Deriving Obligatorily Reflexive Applicatives

1 Overview I propose that the existence of Obligatorily Reflexive Applicatives (ORAs), a semantically heterogeneous class of constructions across various languages, follows from a constrained theory of argument introducing heads and the features of reflexive pronouns. ORAs are then no longer a problem for theories of argument structure, but instead follow from the basic primitives of the theory.

2 The Phenomenon Various languages have applicative constructions where the dative must be coreferent with the subject in SpecVoiceP. In Southern American English (SoAmE), we find “Personal Datives” (PDs) which look like ordinary pronouns, but which in fact behave syntactically like “SE reflexives,” as persuasively argued by Conroy (2007).

(1) \textit{He} needs \{\textit{him}/*me\} a new truck.
(Southern American English; Horn 2013)

In Romance languages like Italian, a reflexive clitic may be added to so-called “ingestive” predicates like ‘eat’, ‘drink’ and ‘smoke’; non-reflexive clitics are not possible.

(2) \textit{Lui} \{\textit{si} /*mi /*ti \} mangia una pizza.
\textit{he} \{\textit{refl}/*me} Dat/*you} Dat\} eats a pizza
\textit{He eats a pizza.}
(Italian; Campanini & Schäfer 2011)

In Icelandic, benefactive dative pronouns for many predicates must be reflexive.

(3) \textit{Hann} prjónaði \{sér /*mér /*pér \} nýja peysu.
\textit{he.NOM} knitted \{\textit{refl}/*me} Dat/*you} Dat\} new sweater
\textit{He knitted himself a new sweater.}
(Icelandic; Tungseth 2007)

3 Previous Analyses All of these constructions have been analyzed as involving a kind of Low Applicative (\textit{Appl}) head (Pylkkänen 2002) (see Campanini & Schäfer 2011 for Italian, Hutchinson & Armstrong 2014 for SoAmE, and Wood 2015 for Icelandic).

(4) \[\text{Voice}_{\text{SUBJ}} \text{voice} \left[\text{VP} \text{VERB} \left[\text{Appl}_{\text{REFL appl direct-object}}\right]\right]\]

Although the ORAs share a consistent syntactic signature, their semantics vary across languages. Thus, Hutchinson & Armstrong 2014 propose that the SoAmE \textit{Appl} is “satisfactive” and involves the semantics in (5); Campanini & Schäfer 2011 propose \textit{Appl}_{\text{INTO}} for Italian, with the semantics in (6) (since the theme of ingestive verbs like ‘eat’ go “into” the subject); Wood 2015 argues for a low \textit{Appl} analysis of Icelandic with benefactive semantics as in (7). (See Wood 2015:216-20 for how (7) is compatible semantically with a low \textit{Appl} structure.)

(5) \textit{[Appl}_{\text{INTO}}] = \lambda x \lambda y \lambda f \exists e. f(x,e) & THEME(e,x) & INTO(x,y)

(6) \textit{[Appl}_{\text{DAT}}] = \lambda x \lambda y \lambda f \exists e. f(x,e) & THEME(e,x) : MATTERS-TO(x,y) & SATISFIED-THROUGH(f,y)

(7) \textit{[Appl}_{\text{BEN}}] = \lambda x \lambda e. BENEFICIARY(x,e)

For present purposes, we set aside the question of whether these exact semantic denotations are correct. What is important now is that the semantics of ORA constructions across languages can be quite different; the literature on these constructions points strongly to this conclusion. Given that, it is highly unlikely that ORAs are obligatorily reflexive because of something in the semantics. This is particularly the case with the Icelandic benefactives, since there is no semantic reason that a benefactive construction should be obligatorily reflexive (see also Bosse et al. 2012:1223). What is called for is a formal explanation for the existence of this construction type, independently of the semantics it gets in a particular language/dialect. See Marantz 2013:164, Wood & Marantz 2014 and Myler 2014 for discussion of how the same structures in different languages can be co-opted for distinct semantic means.\footnote{I thus want to be crystal clear that the point of the present proposal is to derive the existence of these constructions in the syntax; this \textit{must} be paired with a theory for how they are interpreted. Such a theory cannot be presented in the same talk, but I will include an appendix with some remarks; see references above for general discussion.}
4 Specifierless Argument Introducers Recent work has suggested that argument introducers such as Appl, Voice, p, etc., come in two syntactic “flavors”: one flavor has a D-feature requiring a specifier of category D (e.g. Appl$_{(3)}$), and the other has no such feature and does not license a specifier of category D (Appl$_{(1)}$) (Myler 2014; Kastner 2014; Schäfer 2015; Wood 2015). The latter kind of head is thought to be unable to introduce a syntactic argument, but it can introduce semantics that affect the interpretation of the overall structure. For example, Wood & Sigurðsson 2014 propose that the agentive reading of “recipient get” illustrated in (8) involves the structure in (9).

(8) John got the new Harry Potter book (deliberately) (just to annoy me).

(9) Appl$_{(1)}$ Voice$_{(DJ)}$ [vP got [Appl$_{(1)}$ the book]]

In (9), Appl$_{(1)}$ may take no specifier, but may introduce a RECIPIENT role semantically. Since there is no specifier to saturate that role, however, it remains open in the semantic composition. Voice$_{(DJ)}$ syntactically introduces a specifier of category D (John, in this case) and semantically introduces an AGENT role. Since the RECIPIENT role is still unsaturated, however, Voice$_{(DJ)}$ combines semantically with its vP complement by Predicate Conjunction (Krater 2009), with the consequence that John saturates both the AGENT role and the RECIPIENT role. This derives the intuition that in sentences like (8), John is both an intentional agent and a recipient of the theme. This kind of derivation has been applied to various other kinds of constructions, including Figure Reflexives (Wood 2014), predicate possession (Myler 2014), ingestives (Wood 2015), and natural reflexives (Schäfer 2015). The point here is that the theory of argument introducers at present includes a set of argument introducing heads which have no D-feature, and these heads do real, independent work in the theory. I will now propose that this development also provides an explanation for the existence of ORAs, something that has gone unnoticed in the literature so far (though a similar idea is expressed in Cuervo 2003, who proposes a specifierless Appl that is always realized as a reflexive clitic).

5 Deriving ORAs The assumption in the literature so far has been that heads like Appl$_{(1)}$ cannot merge an argument specifier because they lack the D-feature that licenses such as specifier. The system leaves open the possibility that such a head could merge with an argument that also lacks a D-feature. I propose that SE reflexives are of exactly this type; they consist solely of ϕ-features. Following Schäfer 2015 (and work cited therein), they are unvalued ϕ-features, which probe upward to Agree with an antecedent (see Wurmbrand 2013 on upward probing). Given that we have argument introducers that have no D-feature, and that a bundle of unvalued ϕ-features, with no D-feature, may be realized as a SE reflexive, we predict the existence of constructions where an indirect object must be reflexive.

(10) Voice$_{(p)}$ SUBJ$_{(6;3sg)}$ Voice$_{(DJ)}$ [vP get [Appl$_{(5)}$ uφ:3sg]] [Appl$_{(1)}$ OBJ]]] $\Rightarrow$ Agree

Following Kayne 2010, in languages with SE reflexives, realize it is the reflexive pronoun, and not the referential 3rd person pronoun, that realizes purely 3rd person features: referential pronouns like he/she/it contain other features, such as gender and deixis. Thus, Italian realizes (10) with the reflexive clitic si and Icelandic with the simplex reflexive pronoun sé. If Conroy 2007 and Hutchinson & Armstrong 2014 are correct, SoAmE (1) realizes the SE reflexive with a form identical to the 3rd person pronoun. This makes sense when one considers that SE reflexives are generality morphological subparts of complex reflexives with a ‘self’ morpheme (cf. Icelandic sjálfov sé ‘self REFL’). The existence of ORAs do not have to be stipulated as a special kind of construction (pace Webelhuth & Dannenberg 2006), but instead follow from the primitives of an independently supported theory of argument introduction theory.