. The language of the bill is worked out in the relevant committees. Compromises are reached with moderates from the opposing party, but in the end, the bill passes along party lines.\textsuperscript{67} It is a technically-complicated law. The committee reports explain some of the fine points, but most of the law is opaque to the legislators who vote either for or against the bill, largely based on instructions from their party’s leadership.\textsuperscript{68}

Some time after the law was enacted, a dispute arises as to whether it should be applied to the activity of a particular company. The language of the statute does not

\textsuperscript{66} Id. at 40-41.
\textsuperscript{68} When statutes are at all complex, the history is typically more complicated. Yet, the general outline -- a small number of people heavily involved in the details -- is necessarily true, given the enormous demands on members’ time. For a legislative history relevant to my hypothetical story, see Arnold W. Reitze, \textit{The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control}, 36 HOUSTON L. REV. 679, 715-25 (1999).
answer the question adequately. A lawsuit is brought (perhaps a prosecution for failure to comply with the law), and it is left to a court to determine whether or not the law was violated. The judge reads the committee report and concludes that the law’s sponsors did not intend for it to apply to situations such as the one now in litigation. In her opinion, she writes: “The committee report suggests that the legislature did not intend the statute to reach the situation that is the subject matter of this case.”

From what we have seen thus far, the judge’s remark is both natural and coherent, despite the fact that almost no one in the legislature had any intent at all with respect to this issue because just about every legislator either voted for the bill without understanding it, or voted against the bill. Just as I could say that the Rossis had planned to go to Virginia, and you could say that the neighborhood opposed the sculpture, the judge can say that the legislature did not intend the law to apply in this sort of situation, provided that the law was actually enacted, and the legislature would accept the notion that its intent is reflected in the intent of those who most had a stake in framing and negotiating the final terms of the law. Thus, it really does seem to be the case that we glean legislative intent from both the words of a statute and from the circumstances surrounding its enactment.

One need not rely on hypothetical situations to find this kind of argumentation, In Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion made the following remarks in support of reliance on legislative history as evidence of the intent of Congress:

69 It is not difficult to find almost exactly those words in judicial opinions. See, e.g., Jones v. United States 527 U.S. 373, 419 (1999) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)(“The House Report suggests that Congress understood and approved that construction.”).

Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of trusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute has bipartisan support and has been carefully considered by committees familiar with the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely on the views of the committee members in casting their votes. In such circumstances, since most members are content to endorse the views of the responsible committees, the intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of the entire Congress.\footnote{Id. at 276-77 (Stevens, J. concurring).}

Moreover, unlike the Mario’s reliance on Adela to work out the details of their vacations or the neighborhood’s informal social hierarchy, the legislature’s reliance on the committees to work out the details of legislation is a formal part of the process, and always has been, as Professor Roberts points out.\footnote{John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489 (2001).} Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution states that “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”\footnote{U.S. CONST. ART. 1, SEC. 5.} Throughout this country’s history, both houses of Congress have operated through committees formed pursuant to this power. As Professor Roberts describes:

One of the first bills passed by Congress, H.R. 15 (introduced on July 22, 1789), required a conference committee to iron out differences between the House and Senate versions. Published committee reports, which often included explanation and background discussion on reported bills, made their appearance very early. To be sure, the role of early committees was limited as compared to modern practice, as was the legislative business of the House itself. But by 1810, the House had ten standing committees, each covering a distinct policy area, as well as other select committees. Written committee reports performing much the same functions they do today were quite common from the beginning. The Senate’s history is similar, though it has always relied less on the committee system in processing and drafting the final form of legislation.\footnote{Roberts, supra note ___ at 545 (citations omitted).}
Thus, not only does the legislature form its plans through the work of a small number of its members, but it is structured to do things just that way.

This should not be much of a surprise. It is difficult to see how a large body with such a broad mandate could function without a committee system. Even a much smaller departmental or law school faculty at a university cannot do so. Given that the government conducts its legislative business in this manner and does so openly, it serves no democratic function to require the courts to pretend otherwise by ignoring this aspect of the legislative process.

Despite the primacy of the committees, however, attribution of intent is not logically bound to any particular set of events within the legislative process. What matters, as Professor Gilbert suggests, is that the statements be adopted by the group as representing its intent. While committees will often be at the center of this inquiry, this will not always be the case. Sometimes, for example, the administration may propose legislation through members of Congress. When that happens, the relevant committees may adopt statements from the executive branch as reflecting the bill’s purpose.75 In other instances, the bill’s journey through committees, floor debate and conference is complicated, with particular moments in the process being crucial to passage of the bill.76

Furthermore, it is not necessary that all members of the legislature have the same reasons for supporting a bill, as long as there is general recognition that those who ushered the bill through the process did so with particular subplans that deserve to be

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75 For discussion of one such example, see Michelle S. Marks, The Legislative History of the “Equitable Remuneration” Provision Granted in the New Patent Term of 35 U.S.C. § 154(c), 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 33 (1995)(describing statements made by administration in context of treaty negotiations that set policy underlying the statute).

76 See Rodriguez and Weingast, supra note ___; David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002); George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L. J. 39.
honored. Just as Adela’s planning is most useful when the couple loses the directions to the inn on their way to their vacation, the work of a committee or agency that developed the details of a statute is typically the most useful evidence of their intent, and thereby the entire group’s intent. If a bill was introduced to increase the amount of pollutants that can be disposed of without a permit, the legislator who votes for the bill solely because there is a chemical plant in her district will recognize that implementation of the law’s details should make reference to the work of the bill’s planners.

But stray remarks from individual legislators most likely do not reflect even the intent of the subgroup, and are most often not probative of much of anything, as critics of using legislative history in statutory interpretation point correctly out. For example, Reed Dickerson writes:

> Among the least reliable kinds of legislative history are floor debates. Not only are they laden with sales talk, but their frequent references to what a provision means is an unconscious effort to finesse the courts in performing their constitutional function of having the last word on what the statute means. Besides, it would be rare for the authors of a statute to take such references into account.  

77 Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 1125, 1131 (1983).

Although I have argued that legislative intent properly plays a role in statutory interpretation, the arguments I have made require that the evidence of intent be tied to what members of the legislature would legitimately regard as constituting the formation of the statute’s details. Thus, except in unusual circumstances, I agree with the limitations that Dickerson and others have imposed on discussion of legislative intent.

Metaphors that legal theorists have used in describing how courts engage in statutory interpretation fit this story well. Posner writes of the field general whose communication with headquarters is interrupted before an important strategic decision...
must be made.\textsuperscript{78} Aleinikoff writes about a ship that lost its navigation equipment and the crew must find their way back by their own wit and by what they can piece together.\textsuperscript{79} Dworkin writes about creating the next chapter in a chain novel, based on everything that happened earlier, but with the goal of advancing the story.\textsuperscript{80} All of these writers support using historical context as necessary to make the next decision. When crucial information is missing from the statute itself, context becomes a valued source for drawing inferences about the legislature’s intentions, which each writer, despite otherwise divergent perspectives, regards as central to statutory interpretation.

That context includes the stated intentions of the subplanners, whether a congressional committee or an administrative agency or some other person or subgoup. It may be true that many who voted for a bill did so because the party leadership told them to, or because the bill contained some benefit for people in their district, or for some other reason having nothing to do with what the bill’s authors and planners had in mind. Nonetheless, it was the bill’s planners that gave it content. When disputes arise, it would be odd for a member who voted for the bill without knowing what was in it to complain that the court was looking at the details of the planning process, just as it would be odd for Mario to complain that Adela considered her own planning when she asked for directions. Indeed, there is no such general outcry by legislators despite courts’ routinely making reference to the intent of the legislature or to what the legislature had in mind.\textsuperscript{81}

In addition, just as experimental subjects rely upon both intentional and historical circumstantial explanations to account for group action, so do judges. While judges often

\textsuperscript{80} Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire ___ (1986).
\textsuperscript{81} See infra note ___ for discussion of the enormous frequency with which courts use such expressions.
enough speak of the intent of the legislature and attribute specific reasons for their taking
the actions they did, at other times they rely on the history behind the legislature’s actual
decision making process. For example, in Smith v. United States, a majority of six
justices held that the defendant’s attempt to trade a machine gun for some illegal drugs
should be considered “using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime.” In perfect textualist fashion, the Court nowhere relied on committee reports or
other legislative history to support its decision. But it did rely upon a report of the
American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, to help to describe the context in
which Congress made the decision to enact the statute.

All of this means that when judges speak of legislative intent, and attribute
reasons to the legislature as though it were a single individual with a mind of its own,
they are simply doing what we all do when we talk about deliberative groups. Part V
returns to current debate concerning the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation. We turn now one more body of psychological literature that bears on how
it is that we speak of intent so naturally.

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82 508 U.S. 223 (1993). As for legislative outcry analysis of cases in which Congress overrides judicial
decisions suggests that Congress has no general objection to courts concerning themselves with legislative
intent. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
Yale L. J. 341, 347-48 (1991)(“…Congress is much more likely to override ‘plain meaning’ decisions than
any other type of Supreme Court statutory decision.”).
83 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
84 520 U.S. at 240.
Looking Into the Minds of Others

A. How We Use Theories of Mind

For many years, developmental psychologists have been studying how children acquire words at such an incredible rate and seemingly with so little effort.\textsuperscript{85} It seems that children build theories of words based in part on their experience and in part on how our minds are designed to organize the information that they glean from this experience. Adults do the same thing.\textsuperscript{86}

Briefly, our theories of words consist of definitional features, salient features, background information, and sometimes even recognition that we have gaps in our knowledge. At least in part, to know a word is to know the conditions under which it is appropriate to use it, whether or not one can consciously express what those conditions are. Those who focus on the “plain meaning” of statutory terms generally focus on this aspect of word meaning.\textsuperscript{87} My theory of a word’s meaning is also likely to contain salient features, or even actual examples. I am likely to think of a crime, for example, in terms of my own knowledge of it, perhaps based on what I have read or seen on television or film. This approach to word meaning is more consistent with the “ordinary meaning” approach to statutes that courts frequently employ.\textsuperscript{88} Our theories appear to

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{See infra} note ___ for discussion.
\textsuperscript{88} It is typical for courts to say, “When terms used in a \textbf{statute} are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.” Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 855 (2000)(quoting Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995). \textit{See infra} note ___ for discussion.
have both types of information, allowing us to look at legally-relevant concepts both ways.\textsuperscript{89}

Our theories may also include the recognition that part of the meaning of a word is beyond our grasp. I know that table salt is sodium chloride. I know that the chemical symbol for this molecule is NaCl. But that’s about all I know about the chemistry of table salt. Yet I believe that there is much more to the concept of table salt, and that there are people who know about such things.\textsuperscript{90}

How do we develop these theories of meaning in our minds? During the past decade, it has become clear that an important part of what makes it so easy to acquire new words and concepts is our innate ability to draw conclusions about what is in the minds of others. Psychologists call this the “theory of mind” approach to the acquisition of words.

The claim that children come to understand the world through the minds of others may at first seem radical, but it really does accord with our experiences with young children. Consider this summary by Gopnik, Meltzoff and Kuhl, who have written an accessible book that discusses this issue:

When babies are around a year old, then, they seem to discover that their initial emotional rapport with other people extends to a set of joint attitudes toward the world. We see the same objects, do the same things with those objects, even feel the same way about those objects. This insight adds a whole new dimension to the babies’ understanding of other minds. But it also adds a whole new dimension to babies’ understanding of the world. One-year-old babies know that they will see something by looking where other people point; they know what they


\textsuperscript{90} Hilary Putnam uses this observation in his approach to meaning. \textit{See} Hilary Putnam, \textit{The Meaning of Meaning}, in \textit{LANGUAGE, MIND AND KNOWLEDGE} (K. Gunderson, ed. 1975). In this and other works, Putnam uses “gold” to illustrate this point.
should do to something by watching what other people do; they know how they should feel about something by seeing how other people feel.\textsuperscript{91}

To illustrate, in one experiment, an adult looked with a happy expression into one box and with an expression of disgust into another. She then pushed the boxes to the baby participating in the study. Infants will open the box that made the adult happy, but not the other one.\textsuperscript{92} Since the child does not know in advance what was in the boxes, she could only have based her decision on an assessment of the experimenter’s reaction. That is, she had to form a theory of what the experimenter was thinking in order to decide what to do.

Developmental psychologist Paul Bloom takes a similar position: “[C]hildren use their \textit{naive psychology} or \textit{theory of mind} to figure out what people are referring to when they use words. Word learning is a species of intentional inference or, as Simon Baron-Cohen … has put it, mind reading.”\textsuperscript{93} Of course, as Bloom concedes, we don’t \textit{only} concern ourselves with the minds of others when we learn new words and concepts. It would be pointless to say that when a mother points to a caterpillar and says, “that’s a caterpillar” that the caterpillar itself plays no role in the acquisition of the concept. Nonetheless, inferring what others had in mind plays an essential role in how we learn the meanings of words.

Some very interesting work by Dare Baldwin (discussed by Bloom) illustrates how we use both worldly knowledge and our theories of the mind of others to understand

\textsuperscript{91} \textsc{Alison Gopnik, Andrew N. Meltzoff and Patricia K. Kuhl}, \textit{The Scientist in the Crib: Minds, Brains, and How Children Learn} 34 (1999).
\textsuperscript{92} \textsc{B. M. Repacholi}, \textit{Infants’ Use of Attentional Cues to Identify the Referent of Another Person’s Emotional Expression}, 34 \textit{Developmental Psych.} 1017 (1998)(discussed in Gopnik, et al. at 33).
words. In one experiment,\(^{94}\) Baldwin gave babies an object to play with. Another object was in a bucket. The experimenter looked at the bucket and said, “It’s a modi” (or some other nonsense word). Children looked at the experimenter, and redirected their attention to the bucket. Later, when shown the two objects together, they identified the modi as the object that had been in the bucket.

In an even more dramatic study, Baldwin had hidden two objects in separate containers.\(^{95}\) The experimenter looked in one container, said “it’s a modi,” and then gave the child the object that was in the other container. After a pause, the experimenter removed the object that was in the first container. When asked to identify the modi, babies chose the one that the experimenter had identified as such, even though they had seen only the other object, and even though they didn’t know what the modi object was when the experimenter named it. Both of these experiments require children to draw conclusions from what the experimenter must have been thinking when she named the object.

Assessing the minds of others is not limited to children. It is how we interact in social contexts generally. As Steven Pinker puts it:

A mind unequipped to discern other people’s beliefs and intentions, even if it can learn in other ways, is incapable of the kind of learning that perpetuates culture. People with autism suffer from an impairment of this kind. They can grasp physical representations like maps and diagrams but cannot grasp mental representations – that is, they cannot read other people’s minds.\(^{96}\)

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\(^{94}\) Dare Baldwin, *Infants’ Ability to Consult the Speaker for Clues to Word Reference*, 20 J. CHILD LANG. 395 (1993).


In fact, recent work has begun to trace the progression from young child to adult in the ability to derive conclusions about people’s state of mind from their actions.\textsuperscript{97}

To summarize what the philosophical and psychological literatures have shown so far:

1. We are used to understanding new concepts by reference to the intent of the person who introduced the concept to us. We form a theory of the person’s mind.

2. We routinely treat entities as individuals, especially entities that make decisions deliberatively.

3. Once we do so, the human trait that we attribute to entities is the trait of acting with volition, in other words, with having intent.

4. It is common and coherent to understand plural subjects as having beliefs, intentions, and other states of mind.

**B. Can Textualists Avoid Thinking About the Minds of Others?**

It is very hard to stop thinking in terms of the minds of others. We started doing it as babies, and we still do it every day to understand our world. Judges are no different in this respect. Regardless of the academic controversy, judges, including Supreme Court justices, often talk of the “intent of the legislature” or what the “legislature meant.” Consider the 2003 Supreme Court case, *Roell v. Winthrow*.\textsuperscript{98} The case involved a dispute between a group of prisoners and the medical staff at the prison. The prisoners challenged an unfavorable ruling after a trial before a federal Magistrate Judge on the

\textsuperscript{97} For a summary of some of this work, see Andrea D. Rosati, \textit{et al.}, \textit{The Rocky Road from Acts to Dispositions: Insights for Attribution Theory from Developmental Research on Theories of Mind}, in \textit{INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION} 87 (Bertram F. Malle, Louis J. Moses & Dare A. Baldwin eds. 2001).

\textsuperscript{98} 123 S.Ct. 1696 (2003).
grounds that the Magistrate Judge did not have jurisdiction over the case because not all medical staff defendants had formally waived their right to have the case tried before a District Court judge. After looking at the language of the relevant statute, Justice Souter, writing for a majority of five, stated:

These textual clues are complemented by a good pragmatic reason to think that Congress intended to permit implied consent. In giving magistrate judges case-dispositive civil authority, Congress hoped to relieve the district courts' "mounting queue of civil cases" and thereby "improve access to the courts for all groups." S. Rep. No. 96-74, p 4 (1979); see H. R. Rep. No. 96-287, p 2 (1979) (The Act's main object was to create "a supplementary judicial power designed to meet the ebb and flow of the demands made on the Federal judiciary"). At the same time, though, Congress meant to preserve a litigant's right to insist on trial before an Article III district judge insulated from interference with his obligation to ignore everything but the merits of a case.99

The language is full of intentional analysis, with words like hope, object, meant and intended.

Cases like this one are standard fare, although it would be difficult to quantify how frequently courts discuss the legislature’s state of mind because there are so many ways to do so. Nonetheless, just to illustrate how prevalent this kind of thinking is among judges, during the 1990’s state and federal courts combined used the language, “legislature mean(t)” or “Congress mean(t)” about 4,000 times.100 The words “legislature” or Congress” were used by federal courts within six words of “intend”101 words (intend, intent, intention, etc.) more than 3,000 times per year, or at least 30,000 times for the decade. State courts used this combination just a frequently, for a total of at

99 Id. at 1702.
100 LEXIS search: ((legislature mean! or Congress mean!) and date aft 1989 and date bef 2000)), conducted August 9, 2003. There were 3957 hits in the combined state and federal court library.
101 LEXIS search: (legislature or Congress) w/6 inten!
least 60,000 for the decade. That is how judges think and how they express their thoughts.

One way of investigating the extent to which intent is embedded in our thinking is to see whether people who have rejected legislative intent as relevant to legal analysis continue to make reference to it anyway. Consider the famous statement by Oliver Wendell Holmes: "we do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Maybe so. But below are a few quotes from Holmes’s opinions:

When it is considered that at the time the Act allowing the drawback was passed the tax was collected wholly by stamps, it seems evident that Congress meant to carry the policy of the Constitution against taxing exports beyond its strict requirement and to let the event decide about the tax.

Considering that only the principal of mortgages was taxed when the law was passed and that in those days no one thought of an income tax; that any contract of exemption must be shown to have been indisputably within the intention of the Legislature; that it is difficult to believe that the Legislature meant to barter away all its powers to meet future exigencies for the mere payment of a mortgage recording tax;…

We see no sufficient ground for supposing that Congress meant to open the questions that the other construction would raise.

Only words from which there is no escape could warrant the conclusion that Congress meant to strain its powers almost if not quite to the breaking point in order to make the probably very large proportion of citizens who have some preparation of opium in their possession criminal or at least prima facie criminal and subject to the serious punishment made possible by § 9.

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102 After LEXIS hits reach 3,000, LEXIS stops counting and advises the user that it has reached the maximum. Searches of both the federal and state court libraries hit this maximum.


104 Throughout this section I use bold face for words of intentionality without making mention of this alteration from the original text in each instance.


We cannot suppose that the Legislature meant either to practice a cunning deception or to make a futile grant.\textsuperscript{109}

There are many more like these.

I have no reason to call Holmes a hypocrite. In fact, Holmes’s approach to statutory interpretation was more complex than reliance on an acontextual reading of the statutory text.\textsuperscript{110} Yet his frequent reliance on legislative intent in his opinions does seem inconsistent with his famous pronouncement about statutory interpretation. The best explanation for this, I believe, is that he wrote about intent because we think in terms of intent when language leaves us unsure. Because Holmes was not committed to textualist methodology, he did not make a \textit{post hoc} effort to censor his remarks.

What about the argumentation of Justice Scalia, who is a committed textualist? He doesn’t slip up often – but it happens to him as well, especially in his dissenting opinions. Here are a few examples:

When, \textit{Chevron} said, Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute that is to be administered by an executive agency, it is presumed that Congress \textbf{meant to give the agency discretion}, within the limits of reasonable interpretation, as to how the ambiguity is to be resolved.\textsuperscript{111}

Such a system of justice seems to me so arbitrary that it is difficult to believe Congress intended it. Had Congress meant to cast its carjacking net so broadly, it could have achieved that result -- and eliminated the arbitrariness -- by defining the crime as "carjacking under threat of death or serious bodily injury." Given the language here, I find it much more plausible that Congress meant to reach -- as it said -- the carjacker who intended to kill.\textsuperscript{112}

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\textsuperscript{109} Wright v. Central of G.R. Co., 236 U.S. 674, 679 (1915).
\textsuperscript{110} See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1374 (1990), showing that Holmes, despite his famous quote, was not devoted to textualism when it appeared that reliance on the plain language of a statute would lead to results inconsistent with broader principles.
\textsuperscript{112} 526 U.S. 1, 20 (1999)(Scalia, J. dissenting).
\end{flushright}
It seems to me likely that Congress had a presumption of offense-specific knowledge of illegality in mind when it enacted the provision here at issue. Another section of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act…

By giving literally unprecedented meaning to the words in two relevant statutes, and overruling the premise of Congress's enactment, the Court adds new, Byzantine detail to a habeas corpus scheme Congress meant to streamline and simplify. I respectfully dissent.

The suggestion is halfhearted because that reading obviously contradicts the statutory intent. In fairness, Justice Scalia may have been responding to the intentionalist arguments of others in some of these examples, and therefore structured his arguments accordingly. However, intentionality even makes its way into statutory analysis that seems prototypically textual. Consider this seemingly standard analysis by Scalia in a case involving the obligations of individuals who received more Supplemental Social Security benefits than they were entitled to receive:

If Congress had in mind only shortfalls or excesses in individual monthly payments, rather than in the overall payment balance, it would have been more natural to refer to "the correct amount of any payment," and to require adjustment "with respect to any payment . . . of less [or more] than the correct amount." This terminology is used elsewhere in § 204(a)(1)(A), whenever individual monthly payments are at issue ("the Secretary shall decrease any payment under this subchapter to which such overpaid person is entitled"; "shall decrease any payment under this subchapter payable to his estate").

Scalia has used a routine textual argument – Congress could have better used other words to convey the meaning that the losing party would ascribe to the disputed statute – but he has done so in intentionalist terms. We infer from the language, Scalia suggests,
that Congress did not have the party’s repayment scheme “in mind.” And in doing so, we necessarily regard Congress as an entity to which we attribute intentionality.

The same holds true for other text-oriented interpretive devices. Take, for example, the rule of construction that statutory words are to be given their “ordinary meaning.” What is the rationale for this rule? It is based on the assumption that legislative drafters are most likely to use words that way. If a court adopts that assumption it will increase its chances of making a decision that is loyal to the legislature’s intention. Again, consider Scalia’s explanation of the rule:

The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly “begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”

As a matter of intuitive statistics, Scalia argues, we are likely to honor the legislature’s intention if we construe words in their ordinary sense because that is how the legislature probably intended them to be understood. In fact, it is difficult to know what else to say about the task of statutory interpretation, except in cases in which there is no legitimate controversy.

Even arguments of statutory coherence, which imply values other than enforcing the will of the legislature, are often stated as good surrogates for intent, even by textualists:

The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which

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118 See infra note ___.
the provision must be integrated -- a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind. I would not permit any of the historical and legislative material discussed by the Court, or all of it combined, to lead me to a result different from the one that these factors suggest.119

Justice Scalia is not alone in this practice.120 Others also describe the value of coherence as the enforcement of legislative intent.121

Despite his frequently acrimonious tone in deriding the kind of rhetoric he actually uses on occasion, especially in dissent, I don’t believe that Scalia is being hypocritical either. Rather, Scalia has taken an intellectual position that certain kinds of analysis are not appropriate in statutory interpretation. The problem is that it is almost impossible to avoid thinking in the intentionalist terms that Scalia would outlaw. He can’t always do it either.

Text-based canons of construction, then, are by no means an alternative to considering legislative intent. To the contrary, even according to their defenders, they are best seen as default rules for assessing what the intent likely was. This suggests that there really may be less difference between intentionalists and textualists than the rhetoric would cause us to believe. If so, we need to explain why Holmes’s warning – that we care about what the statute means, and not what the legislature meant122 – continues to resonate today.

120 Nor is there only one example of his justifying coherence arguments on intentionalist grounds. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571-72 (1988)(determining what “Congress meant” and what “Congress thought” in interpreting statute allowing for attorney’s fees in certain contexts).
121 See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 255-56 (2000)(Souter, J.)("Surely a Congress that meant to refer to ballots, midway through a statute repeatedly referring to ‘votes’ for gubernatorial slates, would have said ‘ballots.’"); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)(Rehnquist, C.J.)("These cross-references illustrate Congress’ intent that the AFDC and Child Support programs operate together closely to provide uniform levels of support for children of equal need.").
122 Holmes, supra note __.
IV

Private Language and
The Legal Stakes in Intent Talk

A. Where Intent Seems to Matter

I have argued thus far that it is coherent to talk of the intent of a group, especially a group like a legislature, which makes decisions deliberatively. I have further pointed out that it is so natural to do so that even ardent textualists can’t help themselves. This part of the Article explores the circumstances in which the issue of intent arises most frequently, and argues that in certain circumstances it not only is natural to speak of intent, but there are few, if any, alternatives. Much of the debate over this issue, I suggest, stems from the high stakes involved in the dispute: disagreement over the extent to which we can govern ourselves under a rule of law articulated pursuant to constitutional procedures. Seen in this broader light, disagreement over the role of legislative intent serves as a surrogate for a larger disagreement over whether government by laws is at least in part an illusion.

1. Legislative Errors and Absurd Results

Intent frequently plays a role in statutory interpretation when a court decides that the legislature has made a mistake. Consider United States v. Granderson,\(^\text{123}\) Granderson, a letter carrier, was convicted of destruction of mail, and sentenced to five years on probation. The maximum prison sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would have been six months. While on probation, he was caught with illegal drugs. A statute states: “the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the

defendant to not less than one-third of the original sentence.” What is “one-third of the original sentence?” Taken out of context, the most natural reading is that probation is revoked, and the individual is resented to a much shorter period of probation. It can also mean, as the government argued, that the individual must serve a prison sentence of at least one-third of the time that he would have been on probation had he not possessed drugs during his probation period (one-third of five years in this case). Alternatively, it can mean, as Granderson argued, that the individual must serve a sentence of at least one-third the sentence that he would have received had he been sentenced to prison, and not to probation in the first place (one-third of six months).

The Court accepted Granderson’s interpretation. First, the majority of justices agreed with the government that it would be absurd to interpret the statute to require Granderson’s sentence to be reduced to an even shorter period of probation. The Court also rejected the Government’s position, in part using the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity between the remaining two interpretations. In so doing, the majority looked at the legislative history. Congress drafted this provision hastily, and it appeared that the drafters may have had in mind an earlier sentencing scheme, in which probation was granted by imposing a sentence, and then revoking the sentence in favor of a probationary period of good conduct. The intermediate position was truest to general principles of interpretation and to what the legislature was likely trying to accomplish.

Interestingly, it is intent that makes a mistake a mistake. We all have experiences like, “Did I say Tuesday? I meant Thursday.” Alternatively, we sometimes believe that

125 511 U.S. at 44-45.
126 Id. at 45.
127 Id.
we were mistaken when, in retrospect, we failed to think through the consequences of applying what we say in unforeseen circumstances. The two are quite different, and textualists draw a distinction between them.\textsuperscript{128} In the first instance, the person says, “I didn’t mean to say what I said.” In the second, the person says, “I meant to do say I said, but now I see that it was a very bad idea.” Sometimes, in the statutory context, it is not easy to tell which one occurred. For example, in \textit{United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.},\textsuperscript{129} Congress had not drafted an appropriate \textit{mens rea} requirement into a statute making it illegal to deal in child pornography. The majority of justices assumed that Congress intended to write a constitutional statute, and implied the appropriate state of mind requirements in order to rescue the law from constitutional infirmity. Justice Scalia, in dissent, regarded that position too generous, since Congress may well have intended the law to apply according to its plain, unconstitutional language.\textsuperscript{130}

\section*{2. Indeterminacy in Meaning}

A second set of cases raises the issue of intent somewhat differently. The language of a statute is subject to more than one interpretation. If a court pays attention to the ordinary meaning of a statutory term, it will reach one conclusion about how the statute should apply in the case before it. If, on the other hand, it asks whether the legislature would have wanted the statute to apply in a broader range of circumstances, a court would reach the opposite conclusion.

\textsuperscript{128} See Siegel, \textit{Statutory Drafting Errors}, \textit{supra} note ___ at ___ (describing Scalia’s philosophy of correcting only “scrivener’s errors).
\textsuperscript{129} 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Id.} at 80-81 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
This is exactly what happened in an important 1991 Supreme Court case, *Chisom v. Roemer*.\textsuperscript{131} Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires that states not afford protected classes of people “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”\textsuperscript{132} The question in *Chisom* was whether the Act applies to judicial elections as well as to legislative elections.

Based on an analysis of legislative intent, the Court held 6 - 3 that the Act did apply to a judicial election in Louisiana. The majority opinion by Justice Stevens argued, among other things, that the quoted language was borrowed from an earlier Supreme Court opinion, *White v. Regester*.\textsuperscript{133} That opinion, however, used the word “legislators” where the current statute uses the word “representatives.” Congress, the majority argued, would not have troubled itself to replace one word for the other unless it wanted the statute to apply to a range of elections broader than legislative ones.\textsuperscript{134} Moreover, the legislative history suggests that Congress had no interest in limiting the range of elections to which the section of the Act applies.\textsuperscript{135}

In a sharp dissent, Justice Scalia relied heavily on the ordinary meaning rule. Citing (but not quoting) *Webster’s Second New International Dictionary*, Scalia argued: “There is little doubt that the ordinary meaning of ‘representatives’ does not include judges.”\textsuperscript{136} Scalia was right about the statute’s ordinary meaning. Regardless of what the

\textsuperscript{132} 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
\textsuperscript{133} 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1971).
\textsuperscript{134} 501 U.S. at 398-99.
\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 398 n.26.
dictionaries say or do not say, the majority appears to have given the statutory term “representative” a broader interpretation than its ordinary meaning. They did so by using extrinsic evidence to draw inferences about what Congress really might have intended. Thus, the majority used evidence of intent to infer that a statutory term should be given a meaning consistent with the language, but not its most prototypical meaning.

But Scalia’s dissent was equally intent-oriented. He explained his objection to the majority as follows:

The Court, petitioners, and petitioners' amici have labored mightily to establish that there is a meaning of "representatives" that would include judges, see, e.g., Brief for Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights as Amicus Curiae 10-11, and no doubt there is. But our job is not to scavenge the world of English usage to discover whether there is any possible meaning of "representatives" which suits our preconception that the statute includes judges; our job is to determine whether the ordinary meaning includes them, and if it does not, to ask whether there is any solid indication in the text or structure of the statute that something other than ordinary meaning was intended.137

Thus, the rationale for using the ordinary meaning canon, according to Scalia, is as a surrogate for legislative intent. In this case, competition among the canons – resort to ordinary language vs. resort to extrinsic evidence in the face of ambiguity – is merely evidentiary in nature. Both sides purport to base their decision on the intent of the legislature, but the majority and dissent disagree about how to find that intent.

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137 Id.
3. When Intent and Literal Meaning Collide

Sometimes, a party argues that the language of a statute should not be applied literally in a particular situation because Congress would not have so intended.\(^\text{138}\) It is hard to call these situations outright errors, because in most situations, the statute applies without much controversy.

The issue arose in 2000 when the Supreme Court held that the Food and Drug Administration had overstepped its authority when it attempted to regulate tobacco during the Clinton administration. In *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Inc.*,\(^\text{139}\) the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend, when it wrote the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, to give the FDA authority to regulate tobacco, despite language in the Act that quite clearly supported such authority. The Court was closely divided, with the five more conservative justices, including Justice Scalia, voting in the majority.

The holding was expressed largely in intentional terms:

In this case, we believe that Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. Such authority is **inconsistent with the intent that Congress has expressed** in the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA. In light of this clear intent, the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction is impermissible.\(^\text{140}\)

In fact, the opinion is replete with inferences drawn about the intent of the legislature. One argument asserted that the FDA has an obligation to ban completely dangerous substances within its regulatory authority. But Congress has never suggested that tobacco should be banned. From this, the court concluded:

Thus, the FDA would apparently have to ban tobacco products, a result the court found clearly **contrary to congressional intent**. This apparent

\(^{138}\) The classic example is *Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States*, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).

\(^{139}\) 529 U.S. 120 (2000).

\(^{140}\) *Id.* at 126.
anomaly, the Court of Appeals concluded, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to give the FDA authority to regulate tobacco.\textsuperscript{141}

Later, the Court noted:

\textbf{Congress' decisions} to regulate labeling and advertising and to adopt the express policy of protecting "commerce and the national economy . . . to the maximum extent" \textit{reveal its intent that tobacco products remain on the market}. Indeed, the collective premise of these statutes is that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco will continue to be sold in the United States. A ban of tobacco products by the FDA would therefore plainly contradict congressional policy.\textsuperscript{142}

There are many other examples, including the use of legislative history as a source from which legislative intent is to be inferred.\textsuperscript{143}

The problem facing the majority was that the case was governed by the \textit{Chevron} doctrine. In \textit{Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.},\textsuperscript{144} decided in 1984, the Supreme Court reviewed certain regulations that the Environmental Protection Agency had put into place under authority given to the EPA by the federal Clean Air Act. The regulations were being challenged as too weak to fulfill the policies that underlie the Act. The Supreme Court unanimously held that it had had an obligation to defer to the EPA’s interpretation if it found that the statute was “silent or ambiguous”\textsuperscript{145} with respect to the specific issue in dispute. As long as the agency’s construction of the Act was a “permissible construction,”\textsuperscript{146} the agency was to have the last word.

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Id.} at 130.
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Id.} at 139.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Id.} at 142, 144-45.
\textsuperscript{144} 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Id.} at 851.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Id.} at 843.
In Brown & Williamson, the underlying statute permits the FDA to regulate not only drugs, but also “devices” through which drugs are delivered. It is easy enough to argue that cigarettes are not what one would ordinarily consider a device, and therefore not a proper subject of regulation. But the Chevron doctrine takes that argument away from the Court. Surely, a cigarette can reasonably be considered a device to deliver nicotine. If so, the courts lack the power to substitute their judgment for that of the administrative agency that Congress empowered to enforce the statute. Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of himself and three others, made this point forcefully in his textually-oriented dissent.

Both sides make good points. The majority is certainly correct, based on its analysis of other statutes that regulate tobacco, legislative history, and other contextual information, that Congress never intended to permit the FDA to regulate tobacco. The dissent is correct in claiming that cigarettes can be considered devices for delivering nicotine, and that the FDA’s interpretation falls well within the range of linguistically available interpretations of the statute’s plain language. While it is unusual for the justices to align themselves so contrary to their professed positions on the role of intent in statutory interpretation, it is not unusual for intent to become an issue when the language of a statute appears to permit a broader range of interpretations than the legislature intended to include within the law’s purview.

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B. Public Statutes, Private Language

Cases like these arouse a great deal of passion, provoking unpleasant concurring and dissenting opinions from judges, and a huge scholarly literature. The importance of these cases, I believe, lies in a remark that Judge Easterbrook made in an opinion interpreting the federal Bankruptcy Code. In discussing what to do when the legislative history suggests one result and the plain language of a statute the opposite result, Easterbrook noted: “Statutes are law, not evidence of law.”

If statutes have meaning on their own, without inquiry into the intent of their makers, then Easterbrook is at least arguably correct. Decision makers need only read the statute to determine when it should apply. But if determining intent is a necessary element of interpretation, then statutory language can be no more than evidence of that intent. As soon as we begin to speak of “legislative intent” or “what the legislature meant” or “had in mind” or any other such thing, we automatically reduce the statute’s language to “evidence of law” to use Easterbrook’s words. The ramifications of this are serious. It means that constitutional procedures for enacting laws are not enough to determine the rights and obligations of the citizenry in a significant set of

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149 In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
150 This is not to say that Judge Easterbrook is consistent in taking this position. In a controversial decision, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d (7th Cir. 1997), Judge Easterbrook held that Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to a situation in which a computer company shipped a computer along with documentation that included additional terms of the sale, and gave the buyer 30 days to return the machine, or it would be deemed that the buyer had accepted the terms. Had § 2-207 applied, the additional terms, in all likelihood, would not have been held valid. Judge Easterbrook, however, determined that this section of the UCC did not apply because when there is only one form, the statute is irrelevant, since the statute applies to “the battle of the forms.” But the statute does not make reference to any such battle, or to the number of forms involved. Its language refers only to such things as offers, acceptances and terms. Whatever one thinks of the merits of this decision, it can only be supported if one looks at the statute itself as evidence of law, and not the law itself. For critical commentary, see Deborah Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook, 16 Tuoro L. Rev. 1205 (2000).
circumstances. The textualists recognized this inference long ago and have been trying to eliminate intent as part of the interpretive enterprise ever since.

Political concerns, however, do not alter the nature of the human language faculty. Those who remember the Watergate scandal will recall Senator Sam Ervin’s presence as chair of the Senate select committee investigating President Nixon’s activities. At one point in the proceedings he remarked that the President’s duties did not include criminal activity. When asked how he knew that, he replied: “Because the English language is my native tongue, and I understand it.”

What does this mean? When I say that I know the English language as “my native tongue,” I mean that I have in my mind the vocabulary, rules and principles that entitle me to call myself a speaker of English. If I also identify you as a native speaker of English, I assume that your mind is similarly endowed and configured. When I say something to you, I expect that you will understand it more or less as I would if you said it to me. Similarly, when you say something to me, I expect that you intended to express more or less what I understood you to have said. But that is as far as I can go. When we communicate all we have are intentions and some confidence that we are more or less the same as each other with respect to our language faculty. Chomsky refers to this concept of linguistic knowledge as “I(internal)-Language.”

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151 Interestingly, as a historical matter, legal texts such as statutes, contracts and wills, were considered nothing other than evidence of intent prior to the rise of printing, and later, literacy. See Peter M. Tiersma, *A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory Interpretation*, 72 TUL. L. REV. 431 (2001).


154 Chomsky, *Knowledge of Language*, supra note ___. Many philosophers indeed either assume or assert that there is something “out there” called English. Thus, Chomsky’s position, which I adopt here, is controversial. See, e.g., Saul A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982), and Chomsky’s response in *Knowledge of Language*. 

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best interpreted as saying, “anyone who can legitimately claim to have English as his native tongue would understand this statement the same way that I do.”\textsuperscript{155}

Our language faculty consists of many components: vocabulary, a set of sounds, rules governing the sound system, syntactic rules and principles, conventions of inference. With respect to at least some of these, I can be very sure that you and I will be in accord. If I say, to take a simple, standard example, \textit{the cat is on the mat}, I have every reason to believe that you will understand the relationship between the cat and the mat the same way I do. You will not, for example, think that the mat is on the cat. While there may be very small differences at the margin, it appears that knowledge of syntactic relations is quite uniform among speakers of a given language.\textsuperscript{156} There may be words that you know that I don’t, or that you and I appear to use in slightly different ways, perhaps as to whether the cat is on a mat or a small rug. Yet, most of the time we seem to use words the same way. Similarly, we may pronounce some words differently, but we seem able to make adjustments for this. In all of these cases, our experience is individualistic and personal.

Nonetheless, we do have the intuition that when I say I understand English, there is something external to my mind that constitutes English. That, however, is the result of an illusion. We can tell that language is an internal matter every time we misunderstand someone who speaks our language, and when such a person misunderstands us. This can

\textsuperscript{155} The distinction between knowledge of language in this sense, and skills in the use of this knowledge in various social settings has been a matter of some controversy in the linguistic literature. For valuable discussion, see Frederick J. Newmeyer, \textit{Grammar is Grammar and Usage is Usage}, 79 \textit{Language} 682 (2003).

\textsuperscript{156} Chomsky argues that this is because a great deal of syntactic knowledge is innate, and therefore there is not much room for variation. My argument does not hinge on such claims, although there is strong evidence in support of them. For accessible discussion, see NOAM CHOMSKY, \textit{LANGUAGE AND PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE MANAGUA LECTURES} (1988); STEVEN PINKER, \textit{THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATE LANGUAGE} (1994).
only happen if our internal states are similar enough for us to agree that we both speak English, but different and individual in a host of small ways. The illusion, in contrast, comes from the great deal that speakers of English have in common.

To the extent that we can say with complete confidence that you and I will understand an English utterance the same way, it is as though there really is something called English “out there,” apart from our intentions. There is no need to think about intended meaning, possible differences between us, or the context in which a statement was made if there can be no controversy over the statement’s meaning even after taking those things into account. Unless I make a mistake, when I say *the cat is on the mat*, I certainly don’t mean the mat is on the cat. By the same token, when a bribery statute makes it illegal for any person to “corruptly give something of value to a government official,”[^157] we do not mistakenly think it means that a government official cannot give a Christmas present to her dry cleaner. The grammatical relations unquestionably inform us about the direction of the banned payments.[^158]

The point becomes clearer if we compare the following two questions, which roughly track the distinction that Holmes made between the intent of the speaker and the meaning of the language:

1. What did you mean by that?
2. What does that mean?

[^158]: There are few, if any, published legal opinions in which the syntax of the bribery statute is brought into question, despite the fact that the statute is written in the form of a very long and syntactically complex sentence, characteristic of much statutory drafting. For discussion, see Lawrence M. Solan, *Why Laws Work Pretty Well, But Not Great* (reviewing STEVEN PINKER, WORDS AND RULES 1999), 26 L. AND SOC. INQ. 243 (2001).
Philosophers sometimes distinguish between these two senses of meaning, sometimes calling the first “intentional” and the second “extensional.” Others distinguish between “speaker’s meaning” and “word meaning” to describe the two senses of meaning. Yet the distinction seems to disappear on close analysis. It is rather a matter of whether we focus on the individual intent of the speaker, or on the intent of the speaker as a member of a group with shared knowledge.

If you use an English word that I don’t know, I can ask either of these questions appropriately. In (1), I am, sensibly enough, asking for your intent, given that you are trying to convey some thought to me; in (2) I am assuming that everyone with command of that word would have a similar purpose in doing so, and I am asking what that purpose is. They both amount to the same thing. In contrast, if you are speaking French to a group of people, and say something that goes beyond my knowledge of that language, I am more likely to use (2) instead of (1). That is because I assume that French speakers by and large would understand your utterance the same way, by virtue of their having similar I-Language, but that my state of knowledge is deficient. I put the problem in terms of the difference I perceive between myself and the community of people who can legitimately say that they speak French fluently. If, however, you say something vague or ambiguous or otherwise unclear in a language in which I appropriately consider myself a competent speaker, (1) is the more appropriate question. In fact, (2) sounds rather nasty. It more or less accuses you of not having a good enough command of the rules and vocabulary of English to use it as a native speaker.

159 For a very clear discussion of the difference, see M.B.W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent: Fact or Fabrication?, (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994), 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1329, 1358-60 (1997).
160 H. Paul Grice, Utterer’s Meaning and Intention, 78 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 147 (1969). For helpful discussion of these and related concepts, see Bix, supra note ____.
Crucially, if you say something that I understand perfectly well, then neither (1) nor (2) is appropriate – and for exactly the same reason. I believe, as a speaker of English, that I understand what you have said, and that I understand it for the same reason that everyone else who speaks English can say that they understand it. This situation is exactly what courts have in mind when they invoke the “plain language rule.” A commonly quoted example appears in *Caminetti v. United States*,\(^{161}\) a 1917 United States Supreme Court decision:

> It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.\(^{162}\)

When the Court says that the language is “plain,” it is saying that no one would disagree about what someone using that language intended to say. Let us return to the bribery statute. Assume that we have consensus about the relationships among the parties mentioned in the statute. The consensus does not mean that discerning communicative intent is irrelevant to our understanding of the statute’s meaning. It means only that we do not have to worry about any distinction between language and intent, because native speakers of English would only have a single intent if they use the language they did sincerely and without error.\(^{163}\)

\(^{161}\) 242 U.S. 470 (1917).

\(^{162}\) *Id.* at 485. *See also* *Lamie v. United States Trustee, ___ U.S. ___, ___*, 2004 US LEXIS 824 at *6 (2004) (“It is well established that ‘when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts -- at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd -- is to enforce it according to its terms.’”) (quoting *Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A.*, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000).

\(^{163}\) *See Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, supra* note ___.

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In fact, courts at times actually state the plain language rule in terms of the “best evidence” of legislative intent, although the Supreme Court has not done so. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit characterized the role of plain language in statutory interpretation as follows, quoting a leading treatise:

As always, the most authoritative indicators of what Congress intended are the words that it chose in drafting the statute. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03, at 82 (4th ed. 1984) (“What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.”). Here, we think that Congress's use of the word "purchaser" by itself connotes an intent to include only volitional transactions.164

The Third Circuit regards the language of the statute not as the law in Easterbrook’s sense, but as “indicators of what Congress intended.” This is so even when the language is plain. It is easy enough to find similar statements elsewhere, both in the opinions of federal165 and state166 courts.

Thus, when faced with a dispute about whether a law applies in a particular situation, our first impulse is to examine what the law says. After all, laws are intended to be both autonomous167 and authoritative. If a law is clear enough, so is our obligation to obey it in particular circumstances clear enough. Our second impulse is to ask what the legislature meant by what it said. These two impulses are related so closely that they are really part of the same task. For this reason, Scalia’s concurrence in in Conroy v. Aniskoff.

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164 United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 184 (3rd Cir. 1991).
165 See, e.g., Miller v. Carlson, 768 F.Supp. 1331, 1334 (N.D. Cal. 1991)(“In construing statutory provisions, courts must first consider the text of the statute. It is well-settled that the plain language of a statute provides the best evidence of legislative intent.”)(citation omitted).
166 See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 52 P.3d 1278, 1278 (Utah 2002)(“We discern legislative intent and purpose by first looking to the "best evidence" of its meaning, which is the plain language of the statute itself.”); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So.2d 1130, 1137 (Fla. 1990)(“The best evidence of the intent of the legislature is generally the plain meaning of the statute.”).
167 See Tiersma, supra note ___ for discussion of the importance of autonomy in authoritative legal texts.
we should not pretend to care about legislative intent (as opposed to the meaning of the law), lest we impose upon the practicing bar and their clients obligations that we do not ourselves take seriously.\footnote{Conroy v. Aniskoff. 507 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1993)(Scalia, J. concurring).} misapprehends what we do when we interpret the language of others. Indeed we care about the meaning of the law. We care so much that we look at the intent of the legislature to see what that meaning is, just as we look at the intent of others to understand most everything else in social contexts. As Justice Scalia regularly reminds us, the language that the legislature used is often enough the only evidence needed to determine what the legislature had to say. But that doesn’t mean that we don’t care about intent, and it doesn’t mean that the language of the statute is always sufficient to allow us to make a final decision about the statute’s applicability.

Most of the time, whether or not statutory interpreters speak of legislative intent makes little substantive difference. The language of the law as applied to the situation at hand leaves little room for controversy. The stakes go up, however, in those few cases in which different interpretive approaches may lead to different results. Once we encounter even the smallest amount of controversy or uncertainty, we routinely begin thinking in terms of intent.

This explains why courts talk of intent so often. Whether it’s the ordinary meaning canon, or the legislature’s use of similar language elsewhere in the code, or the choice of one expression where another would have expressed a particular meaning better, or for that matter, legislative history, we are searching for intent. We do so, because that is the only question to ask if we care about what someone was trying to say and the words are not enough to answer the question. For these reasons, I don’t believe that any judge or commentator can consistently maintain that courts should dispense
altogether with discussion of legislative intent. The concept is just too deeply embedded in the way we see the world.

C. Can Public Law Values Replace Intent?

At least, this is almost so. Courts also resort to a set of interpretive arguments that do not rely upon intent. Instead, they rely on values that are thought to make a statutory code a good one. Among them are canons of construction that favor interpreting a statute to make the code read as a coherent whole, and the rule that criminal statutes are to be interpreted narrowly. Along these lines, Professor Elhauge has suggested that ambiguous statutes be resolved by default rules that favor political satisfaction at the time that decision is made.169

Consider Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey.170 The issue was whether the fees paid to expert witnesses should count as part of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” with respect to a statute that allows the prevailing party in certain actions to recover attorneys fees. Writing for a majority of six justices, Justice Scalia argued that they should not. The most compelling argument was that Congress had enacted other statutes that shift fees, and some of them mention expert fees specifically. Therefore, if Congress had intended the statute in question to do so, it would have said so.


Earlier, I showed how arguments like this are frequently stated in intentionalist terms, even by devoted textualists. But they need not be. One can say: Regardless of what Congress had in mind, the Court, should, in order to contribute productively to the legislative process, interpret statutes in such a way as to keep codes maximally coherent. Dan Simon has argued that there is a strong psychological impulse toward coherence that governs a great deal of legal decision making. This principle would be a case in point. In fact, Justice Scalia made his point in just that way in *Casey*:

Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law. See 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5201 (3d F. Horack ed. 1943). We do so not because that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers must have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress know what a later Congress would enact?), but because it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the *corpus juris*. This interpretive methodology no doubt has merit in many cases. But the drive to reach coherence must serve some purpose for it to be justified. One such purpose, used frequently by judges, is effectuating the intentions of the lawmakers. If there is no evidence to the contrary, it is a fair enough inference that legislators are likely to want to write coherent codes, and would be happy enough if courts maximized that value if a case arises involving some issue that they never noticed.

Justice Scalia’s stated purpose for promoting coherence in *Casey* is more radical. He justifies the practice as good judicial law making, regardless of what the legislature might have intended. It shows less respect for legislative primacy than does the

171 See supra note ___.
172 Some of these values are explored in Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill and Usman Mohammed, *The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes*, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2000).
174 499 U.S. at 100-01
175 See supra note ___ for examples of courts justifying coherence arguments on intentionalist grounds.
intentional approach. It more resembles Ronald Dworkin’s approach to statutory interpretation, which requires decision makers to decide statutory cases in a manner “that follows from the best interpretation of the legislative process as a whole.”

It is at least arguable that working towards coherence in the interpretation of legal codes serves that goal. Yet Scalia’s approach is less constrained than Dworkin’s, because Dworkin espouses looking at history as an important means of reducing the options available to the interpreter at any given time.

Whether the focus on coherence serves any other purpose, how well it serves as a proxy for intent is an open matter. Professor Buzbee has argued that coherence arguments are not very good surrogates for intent, which suggests that heavy reliance on coherence may at times undermine the principle of legislative primacy, not at all what Scalia purports to be doing. In reality, legislatures do not always pay attention to how a word in, say, the criminal code, might have been used in a statute that regulates mining, or in some other remote law. *Casey*, in fact, may be just such a case. As Justice Stevens’ dissent makes clear, in enacting the fee-shifting statute, Congress had intended to overrule a parsimonious Supreme Court decision, which refused to shift fees in civil rights cases absent legislation requiring it. Congress responded by enacting the disputed statute. The Supreme Court, in *Casey*, then construed this new statute narrowly, and Congress had to respond once again by amending the statute to make it clear that it was to apply to expert fees as well. This may explain why coherence

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176 DWORKIN, supra note __ at 337.
178 *Casey*, 499 U.S. at 108-09 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
arguments are, by and large, also justified by the goal of enforcing the will of the legislature.

Professor Elhauge presents a somewhat different argument to the effect that coherence is a poor surrogate for enforcing the will of the legislature.\textsuperscript{181} Although he directs his remarks against Dworkin’s reliance upon coherence,\textsuperscript{182} his critique has far more general application. Elhauge points out that various dictionary acts that are parts of the codes of many states often contain rules to the effect that specific legislative directives should be given priority over general ones, when conflicts occur. As Elhauge observes, instructing courts to ignore general principles in favor of specific, inconsistent rules provides evidence that the legislature does not itself value coherence, and that coherence as a value cannot be supported on grounds of legislative intent.

As for Justice Scalia’s argument that intent is irrelevant, this opinion does not test the proposition, since he has argued elsewhere that coherence is evidence of intent as well. To argue against the relevance of intent in such cases, Scalia would have to take the position that coherence values must prevail even if they thwart the clear intent of the legislature. Although the dissent accuses him of doing just that in fact, Scalia never made that argument in\textit{Casey}, and I doubt that he would make it in any case in which coherence is the principal argument. In fact, I know of no case in which a court has overtly thwarted the will of the legislature for the same of adding coherence to the\textit{corpus juris}, to use Scalia’s term. Interpreting a code to gain coherence makes good sense as a default position. Absence evidence of intent to the contrary, why not promote coherence as a value? It also can at least arguably serve as a proxy for intent in some cases. But

\textsuperscript{181} Elhauge I, 102 COLUM. L. REV. at 2045-46.
\textsuperscript{182} DWORKIN, supra note ___ at 329-37.
coherence has never been used by courts as an adequate reason for rejecting the contrary will of the legislature.

A somewhat stronger case can be made for rejecting intent in favor of other canons. The rule of lenity tells courts to resolve ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the accused in order to make sure that the statute gives fair notice to defendants and to promote the separation of powers. Fair notice is an important enough value in its own right that courts may be justified in thwarting legislative intent if the statute is not clear enough on its face to put a defendant on adequate notice. In fact, Chief Justice Marshall advocated doing just that in *United States v. Wiltberger*, written in 1820. A statute gave courts jurisdiction over manslaughter committed on the high seas. Provisions of the statute governing other crimes also referred to rivers, basins and other bodies of waters, but these were mysteriously left out of the manslaughter section of the statute. Marshall held that the rule of lenity should apply, even though it was relatively clear that Congress likely intended to write a statute broader in scope than the words convey:

> The probability is, that the legislature designed to punish all persons amenable to their laws, who should, in any place, aid and assist, procure, command, counsel, or advise, any person or persons to commit any murder or piracy punishable under the act. And such would words, "upon the land or the seas" been omitted. But the legislature has chosen to describe the place where the accessorial offence is to be committed, and has not referred to a description contained in any other part of the act. The words are, "upon the land or the seas." The Court cannot reject this description.

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183 See Solan, supra note ___ for discussion.
184 Justice Holmes takes this position in the famous case, McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931)("Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will under stand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.").
185 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
186 *Id.* at 100.
To Marshall, then, the value of providing fair notice to criminal defendants is important enough to override the intent of the legislature.

Professor Elhauge suggests a second, non-intentionalist value that the rule of lenity promotes: criminal law driven by the legislature over time. Elhauge argues that criminal division of the Justice Department has an excellent record when it comes to convincing Congress to override adverse rulings by the courts, whereas the criminal defense bar has a very weak record. The result of lenity, then, is to create a dialectic between the courts, the executive, and the legislature, which will end when the legislature has enacted a statute sufficiently tough that it is satisfied with a narrow interpretation by the courts even when the executive asks for even additional sanctions.

But courts are not willing to hold that all uncertainties in interpretation should lead to the narrower reading of the statute, and modern courts have used intent to temper the application of lenity. As Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in Moskal v. United States:

Because the meaning of language is inherently contextual, we have declined to deem a statute "ambiguous" for purposes of lenity merely because it was possible to articulate a construction more narrow than that urged by the Government. Nor have we deemed a division of judicial authority automatically sufficient to trigger lenity. If that were sufficient, one court's unduly narrow reading of a criminal statute would become binding on all other courts, including this one. Instead, we have always reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to "the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies" of the statute.

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189 Id. at 108 (citations omitted).
It is not unusual for courts to combine intentionalist and other jurisprudential values, ensuring that legislative primacy is at least one of the values that courts consider.\textsuperscript{190} The failure to consider legislative intent can lead to results more out of keeping with the legislative process than most judges are willing to tolerate.

Also capable of trumping intent are arguments that a statute’s meaning has changed over time, or that its enforcement over time has resulted in a legal landscape worthy of preservation even if the enacting legislature would not have been pleased at the developments. As for changes in meaning over time, consider \textit{Moskal v. United States}.\textsuperscript{191} The statute in question banned the interstate transportation of “falsely made” securities.\textsuperscript{192} As Justice Scalia argued convincingly in his dissent, at the time that the statute was enacted, “falsely made” was largely a synonym for “counterfeit.”\textsuperscript{193} Over time, that meaning has dissipated, and we now are more likely to understand it in terms of the meanings of its components: “made to be false.” In \textit{Moskal}, the defendant was a car dealer who had been rolling back odometers, sending the false information to the motor vehicle authorities, and then receiving clean titles with the false information. There was nothing counterfeit about any of the documents, but the new titles surely contained misinformation. The majority found that the clear notice of the statute was enough to trump the more limited mission of the enacting legislature, and affirmed Moskal’s conviction.

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\textsuperscript{190} See, e.g., \textit{Granderson v. United States}, 511 U.S. 39, 41 (1994)(in rejecting narrowest reading of statute, Court notes: “This construction, however, is implausible, and has been urged by neither party, for it would generally demand no increased sanction, plainly not what Congress intended.”). \textit{See supra} note \textsuperscript{\(\_\_\_\)} for further discussion of the case.
\textsuperscript{191} 498 U.S. 103 (1990).
\textsuperscript{192} 18 US.C. § 2314.
\textsuperscript{193} 498 U.S. at 119-20 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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Professor Eskridge has argued in support of his theory of *dynamic statutory interpretation*\(^{194}\) that even when linguistic change has not occurred, values reflected in judicial practice over time may take priority over the enacting legislature’s intent. Eskridge’s principal examples involve the civil rights laws, and especially cases concerning affirmative action. Although the Congress of 1964 that enacted the original federal Civil Rights Act could not be said as a body to favor affirmative action, the statute’s early enforcement history, Eskridge contends, made it appropriate to accept affirmative action as necessary to enforce the civil rights laws without creating perverse incentives that would actually thwart the integration of nonwhite workers into the work force.\(^{195}\) I will not repeat Eskridge’s arguments here other than to comment that he appears to be observationally correct that other values may trump intent in these cases.

For example, in *Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders [*“GLAD”*] v. Attorney General*,\(^{196}\) the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was asked by advocacy groups to declare that state’s sodomy statute\(^{197}\) unconstitutional. The court declined to do so, holding that the statute should be interpreted to ban only acts that are either public or nonconsensual, and none of the parties in the case before the court claimed to engage in such conduct. The decision was in harmony with an earlier decision of the same court, *Commonwealth v. Balthazar*,\(^{198}\) which held that criminal liability under statute banning “any unnatural and lascivious act with another person”\(^{199}\) should not apply to private, consensual behavior. There is no likelihood, however, that the enacting legislature in

\(^{194}\) See ESKRIDGE, supra note ___.

\(^{195}\) Id. at ___ (discussing United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).


\(^{197}\) MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 34 (2002).

\(^{198}\) 318 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1974).

\(^{199}\) MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 35 (2002).
1887 would have endorsed these decisions. Their justification must lie in aspects of today’s culture in which enforcement is sought. In other words, change has trumped intent.

The ultimate test of whether it is possible to dispense with legislative intent in favor of other principles is the one that John Marshall used in *Wiltberger*. Let us call this the “Marshall Test.”

*The Marshall Test*

For any given value proposed to replace legislative intent in the interpretation of a statute, that value supercedes legislative intent if a judge legitimately say:

“There are values more important than intent at stake here, so I am willing to undermine what I know to be the intent of the legislature in order to promote those competing values”

Marshall bluntly put fair notice into this category. Yet as far as I know, no other values stand up to the Marshall Test routinely, although many values become part of the mix of considerations that courts use in deciding cases, as Professor Eskridge has shown. For leniency, courts at least sometimes answer affirmatively. If the language of a statute does not criminalize particular conduct, courts are not likely to expand its scope even if the enacting legislature mistakenly wrote the statute too narrowly. Similarly, plain language arguments outside the context of leniency at times also survive the Marshall Test, even in the teeth of strong evidence that a mistake was made. Decisions in this realm vary, as discussed above. But it would be strange indeed for a court to say: “We know for certain that Congress intended to include expert fees in a fee-shifting statute, but our drive for

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201 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (taking literally a statutory deadline that requires filings “before” December 31, despite likelihood that Congress intended to set deadline as the end of the year).
coherence leads us to undermine that intent in favor of promoting coherence.” Coherence is not such a value, despite Justice Scalia’s rhetoric in *Casey*.\(^{202}\)

Of course many other values contribute to the interpretation of statutes. These are reflected in such principles as the presumption that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional problems and rules designed to preserve the traditional relationship between federal and state government. These principles do not substitute for intent either. Rather, they interact with intent, sometimes in novel ways.

Consider, for example, the rule that statutes are construed to avoid constitutional questions. This canon is often stated in intentionalist terms: The court assumes that the legislature did not intend to enact an unconstitutional statute, and therefore resolves difficulties in favor of a reading that survives constitutional challenge.\(^{203}\)

Contrast this approach with that of *NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago*,\(^ {204}\) in which the Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Act does not give religious school teachers the right to unionize. The Court set a high hurdle for the National Labor Relations Board to vault: Because application of the labor laws to religious school teachers could, on some future occasion, cause the courts to become enmeshed in questions of religious freedom, the Court required some “clear expression” of Congress that it intended to include this group. Otherwise, the Court would assume the group not to be included. Yet the argument was repeatedly stated in intentionalist terms:

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\(^{202}\) See supra note ___.

\(^{203}\) See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994 (“…we do not impute to Congress an intent to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as construed by this Court.”)).

\(^{204}\) See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
There is no clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered by the Act. Admittedly, Congress defined the Board's jurisdiction in very broad terms; we must therefore examine the legislative history of the Act to determine whether Congress contemplated that the grant of jurisdiction would include teachers in such schools.\textsuperscript{205}

In neither case did the Court claim that such values can survive the Marshall Test. That is, the Court did not say that the constitutional values are sufficiently important that the judiciary is willing to override the clear intention of the legislature. A court may at times do so surreptitiously, as Professor Eskridge argues was the case in \textit{Catholic Bishop},\textsuperscript{206} but the fact that it has chosen to speak in intentional terms even to mask its own agenda reveals its own recognition that legislative intent is an important consideration in its own right.

All of this shows not that legislative intent is the only approach to statutory interpretation, but rather that it is an indispensable part of any approach to statutory interpretation. Other values – important values – are surely part of the mix. But it is hard to see how a decision maker, absent some degree of dishonestly, can dispense with the concept altogether.

\section{V}

\textbf{The Status of the Legislative History Debate}

Whether legislative history is good evidence of legislative intent is another matter. Justice Scalia’s disapproval of courts relying on legislative history has two parts. The first is that legislative history can only be used to provide evidence for legislative intent,

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Id.} at 504.

\textsuperscript{206} See Eskridge, \textit{supra} note ___ at 1066-67, criticizing the Supreme Court for ignoring the will of Congress in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
and legislative intent is not a legitimate subject of inquiry to statutory interpreters, whose job it is to interpret laws, not intentions. The second prong of Scalia’s argument is that even if it is legitimate to speak of legislative intent, legislative history is a notoriously bad way to investigate intent. Although I have expressed strong disagreement with the first prong of the argument, the second prong presents questions that have not yet been adequately answered.

A. Constitutional Objections

Critics of legislative history point to exactly the kinds of examples I have presented to argue that this kind of focus subverts basic constitutional values. In a nuanced version of this critique, Professor Manning argues that when a court relies on what only a small group of members (perhaps as small as zero) puts into a committee report, it in essence has permitted Congress to delegate lawmaking authority to its own committees, which would be unconstitutional. The Constitution requires that the two houses of Congress pass a bill by majority vote before it can become law.

Professor Manning correctly rejects the stronger textualist argument that legislative history is illegitimate authority merely because it did not survive the legislative process. Lots of arguments that textualist judges make - from reliance on dictionaries to reliance on external historical circumstances - did not undergo votes in Congress. What is special about legislative history, Manning argues, is that it amounts to a small group of legislators controlling the interpretation of statutes. If a law were passed delegating all questions about interpretation of, say, USA Patriot Act, to the chair of a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, surely that delegation would be
unconstitutional. When courts rely upon legislative history, the argument continues, they are doing more or less the same thing.

Professor Jonathan Siegel has argued that Professor Manning is incorrect because the legislative history upon which courts rely is already in existence when Congress enacts a statute. Since Congress has the right to incorporate by reference into a law anything it wishes, there is nothing unconstitutional about reliance upon the pre-enactment historical record that was in place at the time a statute was enacted.

I agree with Siegel, in part for the reasons he presents, and in part for a separate reason. In his response to Siegel, Manning summarizes his earlier argument as follows: "In particular, I have argued that the Court's separation-of-powers case law powerfully undermines any approach to legislative history that generally treats it as authoritative." The key word is authoritative. The entire debate between Manning and Siegel is about authoritative texts. But the approach to group intent that I have espoused here does not rely on authoritative texts, apart from the statute, which gains its authority by virtue of having made its way through the legislative process. Everything else is just evidence, and what constitutes good evidence of intent will vary from statute to statute depending on the specifics of the enactment history. Sometimes, it may be a statement from an agency. Often, it will be a committee report. Sometimes the record will be such a mess that there may be no decent evidence, because no one can sort it out well enough to make convincing arguments.

Manning anticipates this objection to his proposal. In response, he argues that the only reason that committee reports and the like are good "evidence" is by virtue of their being authored by a subgroup within Congress as representing the intent of the
entire group. To the extent that the courts find such evidence of intent to be decisive, he argues, they have allowed the committee (or sponsor, or some other small group within Congress) to co-opt the process, at least with respect to how a statute should be applied in close cases.

It is appropriate to be concerned about a legal system that permits laws to be interpreted on the basis of statements of a small group with no official status to give authoritative interpretations. But Manning is incorrect in concluding that just because a committee report or sponsor's statement provides convincing evidence of intent that it is something other than evidence of intent. Convincing evidence and decisive evidence are still only evidence. What makes the evidence convincing is its relationship to what seems to be the reality of the legislative process. The worse the match, the less convincing the evidence, and the more subject to criticism courts should be for using it. But evidence is evidence and it should not be rejected out of hand because it is good evidence. Even proponents agree that courts may reject legislative history when they find it unconvincing, and they often do so.

Let us say that a dispute is not about the applicability of a statute, but rather about whether a corporation had a culpable state of mind when it engaged in some action, perhaps misstating the status of some new product in a prospectus for a public offering of stock. Available are various emails from senior officers and directors on the new product's progress. This information will constitute evidence of what the corporation knew at the time of disclosure. How good any such item of evidence is depends on such things as timing, the role that the author played in the disclosure process, the extent to which the language of the disclosure and the piece of evidence are consistent or
contradictory, and so on. By the same token, legislative history is evidence, with varying persuasive force depending on a host of circumstances.

For these reasons, what I have said thus far about treating the legislature as an individual may cause one to be concerned about questions of governance, but do not rise to the level of constitutional crisis. Perhaps the real concern should be that the legislative process works the way it does, with so many members voting on bills with which they are only barely familiar. Conceivably, our propensity to view a deliberative group as a single entity with a mind of its own makes it too easy to see this process as natural.

B. Even if Legislative Intent is Important, Is History “Good Evidence” of Intent?

Much of the debate about legislative history focuses on the question of how good a window into legislative intent it really is once we accept that legislative intent is a legitimate inquiry in the first place. Opponents, focusing largely on cases in which courts appear to pick and choose snippets of the Congressional Record to make a point, argue that it is not reliable at all.

It is very difficult to assess this argument. For the most part, I do not believe it to be very important, despite all the attention it has received in both the case law and the scholarly literature. How often does a dissenting or concurring opinion, or a well-researched law review article show that judges actually misuse legislative history in a way that seriously threatens a legal system based on decent legal values? It happens, but not very often. For example, Scalia’s remarks in his concurring opinion in *Conroy v. Aniskoff*, discussed above, appear to demonstrate that the majority did a sloppy job in selecting snippets of legislative history. Scalia’s point strikes me as valid. Since the

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statute was clear on its face, and the historical research shoddy, perhaps the research should not have been reported as part of the basis of the decision. Yet the history was used only to confirm the decision based on the statute’s language. Scalia concurred.

On the other side of the equation, just how often is legislative history demonstrably useful? Of those cases, how often does it do enough good to justify the cost of finding it in those cases, as weighed against the cases in which its misuse leads courts astray? To the best of my knowledge, no one has investigated these questions systematically. In a recent article, Professor Eskridge has called for research into these kinds of issues.208 I agree with him. That is the only way to separate the facts from the ideologically-based biases, which are often asserted with no serious empirical foundation, other than arguments about one case or another that aroused the ire of a commentator.

In just this context, an exciting debate has developed over whether legislative history was misused by the Supreme Court in *Holy Trinity Church v. United States*,209 probably the first Supreme Court case in which legislative history trumped the language of the statute. A statute made it illegal “in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation .. of [an] alien ... to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States.” Did that make it illegal for a church to pay the transportation of its minister from England to New York? A lower court had said yes. The Supreme Court reversed, based on a number of arguments concerning the intent of Congress. Some were linguistic: Although the church’s acts fell within the plain meaning of the statute, “[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,

208 Eskridge, supra note ___ at ___.
209 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”\textsuperscript{210} Other arguments involved inferences of intent from the statute’s substance. The Court inferred that Congress, respecting the United States as a Christian nation, would never have intended to impede the practice of religion, with the possibility of creating a First Amendment violation.

More central for our purposes, the Court also relied on a committee report that suggested that Congress intended the statute to apply to manual labor, but would not have time to make the language more precise before recessing for the term.\textsuperscript{211} A recent article by Adrian Vermuele, who reviewed the entire legislative history surrounding the enactment of the statute at issue in that case, argues that the Court got it wrong.\textsuperscript{212} Vermuele argues further that the work it takes to learn the full history and the likelihood of error from picking and choosing make legislative history an unreliable source. In response, Carol Chomsky has written an article defending the use of legislative history in \textit{Holy Trinity Church}.\textsuperscript{213} She suggests that when the enactment history and social context are taken together, the Court’s decision is vindicated. She further claims that this sort of investigation is necessary if the interpreter wishes to base a decision on a full understanding of the context in which the statute was enacted.

Controversy over the use of legislative history is most stark when there is no serious debate over whether the history was strategically culled to create a false impression, and the historical analysis suggests that the legislature did not want the statute to apply as a reading the language of the statute would seem to demand. The issue

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{210} \textit{Id.} at 458, 459.
\item \textsuperscript{211} \textit{Id.} at ___.
\item \textsuperscript{212} Vermuele, \textit{supra} note ___.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Carol Chomsky, \textit{Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation}, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000).
\end{itemize}
arises most often when the history is at odds with the ordinary meaning of a statute’s words, as happened in *Chisom v. Roemer*\(^{214}\) and *Brown & Williamson*,\(^{215}\) discussed in the previous section. In both of those cases, the Court chose to look at extrinsic evidence of legislative intent, which ultimately trumped the most natural reading that the statute would have without the additional context.

The analysis presented here suggests that as a default position courts should indeed take legislative intent into account, and then make a decision as to whether evidence of legislative intent that contradicts the way in which most people would understand the statute as written should be given priority over the language itself. If even plain language is by and large only evidence of communicative intent, albeit privileged evidence, then this is really the only conclusion to reach. In this way, both rule of law values and the intent of the legislature are given weight. As for legislative history as evidence of legislative intent, evidentiary issues will always remain. When is it the best evidence? When is it supportive, but equivocal? How much weight a court should give to each type of evidence will depend on the facts of the case and the political orientation of the judge. That cannot be helped.

In most cases, the language of the statute does lead to the conclusion that only one interpretation is possible. Consider *United States v. Jefferson,*\(^{216}\) a recent case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. A statute made it illegal to “sell or otherwise dispose of” a firearm to a known felon.\(^{217}\) The defendant was convicted of violating this statute after buying two guns and giving one to his brother, a convicted

\(^{216}\) United States v. Jefferson, 344 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2003).
felon, temporarily for safe keeping. The question was whether this transfer should count as “disposing of” the gun under the statute. The language would support, but not require a finding that the defendant violated the statute. In affirming the conviction, the Seventh Circuit held:

Although we must keep in mind that ambiguity in criminal statutes should generally be resolved in favor of lenity, this maxim must of course yield to the paramount consideration—to follow congressional intent. Here, our best evidence of congressional intent is the legislative history cited above, which indicates that Congress wanted to broaden the reach of the gun control statute to cover a wider range of firearms transfers.218

The court in Jefferson probably overstated its position. Assume that the statute, instead of saying “dispose of” said “transfers permanently,” or some such thing. Assume further that the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended the statute to reach far beyond the statutory words, to cases like this one. I know of no judge that would permit the intent of the legislature to criminalize conduct clearly outside the scope of any reasonable interpretation of the statute. Due process values set limits on the extent to which extrinsic evidence of intent can trump the intent indicated in the statute itself.219 But this does not mean that intent is irrelevant to statutory interpretation or that legislative history cannot be credible evidence of intent. It means only that a host of substantive considerations play a role in determining the weight that each type of evidence should be given in each case. Obviously, there is likely to be disagreement over the weightings.

When legal values conflict, choices always have to be made. Sometimes, these choices will be result-oriented, as Radin suggested 75 years ago, and as these cases

218 334 F.3d at 675 (citation omitted).
219 Elsewhere, I refer to this as “the linguistic wall.” Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity supra note ___. Peter Tiersma makes a similar point. See Tiersma, supra note ___.

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strongly imply. Furthermore, some will ordinarily give more weight to one value than to
the other, as a matter of political values and cognitive style. But, as I hope to have
shown, it is very hard indeed to find a judge that can consistently claim to eschew intent
as a value, and no judge that I know of would even try to eschew plain language as a
leading consideration in statutory interpretation.

VI

Conclusion

I have argued that it is both natural and sensible to talk about the intent of a group,
especially a group that makes decisions together, through deliberation. I have argued
further that the distinction between the language of a statute and the intent of the
legislature is largely a false one. All we can do when we interpret language is to hope
that we have absorbed whatever a speaker or writer has intended to convey. If intent is
basically all that interpretation is about, then there is no point in positing rules pretending
to avoid it. As I hope to have shown, even those who try to avoid intent talk do not
always succeed, and often use intent as the rationale for rules that they claim to be
alternative approaches to interpretation.

This does not mean, however, that the language of a statute does not count for
much. Nor does it create an open season for those who would like to see courts create
policy without regard to what the legislature wrote. For one thing, with respect to every
statute, an overriding aspect of the intent of the legislature was to write a law of general
application. It is no accident that each federal statute is given a “Public Law” number.
For this reason and because, as textualists point out, laws must be enacted pursuant to a
set of rigid constitutional procedures, courts (and others) construing statutes should clearly give disproportionate weight to the statute’s language. And they do.

Nor does this mean that intent should automatically trump other values, such as coherence and fair notice, when these values are espoused for their own sake. It may well be, for example, that the rule of lenity should be applied in some cases regardless of whether the enacting legislature would have wanted a statute to be applied more broadly. But this does not make intent irrelevant to interpretation. Rather, it makes intent one of a number of competing values, which may be given different weights in different cases.

Questions of intent arise when a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, when it appears that the legislature has made a mistake, or when the statute is written in terms broad enough to capture situations that the legislature would almost certainly have thought to be outside the statute’s proper scope. When a statute is ambiguous, the situation is unavoidable. When there is an error, or when the statute’s reach is arguably excessive, it is possible for courts to wash their hands of the problem and to apply the statute literally, although our legal tradition has, quite appropriately in my opinion, permitted courts to address these problems substantively. When the problems reach the level of absurdity, all judges, even textualist ones, agree that judicial intervention into the legislative process should occur. This makes intentionalists of us all.

How should courts determine intent? Many principles of interpretation espoused by those who eschew legislative intent as a legitimate inquiry are rules of thumb that the

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220 See Lamie v. United States Trustee, ___ U.S. ___, 2004 US LEXIS 824 (2004)(interpreting § 330(a) of Bankruptcy Code literally despite obvious drafting error); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985)(taking literally a statutory deadline that requires filings “before” December 31, despite likelihood that Congress intended to set deadline as the end of the year).
proponents justify as good proxies of intent. Among them are the ordinary meaning rule, the plain language rule and the rule that statutes be construed to maximize coherence within the code. Interpreters also reasonably presume that legislators have in mind a number of noncontroversial background principles when they interpret statutes.\(^{221}\) As for legislative history, the only legitimate question is the quality of the evidence it provides. Thus far there has been more rhetoric than evidence that the use of legislative history in as evidence of intent has done our system great harm. Serious empirical investigation, as Professor Eskridge suggests, is clearly in order.

None of this seems very radical to me, although there is clearly room for disagreement about what weight to give each of these factors in an individual case. Moreover, the situation gets no better if we decide to avoid speaking of intent. We will still need to find principles upon which a court should rely. Most of these are now stated in intentionalist terms, even by textualists. We can begin to state some of these instead as rules by which courts should interpret statutes for the sake of making the law better, but that would reduce the role of the legislature in the lawmaking process without adding any certainty to the system. For example, adjusting the quest for coherence so that it is no longer stated intentionally will do nothing to rid us of the task of determining in which cases this principle should apply, and how much weight to give it when it does apply. The same holds true for other interpretive rules of thumb.

We understand our world by conjecturing about the intent of others. Will the world really collapse if our judges remain human too?

\(^{221}\) Siegel, *Drafting Errors*, *supra* note ___, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 348-49.